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Abstract 
The central concern of this thesis is the examination of individual agents’ moral responsibilities 
in large-scale social structures. I begin with a discussion of the emergence of social structural 
harm and the history of the collective responsibility debate. I suggest that previous attempts to 
make accurate responsibility ascriptions in cases of social structural harm have fallen short, 
leaving responsibility for the harm caused underdetermined. Arguing that collectivist approaches 
to large-scale harms are inadequate, because those participating in social structures cannot satisfy 
the criteria for responsibility-bearing groups required by these accounts, I turn to an attempt to 
provide an individualist account of responsibility in these cases presented by Young. I argue that 
there are many interesting ideas in her work that support an account of collective responsibility 
for social structures, but that her specific attempt to develop a new kind of non-moral 
responsibility ultimately fails. I therefore examine an alternative account of joint responsibility 
based on agent motivation and attitude presented by Bjornsson, who focusses on the reasons why 
agents become involved and complicit in collective harms. Through the further development of 
Bjornsson’s discussion of the importance of agent motivation and participation in harmful 
practices, and Young’s analysis of the relationship between individual agents and social 
structures, I suggest an alternative approach to analysing social structural harm: expanded 
individualism. To support this account, I analyse the ways in which agents come to be involved 
in these harms in a blameworthy manner, and the reasons why participation makes individuals 
responsible for addressing the harms caused by the social structures in which they participate.  
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1: Individual Responsibility in Collective Contexts 
1.1 Introduction 
In what way are we responsible for harms that we have collectively brought about with 
many other agents? The debate over collective responsibility has overwhelmingly concentrated 
on the possibility of group agency and group structure. However, many of the most pressing 
harms in the world today are the product of large-scale coordinated human interactions performed 
by agents participating in quite different types of groups from those usually discussed. This leaves 
current debate unable to adequately account for some of the most wide-spread and devastating 
harms we currently face. The aim of this work is to develop an account of collective responsibility 
that incorporates these large-scale non-standard group harms.  
In order to discuss these harms, in this introduction I shall offer an outline of the nature 
of large-scale harms, their emergence, and how they fit into the collective responsibility debate. 
I argue throughout that large-scale harms are difficult to incorporate into traditional responsibility 
models and most of the collective responsibility models currently found in the literature. I begin 
with a brief contrast between more traditional concerns regarding collective responsibility and 
contemporary large-scale harms. In the next section I discuss the emergence of large-scale harms 
as a distinct form of collective harm that does not fit into group-orientated forms of collective 
responsibility due to the nature of the relationships between participating agents. In section 3 I 
discuss the problem of collective responsibility and of holding groups responsible, outlining the 
two main positions that have been taken in the debate so far, before outlining the history of the 
collective responsibility debate in section 4. I highlight the ways in which large-scale harms 
cannot be incorporated into either of the main accounts of collective responsibility. The 
introduction concludes with an outline of the thesis, detailing the way in which I aim to develop 
an account of responsibility for large scale harms which is ultimately individualist, but that takes 
an expanded view of the responsibility agents bear for their participation in large-scale harms. 
Over the last century, globalisation has changed the way societies are organised and the 
way that people live their lives. Our lives are increasingly complicated and the interactions and 
interdependence we have with, often distant, others continues to increase. Along with this 
increased interaction comes wider impact, with the effects of social, economic, and political 
changes in the developed world having global implications. In a time when most individuals are 
contributing to a variety of collective harms through their participation in these social institutions 
every day, answering this question of responsibility for collective harms is more important than 
ever before.  
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Traditionally, moral responsibility was largely seen as a matter concerning individual 
agents and the specific harms or benefits each individual causes. Whilst there has been an increase 
in interest regarding collective responsibility over the last seventy years, much of this revolves 
around the problem of highly organised groups with easily identifiable members. This approach 
leads to an emphasis on analysing group agency and group member interactions in an attempt to 
establish grounds on which to treat groups as moral agents and therefore as capable of bearing 
moral responsibility. However, many contemporary collective harms are the result of much bigger 
groups of agents participating in large-scale social institutions, processes, and practices, what 
Young refers to as ‘social structures’. 1 These are organised ways of coordinating agent interaction 
that facilitate extended agency and allow agents to pursue their goals through structured social 
interactions. Social structures can be economic, political, or social, can vary in levels of 
organisation, but are all ways in which large numbers of agents are able to participate in large-
scale social structural groups. Such groups do not fit well within the established framework of the 
collective responsibility debate. 
The kind of groups involved in many contemporary large-scale harms are not the highly 
organised tight knit groups that are the usual focus of collective responsibility theories. Nor are 
they merely random sets of individuals all acting independently in isolation; agents act and 
interact in structured ways through participation in social structures. These institutions and 
processes that underpin social structures allow for the coordinated interactions of vast numbers 
of people in social, economic, and political exchanges. Social structures have their own sets of 
rules, procedures, customs, and traditions. Participants engage with others in social structures 
through established methods of interaction. For example, people participate in democratic 
government through voting, and people participate in economic institutions through the exchange 
of money for goods and services. There are specific interactions that need to take place in order 
for an agent to vote or buy goods, high levels of organisation and coordination, as well as a wide 
acceptance and knowledge of established methods of participation, are required for these social 
and economic structures to function. 
The individuals participating in these structures may not even be aware that they are 
involved in any such institutions, and not identify themselves as members of any group. Although 
some members of these structures have organisational and decision making roles, many may not 
be directly involved in any decision making processes. Social structures need not have a specific 
goal and participants need not have any shared intentions. All of these characteristics exclude 
social structures from the kind of group analysis commonly involved in discussion of collective 
                                                        
1 Iris Marion Young Responsibility for Justice, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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responsibility. This leaves these large-scale harms stranded between the two main approaches to 
collective responsibility. The harms are not simply individualistic; when considered individually, 
agents may make such small contributions to these harms that their input appears insignificant. 
Neither are they collective in the collectivist sense, the social structures are not necessarily 
traditional groups with clearly defined aims, decision-making procedures, or any of the other 
defining characteristics put forward by collectivists.  
 
1.2 The Emergence of Large Scale Multi-Agent Harms 
Over a billion people are currently believed to be living in extreme poverty,2 air pollution 
caused an estimated 3.7 million premature deaths in 2012,3 and global warming is estimated to be 
costing at least 140,000 lives a year, rising to 250,000 annually by 2030.4 Whilst such statistics 
are deeply troubling, they are not necessarily thought to be the subject of collective responsibility, 
particularly not any kind of moral responsibility. Sometimes they are put down to bad luck, or 
thought to be the responsibility of small groups of powerful and influential individuals, or the 
personal responsibilities of those affected. Far less frequently is it suggested that these harms are 
the result of large-scale social structures in which most individuals participate on some level. The 
circumstances that lead to these harms, however, are often not the result of random acts of bad 
luck, or the acts of an isolated few, but rather are a consequence of wider social, economic, and 
political practices that constitute the framework of most people’s lives. 
The idea that these harms are the responsibility of a great many people is widely rejected.5 
Claims of over-demandingness, of a lack of connection between agents and the harms, or the 
responsibility lying with other specific agents or groups, such as corporations or governments, 
make this position seem untenable.6 In order to hold an agent responsible we usually insist that 
there be some clear and relevant link between that individual and the harm caused. Claiming that 
                                                        
2 ‘Ending Poverty and Sharing Prosperity: Global Monitoring Report 2014/2015’, World Bank, 
<http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/gmr/gmr2014/GMR_2014_Full_Report.pdf>, xi. 
3 ‘Ambient (outdoor) air quality and health’, World Health Organisation Fact Sheet No 313 (2014), 
<http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs313/en/>. 
4 ‘Climate change and health’, World Health Organisation Fact Sheet No 266 (2014), <http://www.who.int/ 
mediacentre/factsheets/fs266/en/>. 
5 Even those who accept collective responsibility often deny that harms such as global warming and global poverty 
could be collective. See Christopher Kutz, Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age, (Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge, 2007) chapter 6; Tracy Isaacs, Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011) chapter 5. 
6 See Garrett Cullity, The Moral Demands of Affluence, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); David Miller, 
National Responsibility and Global Justice, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) chapter 9 and ‘Collective 
Responsibility and Global Poverty’, Ethical Perspectives, 19 (2012) 627-648; Samuel Scheffler, Boundaries and 
Allegiances, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); and John Kekes, ‘On the Supposed Obligation to Relieve 
Famine’, Philosophy, (2002), 503-517. 
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individuals are responsible in any way for harms that they have not caused either directly or 
indirectly, nor through act or omission, is argued to be unreasonable and unfair. No individuals 
cause these harms, so, it is argued, none are responsible for them. Maintaining this divide between 
responsibility ascriptions for large-scale harms and their contributing agents leaves us with a gap 
in our explanation as to how these harms come about and who bears responsibility for them.  
Identifying large-scale harms and the actions which contribute to them is in many cases 
quite straightforward. The difficulty lies in trying to identify the exact harm that any particular 
agent or group has caused. The specific relationships involved between individual agents and 
wider social processes are complex, individual contributing acts can appear insignificant. It is 
only when these acts are considered as part of a wider social process that we can identify that 
individual actions contribute to large-scale harms.  
Once actions are contextualised in this way, it becomes much easier to recognise 
relationships between social institutions and harms. For example, affluent societies’ demands for 
cheap goods have profound effects on the economies of less developed countries as well as the 
environment.7 As companies compete to provide goods at the cheapest price, there is an increased 
use of cheap labour, where individuals are employed in low paid, unsafe jobs, often for extremely 
long hours in awful conditions. Despite knowledge of the working conditions in sweatshops 
consumers continue to purchase products manufactured in this way, providing companies with 
little incentive to change their processes. This link between consumer demands and producer and 
environmental harms is clearly identifiable, and in many cases readily predictable. When it is 
established that a harm is attributable to the organised, coordinated actions of multiple agents, 
often interacting on a large scale across national boundaries, suggestions that these harms are a 
matter of luck, or only the responsibility of a select few, are harder to justify.  
Large-scale multi agent harms can be quite varied. Some widely recognised examples 
include reliance on sweatshops in the global fashion industry and the increase in global warming 
due to the use of fossil fuels. Neither of these problems are the result of random or uncoordinated 
actions. The design, manufacture and distribution of clothes, and the drilling, processing, and 
distribution of fossil fuels both require a high degree of cooperation and organisation between 
large numbers of individuals around the world. The effects that these processes have on people 
and the environment are foreseeable. Although harms like environmental damage could in theory 
                                                        
7 See Andrew Brooks, Clothing Poverty: The Hidden World of Fast Fashion and Second-hand Clothes, (London: Zed 
Books, 2015) for a discussion of the effect of the fashion industry on developing countries and Emma Seery and Ana 
Caistor Arendar, ‘Even it Up: Time to end extreme inequality’, Oxfam International Campaign Report (2014), < 
http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/even-it-up-time-to-end-extreme-inequality-333012> for a report on 
the problem of the effects of extreme inequality on developing countries. 
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be caused by other sources, there is an almost universal agreement that current climate change is 
caused by the wide-spread use of fossil fuels. These are fuels that almost everyone uses either 
directly or indirectly in their daily lives, without duress, and with knowledge of their effects on 
the environment. A similar explanation can be provided of most people’s use of sweatshop 
produced items. In both cases the harms result from the coordinated actions and participation of 
huge numbers of agents around the world, rather than from the isolated, independent actions of 
individuals or small-scale traditional groups. 
The individuals who make up the participants in large-scale social structural harms do 
not fit any of the standard criteria for groups as presented in the collective responsibility debate. 
Denying their group status, however, still leaves us with the problem of explaining what these 
collections of people are if not groups. They are not random sets, the relationships involved can 
be identified, explained, and predicted. Their actions are not isolated nor independent, in many 
cases the organisation required to maintain such complex social structures is vast. But those 
involved are not necessarily united around a common goal or shared intention. Many individuals 
participate in order to better pursue their own goals, without thought to the nature of the wider 
process of which they are a part. This lack of cohesion or shared sense of membership causes 
problems in terms of analysing responsibilities of participants. Questions may be raised about the 
knowledge or awareness of participants, or how voluntary their participation is, but these do not 
detract from the fact that these large-scale harms are collective, despite not fitting the standard 
definitions of groups that can be found in collective responsibility literature.  
When we have such an established set of criteria for groups and group agency, and so 
much discussion regarding their status and the possibility of agency, it may be wondered why 
these looser collections of agents warrant special consideration. Social structures require more 
attention than they have been given up until now because of the huge role they play in people’s 
lives and the effect they have on both people and the environment. Some of the biggest and most 
well-established social structures have become ubiquitous. Their normalisation into society has 
led to people viewing them as naturally occurring and beyond the influence of agents, like forces 
of nature.8 This leads to a lack of motivation or awareness to address the harms caused by these 
structures. When people view a process and its consequences for others and the environment as a 
matter of luck, they are not motivated to address the process itself. That the majority of agents do 
not seem to think that such social structures are their responsibility or concern is problematic, not 
least because most agents are perpetuating the existence of these structures and contributing to 
the harm they cause. Whilst this continues to be the status quo, social structures will continue to 
                                                        
8 Young, Responsibility, p. 40. 
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cause a great deal of harm in the world without any agents taking responsibility for their part in 
this harm. 
 
1.3 The Problem of Collective Responsibility 
The problem of collective responsibility rises from the question of how to analyse 
situations where a group, rather than an individual, has brought about a state of affairs. The main 
area of interest is cases in which determining the individual effect of the contributing actions of 
group members cannot necessarily be measured or identified. Sometimes it seems to make sense 
to say that a group did something rather than the individuals involved. We may say that the team 
won the football match, that the club went bust, or that the company polluted the river. Each 
statement is intelligible, and we refer to groups in this way regularly. In each case, it can be asked 
whether the group in question is responsible, the members, or both. The problem is how we 
analyse who, or what, is responsible in these group situations. 
The collective responsibility debate has for the most part focussed on establishing 
whether or not a group of agents can be held responsible in the same way as an individual agent. 
This involves analysing whether or not a group can meet the criteria we usually set for agency. 
Although these criteria are the subject of ongoing debate, generally an agent is thought to need to 
be able to have interests, form intentions, make decisions, and act on these. The approach of many 
engaging in the collective responsibility debate is then to argue as to the circumstances that groups 
may be said to meet these criteria, or argue why such criteria can only be applied to individual 
agents. Part of the reason for the narrow line of discussion stems from widely held conceptions 
of the relationship between agency and responsibility. If, as is often argued, only agents can be 
held responsible in a moral or legal sense, then for a group to be responsible it needs to satisfy 
the criteria for agency. The two main positions in to which responses to this problem fall are 
individualism and collectivism. Individualist accounts argue that all responsibility can be reduced 
to responsibility of individual agents, and that groups qua groups cannot be the bearers of 
responsibility in any robust sense. Collectivists, on the other hand, argue that under certain 
conditions groups are the appropriate bearers of responsibility.   
We may hold agents and non-agents causally responsible for something, but this kind of 
responsibility is not the central concern of collective responsibility. Downie, for example, has 
argued that if groups are responsible, it can only be in the same way that non-agents can also be 
causally responsible.9 A group’s actions can result in a harm, but it is argued there is no agent 
                                                        
9 R. S. Downie, ‘Collective Responsibility’, Philosophy, 44 (1969), 66-69. 
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involved which we can hold accountable for the harm, in the same way that we cannot hold the 
weather accountable for rain that causes a flood.  The question we are most interested in when 
discussing cases of collective responsibility is that of holding agents or groups responsible, and 
associated questions of blame, praise, duty, and obligations that come along with bearing these 
kinds of responsibilities.10 Therefore, when people who argue against group agency suggest that 
groups can only bear causal responsibility11, and not responsibility in any blameworthy sense, 
supporters of collective responsibility find this position inadequate.  Collectivists, and some 
individualists, argue that this response to collective responsibility underestimates the role of 
groups and agent interaction on individual responsibility.12 
 
1.4 The History of the Collective Responsibility Debate 
The idea of collective responsibility is not a new one. Problems of common, shared, and 
collectively held responsibility have been discussed since Aristotle, who observed a problem that 
continues to the present day, that ‘what is common to the greatest number has the least care 
bestowed upon it’.13 However, discussion of collective responsibility became increasingly 
common in the years following the Second World War, particularly in the work of Karl Jaspers14 
and Hannah Arendt15. The main question they were discussing was whether a nation could be held 
collectively responsible, particularly whether the whole of Germany was responsible for the 
horrors of the Holocaust. The emergence of harms on such a huge scale, in which so many people 
were involved, raised concerns for more traditional approaches to responsibility. Although few 
agents were directly involved in acts of violence and murder, many were indirectly involved, 
supported such acts, or turned a blind eye. It was argued that in order for the kinds of large-scale 
harms that were perpetrated in Germany to come about, the majority of citizens needed to support 
these at least passively, otherwise such wide-spread harms would be impossible to achieve. The 
                                                        
10 Antony Duff, ‘Legal and Moral Responsibility’, Philosophical Compass, 4/6 (2009), 978-986, (p. 980) discusses the 
way in which responsibility can be understood in terms of answerability, “we attribute an action or event to the person 
as its author, and request (or demand) that she answer for it.”. This does not entail that we must also blame an agent 
for their action, they may have an excuse that exculpates them, but without an adequate excuse we will still hold an 
agent answerable regarding restitution for their role in bringing about the harm. 
11  On this account, a group can be cited in the explanation of the way in which a particular state of affairs came about, 
that the team won the match for example, but that this simply an abbreviated way of outlining the chain of events which 
led to the particular state of affairs. 
12 Individualists including Young and May, and collectivists such as Gilbert and Bratman have all discussed the problem 
of denying group responsibility and underestimating the effect of groups on individual responsibility. 
13 Aristotle, The Politics, trans. T. A Sinclair, (London: Penguin Books, 1992). 
14 Karl Jaspers, The Question of German Guilt, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000). 
15 Hannah Arendt produced several works on this topic, particularly Responsibility and Judgment, ed. by Jerome Kohn, 
(New York: Schocken, 2003) and ‘Organised Guilt and Universal Responsibility’, in Collective Responsibility: Five 
Decades of Debate in Theoretical and Applied Ethics, ed. by Larry May and Stacey Hoffman (Savage, Md: Rowman 
and Littlefield, 1991) pp. 273-283. 
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discussion of whether whole nations could be held responsible, what the relationship was between 
members and groups, and the relationship between individual and collective responsibility has 
continued over the last seventy years, though the focus has shifted between discussion of groups 
such as States and smaller, more unified groups.  
As the debate progressed into the 1980s, more attention fell on the responsibilities of 
corporations and other organisations. Peter French’s account of collective responsibility in the 
form of corporations as moral agents, the decision-making capacities of highly organised groups, 
and the goals and intensions of these kinds of corporations came under much analysis. If a group 
could develop interests and intensions, display a complex decision making process, and survive 
changes in membership but retain these characteristics, then it was argued that such groups satisfy 
the criteria for agency.16 Whilst this type of collectivism restricts the number and types of groups 
which are able to bear responsibility, it does manage to maintain the link between agency and 
responsibility. 
Arguing against this narrow account of collective responsibility, Larry May put forward 
an account with foundations in social existentialism. May’s account of collective responsibility 
suggests that it should be viewed as a responsibility shared by group members who have common 
attitudes. His account does not rely on the strict criteria for agency found in French, but rather 
relies on group members sharing certain attitudes and intentions, for which they should all be held 
accountable. We find in his account the suggestion that members of societies that share common 
prejudices share in a responsibility for prejudiced acts, such as hate crimes, even when not directly 
perpetrating these crimes themselves, because their shared prejudiced attitudes help support the 
occurrence of such acts.17 Other theorists, such as Margaret Gilbert18 and later Michael Bratman19, 
have suggested that shared intentions form the basis of collective responsibility. In these accounts, 
agents are collectively responsible for actions performed when a group is working on shared 
intentions to achieve common goals.  
Whereas French’s account is in danger of excluding groups of agents we may wish to 
hold responsible for collective acts, May’s account is so inclusive that it is in danger of rendering 
the concept of collective responsibility meaningless. French’s account would exclude most of the 
individuals participating in social structural harms from responsibility because these individuals 
do not clearly form part of the group decision-making process and social structures do not bear a 
close enough resemblance to agents, making them ineligible as responsibility-bearing candidates. 
                                                        
16 Peter French, ‘The Corporation as a Moral Person’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 16 (1979), 207-215. 
17 Larry May, The Morality of Groups, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987). 
18 Margaret Gilbert, On Social Facts, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). 
19 Michael Bratman, ‘Shared Intention’, Ethics, 104 (1993), 97-113. 
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May’s account severs the important link between an individual agent’s acts and omissions when 
considering their moral responsibility and instead suggests that responsibility through association 
is adequate.  All of these accounts that rely on group membership of one kind or another face the 
added objection that they risk holding innocent members responsible for harms caused by other 
members, and that they weaken the link that we usually hold between agency and responsibility.  
In order to overcome some of these problems, contemporary accounts of collective 
responsibility have suggested alternative foundations for group responsibility. Isaacs has 
suggested an account of collectivism which is conceived of on two levels.20 On one level we have 
individual responsibility of agents for their actions and inaction, for their participation in and 
contribution to events. On the other level we have collective responsibility, held by the collectives 
of which individuals are a part. By separating these two kinds of responsibility, Isaacs attempts 
to maintain an account of collective responsibility without holding individual agents responsible 
for collective acts. Young has suggested an account that is individualist in nature, but that draws 
out the collective nature of many agent interactions and the effects these have on agents’ choices 
and actions.21 Although these recent accounts have made some progress in acknowledging the 
harms caused by social structures, none has managed to provide a fully satisfactory explanation 
of responsibility ascriptions for these kinds of groups.  
 
1.5 Thesis Outline 
The central concern of this work is to establish an account of moral responsibility 
regarding large-scale harms. Through a discussion of previous accounts of collective 
responsibility, I shall argue that both collectivist and individualist theories have so far failed to 
present an account that can incorporate harms involving the participation of large numbers of 
agents. In cases where agents are participating in processes and institutions that cause great harm, 
establishing the relationship between an agent’s involvement and their moral responsibilities is 
an important step in developing an account of moral responsibilities for large-scale harms. 
Throughout the next two chapters I examine selected collectivist and individualist accounts in 
order to identify the ways in which they fail to incorporate social structural harm. From this, I 
suggest ways in which an alternative account may be developed that takes into consideration the 
importance of collectives in understanding and analysing agents’ responsibilities. Using this 
expanded form of individualism, I analyse the problem of global poverty, particularly the use of 
                                                        
20 Isaacs. 
21 Young, Responsibility for Justice. 
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sweatshops in the global fashion industry, to illustrate how this account can help ground agent 
responsibility for participation in collective harms. 
In chapter 2 I examine the collectivist response to questions of collective responsibility. 
I begin by explaining why many well-known accounts, such as that provided by French, whether 
or not they are found convincing in the case of smaller highly organised groups, will not help us 
analyse large-scale harms. The focus on establishing the criteria for agency overlooks many 
important aspects of collective actions and the ways in which collective interaction effects 
individual agents’ actions. In order to explain why large-scale harms cannot be understood in 
collectivist terms, I discuss both Gilbert’s and Isaacs’ accounts in particular. Putting the kind of 
collectivism that is solely concerned with agency amongst small, tightly-knit groups aside, these 
two theories provide good examples of collectivist accounts that aim to include larger and broader 
collections of people under the category of responsibility-bearing groups.  
Gilbert argues that in cases where members of a group are united by common intentions 
and shared goals, the group is responsible for actions carried out on those intentions and in pursuit 
of that goal. Due to members being united towards common goals, the whole group can be held 
responsible for actions carried out by a subsection of that group where those actions are performed 
relating to achieving the common goal. The key feature of Gilbert’s account is that group 
members must share in common mental states. These states identify them as group members, 
bond group members together, and provide the foundations for holding the group as a whole 
responsible. Without these common mental states, there can be no responsibility-bearing group. 
Isaacs, on the other hand, separates the responsibility of the individual group members 
from the responsibility of the group. This two-tier approach avoids problems relating to holding 
innocent group members responsible for the actions of fellow members, but it suffers from 
suggesting a rather more complicated account of collective responsibility. Isaacs maintains that 
groups can bear moral responsibility and suggests that in some cases a collective account is 
necessary in order to explain the moral significance of the actions of individual group members. 
For example, the moral significance of an individual taking part in a charity run needs to be 
explained in the collective context of the fundraising event. However, Isaacs also maintains that 
it can be the case that we could have a morally responsible group with no morally responsible 
group members. This raises questions regarding what exactly it means to hold a group morally 
responsible but not its members, and whether this provides the kind of account of responsibility 
ascriptions that helps us understand the moral import of contributing to harmful actions. 
Neither of these more inclusive forms of collectivism is able to adequately account for 
large-scale social structural harms. Gilbert’s reliance on common mental states excludes large-
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scale harms because the relationships of the agents involved do not require them to share such 
states. Each can participate in a social structure for their own ends without having to share 
common intentions and goals with other participants. Isaacs’ account, by separating the 
responsibility of groups from the responsibility of group members, undermines the moral 
responsibilities members have for participating in harmful groups and faces problems regarding 
what it means to hold an agent as accountable.  
These accounts, as with other collectivist accounts, focus their attention on the wrong 
aspect of collective responsibility, namely the nature of the collective rather than the individuals 
and harms involved. Even those accounts which try to expand membership criteria to include the 
widest variety of groups still fail to capture responsibility ascriptions for agents participating in 
many social structures.  Focussing their analysis on common membership traits fails to recognise 
the importance of agent coordination and interaction for participants’ moral responsibilities, an 
individual’s agency is expanded through their interaction with others. We facilitate a much wider 
range of options for each other through our coordinated daily endeavours than we could ever 
make available to ourselves working alone. Whether or not a group is an agent is not important 
when analysing large-scale harms, many of the ways in which agents organise themselves will 
not meet the criteria for agency,22 but will still effect the individual participants’ responsibilities. 
Where an agent’s actions involve participating in a social structure that causes harm, the 
individuals involved bear some responsibility for that harm because of their participation, because 
their involvement is part of the explanation as to how that harm came about. This does not rely 
on the individuals involved sharing common traits, it is a result of their coordinated actions. 
Having established that collectivist accounts of collective responsibility fail to adequately 
incorporate the kinds of large-scale harms in which most agents are involved and which cause so 
much harm, I turn to an analysis of individualism. In chapter 3 I discuss the problem that many 
individualist accounts face by attempting to reduce collective responsibility to solely individual 
responsibility. Agent interaction has a profound effect on individual agent intentions, choices, 
and actions. People act differently with others than they do alone. In some cases the effects that 
individual agents have when acting with others are difficult or epistemically impossible to 
separate out from the effects of others, or if considered in isolation do not appear to cause any 
harm. In these cases, focussing only on establishing the precise harm any one individual has 
                                                        
22 Social, political, and economic social structures are not organised in the required way to satisfy collectivist accounts. 
Whilst they involve a lot of coordination on the part of participating agents, they do not necessarily have a decision-
making process in which most participants are involved. Even some groups that are widely taken to meet this criteria, 
such as states, may fail to maintain all their members on a collectivist account. Providing an explanation of membership 
for those individuals who do not share common mental states or shared intentions with their fellow citizens is 
problematic for these accounts. 
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caused can be implausible or misleading. This approach undermines the increased impact 
individual agent acts have when performed as part of a wider social process. 
In an attempt to provide an individualist account that incorporates the importance of this 
increased agency through collective processes, Young developed her ‘social structural’ theory of 
collective responsibility. This account is intended to be based in individualism, but provides an 
explanation of the collective nature of many of our actions. Young argues that this collective 
aspect of our lives brings with it responsibilities that we would not have if our actions were 
performed in isolation. But, since few of our actions are performed in isolation, and because so 
many of our intentions, choices, and actions are informed and influenced by our participation in 
social structures, we bear responsibilities for the effects these structures have on others and on 
the environment.  
Young’s account provides some interesting observations regarding the importance of 
social interaction in analysing agent responsibilities. However, her account becomes problematic 
when she argues that collective responsibility is a distinct form of responsibility, different from 
moral or legal responsibility. On her account, collective responsibility is ‘political’ responsibility, 
it stems from involvement in social structures and bestows upon bearers a responsibility to 
improve those processes, but does not hold an agent responsible for their participation in the way 
that more traditional types of responsibility would. In this way political responsibility is weaker 
than standard forms, as it brings with it no notions of blame or accountability. I argue that this 
new form of responsibility is unsustainable, the conception of responsibility as suggested by 
Young does not hold up under analysis.  
The distinctions Young makes between traditional responsibility models and political 
responsibility are problematic. Young’s account raises important questions regarding 
participation in collective harms, but her answer to these does not provide a satisfactory account 
of responsibility ascriptions in social processes. In trying to avoid ascriptions of blame in relation 
to social structural harm, Young devalues the importance that participation in these harms has on 
individual responsibility. An agent’s involvement is analysable in more familiar terms than those 
of political responsibility. There is no real need for a ‘new’ form of responsibility in order to 
analyse responsibility ascriptions for agent participation, particularly when this new form fails to 
make agents answerable for their part in bringing about harm. Young provides a good explanation 
of the ways in which participation in social structures leads to individuals helping to perpetuate 
harmful social structures, but fails to provide a satisfactory account of the responsibilities agents 
bear for their involvement in these harms. 
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In order to develop an account of moral responsibility that can incorporate participation 
in large-scale social structural harms, in chapter 4 I develop a theory based on expanding 
traditional conceptions of individualism to account for responsibility in collective contexts. I 
argue that in order to adequately analyse agent responsibility for actions that involve participation 
in wider social processes, the context of an agent’s actions must be taken into account. Many 
actions that constitute participation in large-scale harms seem innocuous when viewed in 
isolation. When viewed in context as contributions to sometimes quite severe collective harms, a 
more accurate analysis of the moral import of an agent’s actions can be developed. The key 
consideration when assessing an agent’s actions becomes an explanation of the collective context 
of an agent’s action, shifting focus from the consequences of the action viewed in isolation.  
The development of this expanded form of individualism is aided by Bjornsson’s 
Explanation Hypotheses.23 Bjornsson’s work focusses on the relationship between agent 
intentions and our reactive attitudes towards agents in cases of small-scale joint responsibility. 
He highlights the importance of establishing the role an agent plays in bringing about a harm, 
whether their actions form part of the explanation of events. By providing part of the explanation, 
an agent’s action needs to contribute to or be related to the harm in a meaningful and morally 
relevant way. Developing this idea further and applying it to an analysis of social structural harms, 
I suggest that analysing agent participation in terms of contribution and facilitation of larger harms 
is an essential factor for providing responsibility ascriptions in these cases. Contextualisation in 
the form of explanation of the relation of an agent’s acts to the social processes of which they are 
a part is a necessary part of understanding the nature and impact of such actions, and therefore 
also the responsibilities these actions create. 
Expanded individualism overcomes the shortfalls of both collectivist and narrow 
individualist accounts regarding the analysis of social structural harms. By analysing 
responsibility in terms of participation in social structures, rather than sharing common mental 
states or traits, we can explain the responsibility ascriptions of all of those involved in social 
structural harms, without fear of including agents who are not involved or excluding those who 
are. Expanded individualism also provides an account that holds agents responsible for their 
participation in harms that they bring about with many others, where their individual action may 
appear insignificant. By analysing agents’ actions in their context as instances of participation in 
larger harms, we can explain responsibility ascriptions for participants in cases of large-scale 
harm involving minute contributions from vast numbers of agents where narrow individualist 
                                                        
23 Gunnar Bjornsson, ‘Joint Responsibility without Individual Control: Applying the Explanation Hypothesis’, in 
Compatibilist Responsibility: Beyond free will and determinism, ed. by Jeroen van de Hoven, Ibo van de Poel, & Nicole 
A. Vincent, (Netherlands: Springer, 2011), pp. 181-199. 
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positions cannot. This account therefore more accurately captures agents’ responsibilities for 
participating in social structures, an important consideration given the role social structures have 
come to play around the world in everyone’s daily lives.  
Once I have outlined an expanded form of individualism and discussed the ways in which 
it is better suited to incorporate contemporary collective responsibility problems, I consider the 
way in which this account helps provide a better understanding of moral responsibility ascriptions 
in social structural harms in chapter 5, with a particular focus on the case of harms caused by the 
global clothing industry. The wide-spread use of sweatshops to produce cheap goods by workers 
in terrible conditions is one of the most prevalent large-scale harms caused by the global clothing 
industry. Whether or not agents think of themselves as participants in the fashion industry, all 
agents are involved with it in some way since clothing is viewed almost universally as a necessity.   
I discuss the importance of viewing social structural harms collectively, instead of 
focussing on an individual difference-making condition. By focussing on the connection between 
agent’s actions, motivations, sensitivity to causing harm, and assumptions regarding their 
participation in harmful social processes, we can explain the ways in which agents are often 
culpably ignorant of the significance of their participation. The problem of the nature of the harm 
caused by individual participants has led to further problems with agents failing to appreciate 
their role in social structural harms, as well as suggestions that some harmful consequences of 
social structures, such as sweatshops, are not harmful if they make people better off.24 I argue that 
this final position rests on a number of questionable assumptions regarding the emergence, use 
and effects of sweatshops on developing economies.  
Over recent decades, clothing production around the world has developed into a global 
industry.25 This process has speeded up considerably over the last 40 years as fashions around the 
world have become homogenised and many fashion designers and retailers have become globally 
recognisable. Whether agents buy high-end fashion or supermarket economy lines, the vast 
majority of clothes on sale are produced in sweatshops. It is an economic institution in which a 
lot of people participate unreflectively, concerning themselves with their personal desires 
regarding acquiring garments, often with little or no thought as to how those items are produced. 
However, through the continued participation in this social institution, the use of sweatshops 
continues. These factories are used to produce goods as inexpensively as possible, the working 
conditions of those employed in them are often unsafe and insanitary.  Knowledge of the use of 
                                                        
24 Matt Zwolinski, 'Sweatshops, Choice, and Exploitation', Business Ethics Quarterly, 17 (2007), 689-727. 
25 Denis G. Arnold and Laura P. Hartman, ‘Moral Imagination and the Future of Sweatshops’, Business and Society 
Review, 108 (2003), 425-461. 
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these factories in garment production is extremely wide-spread amongst those purchasing the 
items these factories produce. Since consumers continue to buy these goods regardless of the 
treatment of those who produce them, or the effect the production has on the environment, 
producers continue to use the cheapest, and often most harmful, methods of production.   
An agent’s individual purchase of a sweatshop produced garment appears to make no 
discernible difference to the life of any particular factory worker, nor does refusing to buy the 
item appear to help reduce any worker’s suffering, and therefore an individual purchase is not 
considered immoral. However, I argue that this is not the correct analysis of the morality of the 
agent’s action. They are not performing this purchase in a vacuum, they are one of many agents 
faced with a similar choice regarding their participation in a known harmful social process. Were 
they to acknowledge the fact that their action is one of many that contribute to the continued use 
of sweatshops in clothing manufacturing, an agent would be better situated to see the moral import 
of their action, and that by continuing to contribute to a harm they are responsible for perpetuating 
it. Expanding individualism to explain why participation in social structures can lead to significant 
harms can help provide an important link between an agent’s seemingly unimportant contributing 
act and the harms which it perpetuates.   
In chapter 6 I turn to the question of how agents should take up their responsibility for 
participating in social structural harm. Changing social structures is not something agents can do 
alone, and withdrawing from social structures leaves agents less able to redress the harms in which 
they have been involved. It is therefore important for agents to become actively involved in 
collective action to change the social structures in which they participate, that they must recognise 
and raise awareness of the importance of agent participation in perpetuating large-scale harm. 
Agents need to take up their responsibility for social structural harm in three main ways, they 
must work towards reform, compensate those who have been harmed through social structures, 
and attempt to avoid causing further harm.  
I also address the concern that holding individual agents morally responsible for large-
scale harms such as those caused by the global clothing industry seems susceptible to criticisms 
of over-demandingness due to the scale of the harms involved and the relatively small 
contribution of each participant. However, I argue that holding agents responsible for their 
participation and for their contribution to such harms is justified when it is an accurate reflection 
of their involvement in these harms. It expands an agent’s moral responsibilities further than many 
other accounts currently do, but as it more accurately accounts for the impact agents have on 
others and the world, and is more closely related to the way their actions affect others, this 
expansion is fair. If it is currently very demanding on the individuals involved, this only reflects 
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the scale of the current harms being perpetuated in the world at the moment. In a world full of 
extreme inequality, poverty, and global warming, it is hardly surprising that morality should ask 
a lot of moral agents. 
By incorporating responsibility for all harms in which we participate, rather than singling 
out only those we cause alone, we have a more complete account of moral responsibility. Without 
the contextualisation that identifies participation, we are left with a situation where there are 
harms produced by the coordinated actions of many agents, where such harms are traceable to the 
actions of these groups of agents, but where instead of holding those causing the harm responsible, 
we instead put these harms down to a matter of bad luck or to forces beyond our control. These 
attitudes towards collective responsibility serve to undermine individual agency, suggesting that 
people are not interacting with each other as agents at all, which is an undesirable and implausible 
conclusion. My aim in this work is to provide an explanation of how and why agents bear moral 
responsibility for their participation in social structural harms, how this responsibility is best 
understood, and how it can be best addressed by responsible moral agents. 
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2: Collectivism and Social Structural Harms  
2.1 Introduction 
As one of the two main approaches to collective responsibility problems, collectivism has 
been influential throughout the debate. Collectivism can broadly be divided into two main camps, 
group-agent and shared-intention, which differ in their accounts of the nature of the groups 
involved. However, the central argument of all collectivist accounts is that in some cases groups 
can be held morally responsible as groups, rather than simply holding each individual member of 
a group as morally responsible for their own actions. Indeed, some collectivists maintain that it is 
possible for groups to be morally responsible without any of their members being individually 
morally responsible.26 All collectivist accounts agree that in certain circumstances, the appropriate 
bearer of responsibility is the group that has brought about the state of affairs through some form 
of group action, rather than the individuals of which the group is composed. 
Collectivism is considered by many to be a controversial position, so much so that it has 
led some to label  it ‘barbarous’.27 It raises problems concerning the possibility of blaming 
innocent people for the actions of others, as well as being accused of undermining individual 
responsibility. The argument for holding groups morally responsible is not a new one. The idea 
of communities bearing responsibility is discussed in the works of Plato and Aristotle, and the 
practice of holding groups such as States or the Church responsible has been discussed for 
centuries. Although current focus has largely moved to a more individualist view of 
responsibility, collective forms of responsibility have historically been seen as very important.28 
The twentieth century saw a sharp increase in the discussion of collective responsibility, 
particularly after the Second World War. Jaspers’29 and Arendt’s30 post-war work on collective 
responsibility in Germany marked the beginning of an ongoing debate regarding moral 
responsibility and groups. Today the debate continues, with a recent increase in discussion 
regarding collective responsibility for harms such as global warming. 
Despite its perceived problems, part of the continuing appeal of collectivism lies in the 
importance collectivist accounts place on the effect of sociality in our understanding of morality. 
Collectivists attempt to offer explanations for the effects of acting with others on our 
understanding of moral responsibility. These accounts focus their analysis on the fact that we do 
                                                        
26 Both Gilbert and Isaacs hold this view, a position that Stanley Bates in ‘The Responsibility of “Random Collections”’, 
Ethics, 81 (1971), 343-349, (p. 346) argues is ‘not a possibility’. 
27 H. D. Lewis, ‘Collective Responsibility’, Philosophy, 23 (1948), 3-18, (p. 3). 
28 H. Gomperz, ‘Individual, Collective, and Social Responsibility’, Ethics, 49 (1939), 329-342, (p. 332).  
29 Jaspers. 
30 Arendt. 
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not live in isolation, we are engaged in a variety of social groups and our lives involve a great 
deal of interaction with others. Group membership can often play an important part in the way 
agents self-identify.  The fact that agents may act differently as part of a group than they would 
alone, and that group membership can have a profound effect on an agent’s world-view has been 
discussed by several authors. Mathiesen has argued that these social groups ‘extend our agency’ 
allowing us to do ‘things that we could never do alone’,31 and May has stated that whilst 
communities enable us to achieve more, they also bring increased responsibilities for those 
involved.32 Collectivist accounts attempt to explain this expanded responsibility, either through 
an analysis of the nature of the group itself, or of the actions being undertaken by the group. 
In this chapter I shall explain why collectivist accounts are unable to adequately account 
for social structural harms. Even if we were to accept either of the main forms of collectivism, 
the agents involved in social structures neither meet the criteria for agency, nor necessarily share 
common mental states that would enable them to be incorporated into a collectivist analysis. In 
section 2.2 I provide an outline of the key aspects of collectivism, discuss some of the main 
objections it has faced, and how different collectivist accounts have approached these criticisms. 
I then analyse group agent approaches to collective responsibility. I suggest that the nature of 
groups like social structures excludes them from being regarded as collectives in group-agent 
collectivist accounts. Their structure prevents them from meeting the strict criteria for achieving 
agency that these theories posit, they are not groups in the required sense. My argument against 
collectivism shall be twofold. Firstly, collectivism is a problematic position, it often makes high 
epistemic demands of group members, and risks blaming innocent members for the actions of 
others. Secondly, even if we did accept that in certain circumstances a group can be held 
responsible as an agent, this would not help us analyse social structural harms, as they cannot 
satisfy the group criteria required by collectivist accounts. 
However, social structures do involve the cooperation and participation of agents. The 
agents comprising these structures coordinate their actions, often in highly organised processes, 
and these structures do satisfy some common criteria for being described as collectives or groups. 
With this in mind, section 2.3 outlines Gilbert’s plural subject collectivist theory. Gilbert’s 
account rests on groups sharing common knowledge and mental states, rather than adhering to 
specific decision-making structures. This, she argues, allows very large groups to be held 
accountable for harms they cause. Although this appears better able to account for social structural 
harms, I argue in section 2.4 that Gilbert’s position faces several problems, particularly when used 
                                                        
31 Kay Mathiesen, ‘We’re all in this together: Responsibility of Collective Agents and Their Members’, Midwest Studies 
in Philosophy, 30 (2006), 240-255, (p. 240). 
32 Larry May, Sharing Responsibility, (Chicago: University Chicago Press, 1992), p. 4. 
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in an analysis of social structures. The epistemic demands of her position, as well as questions 
regarding establishing membership and the nature of the responsibility Gilbert has in mind, 
demonstrate the problems involved in a shared-mental-state collectivist approach to social 
structural responsibilities. 
A more recent suggestion of an alternative conception of collective responsibility has 
been offered by Isaacs, who presents a two-tier model of collective responsibility. I outline her 
position in section 2.5, examining her suggestion that some actions can only be properly explained 
as part of a collective context operating at a different level from individual actions. By analysing 
situations at both the collective and individual levels, Isaacs argues we can develop a better 
understanding of both individual and collective responsibility ascriptions. She suggests that there 
are many instances where the moral import of individual actions is only discernible when 
considered as part of a collective action. Isaacs argues that analysing responsibility at both levels 
allows us to identify responsible groups even in cases where we cannot identify responsible 
individuals. However, I argue in section 2.6 that by separating the collective from the individual 
in the way she suggests, Isaacs’ position fails to produce an adequate account of moral 
responsibility in collective contexts. Whilst her account provides some interesting support to the 
importance of collective contexts on the analysis of individual contributing actions, the separation 
of collective from individual responsibility is problematic and, I argue, ultimately fails. In 
conclusion I suggest that collectivism is unable to provide an adequate account of moral 
responsibility in cases of social structural harm. 
 
2.2 Collectivism  
A recurring observation by collectivists is that we commonly hold attitudes towards 
groups which indicate that we think of them as agents in their own right. These attitudes have 
been discussed by several authors. Tollefsen argues that we have emotional responses towards 
groups; we love our favourite sports teams and get angry at our local government,33 Cooper 
observes that we blame groups for harms they cause just as we blame individuals.34 Gilbert 
focuses on the fact that we routinely ascribe emotional states and attitudes to groups,35 and Cooper 
argues that when we experience or ascribe these emotional states, we are often unable to identify 
specific group members to which we might assign them, the feelings are held towards or by the 
                                                        
33 Deborah Tollefsen, ‘The Rationality of Collective Guilt’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 30 (2006), 222–239, (p. 
222). 
34 David Cooper, ‘Collective Responsibility’, Philosophy, 43, (1968), 153-155, (p. 258). 
35 Margaret Gilbert ‘Who’s to Blame? Collective Moral Responsibility and Its Implications for Group Members’, 
Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 30 (2006), 94-114, (p. 107). 
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group qua group, not its members.36 Arguing that there is no reason to suppose that all such 
attitudes and beliefs are misplaced or mistaken, many collectivists take our widely held customs 
regarding holding groups responsible and referring to them as agents as appropriate in certain 
situations. 
Individualists, however, object that our attitudes towards groups do not determine their 
moral status. Although we may refer to groups as if they were agents, this in itself does not 
demonstrate that groups can bear responsibility. For individualists, all group responsibility 
ascriptions are reducible to ascriptions to individual agents, and groups themselves are unable to 
be held morally responsible for actions. Downie, for example, has argued that our tendency to 
hold groups responsible should only be understood in terms of causal responsibility, where the 
actions of a group causes a state of affairs. However, any moral responsibility relating to such a 
state would need to be attributed to group members.37 Narveson goes further, arguing that 
attributions to groups can always be broken down to the attitudes and actions of group members. 
Whatever our emotional responses regarding groups may be, ultimately all group actions are the 
actions of individual group members, whatever their relation to others in the group.38  
Whatever our emotional attitudes towards groups may be, the question of the reducibility 
of group actions remains. Collectivists maintain that in some situations reducing group actions to 
actions of specific group members is not possible. Group members are thought to interact and 
contribute to the action in such a way that separating out the actions of each is either impossible, 
impractical, or misleading. Consider the example of a football team winning a match. In this case, 
it was the actions of all the team’s members playing together which brought about the victory. 
Whilst a few specific individual members may be identified as the players who scored the goals, 
their opportunity to do so was facilitated by the other team members. Cases such as this are often 
used to illustrate the problem of attempting to separate out the individual contributions of group 
members from the collective action.  
Not all groups, however, are presented as equally irreducible in this way, and the structure 
and relationships thought to be essential to group responsibility vary between theories. In the 
example of a team, we have a group in which membership is easily established and where we can 
identify group actions and outcomes such as playing a match and winning or losing. Other groups 
have membership that is harder to accurately capture and where attributing actions to the group 
is more difficult. States, for instance, are frequently discussed as potential responsibility-bearing 
                                                        
36 Cooper, p. 260. 
37 Downie, p. 66. 
38 Jan Narveson, ‘Collective Responsibility’, Journal of Ethics, 6 (2002), 179-198, (p. 183). 
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groups. Group membership is established through citizenship, and States are often referred to as 
agents acting in the world through our frequent use of phrases like ‘country X declared war’. 
These groups are very different in terms of the way in which agents become members and the 
extent to which they play a part in influencing group decision-making. When agents do not choose 
to be citizens of a State but have no option to leave, and when a state is not democratic so that 
most members have no say in the group’s actions, attributing an action to the whole group is very 
problematic. Determining which kinds of groups can bear responsibility, and in which situations, 
is central to the collectivist debate. 
The most widely discussed theory of group-agent collectivism is that offered by French. 
French’s central claim is that groups that meet the standard criteria for agency should be treated 
as agents. Agency criteria includes the ability to have interests and intentions, and the ability to 
act on these. French argues that some groups, particularly corporations, meet these criteria. They 
have policies, they form intentions based on corporate interests and act on these.39 Corporate goals 
can be identified as distinct from the ‘transient self-interest of directors, managers, etc.’40 which 
means a corporation can have interests and intentions that are irreducible to and independent from 
the interests and intentions of its members. In order to meet the demands of agency, corporations 
must have highly organised decision-making procedures and corporate policies.41 Further criteria 
have been suggested, including the need for groups to be capable of reflectively endorsing 
corporate intentions,42 which further restricts the number of groups that could be held as moral 
agents.  
This approach faces criticisms from those who argue that morality is solely the concern 
of persons. McKenna argues that irreducible agency is not enough to establish moral 
responsibility, non-persons cannot be morally responsible agents because moral responsibility 
can only be held by persons.43 The reason for this restriction lies in moral agents being part of a 
moral community, able to understand and react to moral reasoning.44 This requires a level of 
reasoning that few people are willing to attribute to groups. However, Mathiesen has suggested 
                                                        
39 French, p. 213. 
40 Ibid. p. 214. 
41 Even Christian List and Philip Pettit’s Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) extension of French’s account, intended to incorporate a wider variety of 
group agents, is still too restrictive to accommodate social structures. It requires that group members ‘each intend that 
they together act so as to form and enact a single system of belief and desire’ (p. 34), and that they form a level of 
coordination that allows the group to exhibit rationality (p. 36). The organisation of social structures does not mirror 
individual agency in this way, participating agents need not share beliefs and desires nor be able to act as a united 
group. On this account, social structures cannot meet the criteria to be analysed as a responsibility-bearing group.  
42 Denis Arnold, ‘Corporate Moral Agency’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 30 (2006), 279-291, (p. 291). 
43 Michael McKenna, ‘Collective Responsibility and an Agent Meaning Theory’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 30 
(2006), 16-34, (p. 21). 
44 See David Shoemaker, ‘Moral Address, Moral Responsibility, and the Boundaries of the Moral Community’, Ethics, 
118 (2007), 70-108, for a discussion of the limits of the moral community. 
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that it is precisely because some groups are able to display sensitivity to praise and blame and 
modify their behaviour accordingly that we can accept them as part of the moral community.45 
Even if we accept that some groups do reach this level of moral reasoning and sensitivity, we still 
face the problem of explaining the moral status of non-person members of the moral community. 
Members are usually thought to have certain rights, including the right to life,46 which we may 
not want to attribute to groups. However, if we accept groups as moral agents, we must explain 
their position in the moral community or face inconsistencies regarding our identification and 
treatment of moral agents. 
The group-agent approach benefits from working from a traditional view of morality 
being the reserve of agents and finding ways of incorporating groups into this model. It does not 
require alterations of concepts of morality, but rather suggests expanding the range of candidates 
for agency.  Although this allows some groups to be held morally responsible, very few groups 
are capable of meeting the strict criteria required for agency. This approach is therefore of little 
help to explain social structural collective responsibility, since social structures are unlikely to 
develop the high levels of unified decision-making procedures needed for agency. Agents 
participating in social structures like the global clothing industry are not part of any formal 
decision-making processes that holds across the structure. The nature and effects of social 
structures are influenced by the actions performed by its members, in the case of clothing a 
demand for cheap fashion has led to the proliferation of sweatshops for instance. If lots of the 
agents involved campaign to end the use of sweatshops and choose to buy non-sweatshop 
produced goods, the social structure will change to reflect this change in attitudes. There is a large 
amount of coordination and organisation throughout such social structural process, but it is not at 
all like that of a moral agent, and so is not compatible with group-agent approaches to collective 
responsibility. 
The main collectivist alternative to group-agency is shared-intention collectivism. 
Although shared intention positions still argue for responsibility-bearing groups and the treatment 
of groups as morally responsible entities, they do not suggest that groups need to meet the 
organisational requirements we see in group-agent accounts. The make-up of shared intention 
groups is therefore quite different, and a range of theories have been proposed focussing on 
different kinds of intentions and relations between group members that may allow groups to bear 
moral responsibility. These can include certain shared mental states including intentions, common 
goals, or common knowledge. Shared-intention theories all argue that in some circumstances the 
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members of a group can be so united around a shared mental state that they can be held 
accountable as a whole group, rather than at the individual agent level. 
One of the benefits of shared intention collectivism is that a much broader range of groups 
are potentially capable of meeting the criteria for moral responsibility. Many groups are united 
by common knowledge, goals, interests, culture, traditions, and other unifying shared experiences 
or intentions. For most agents, various group memberships play an important role in their 
understanding of their own identity, from their nationality and religion, to support for local sports 
team, club membership, and family ties. All these different kinds of groups rest on different 
relationships between members, and few would fit into a group-agent analysis. At first this may 
seem to bode well for an analysis of social structural harms, where group members lack the unified 
decision-making procedures that group agency requires. However, despite the less rigorous 
criteria of shared-intention accounts, the requirement for all members to be unified around 
specific shared mental states still excludes many groups from bearing moral responsibility, 
including social structures. 
A common suggestion amongst shared intention accounts is that the intentions of 
individuals mix together in group situations in a way that both alters the way individuals act and 
alters individual responsibility. In group situations, agent intentions are not formed individually 
and then somehow aggregated, instead agents form intention together, influencing one another’s 
attitudes and desires. Bratman refers to this as ‘meshing’,47 the process by which those individuals 
involved modify their individual intentions in order to develop shared intentions with others in 
group environments. This occurs in all manner of circumstances, from two people painting a 
house together,48 teams playing a match, or friends organising a trip together. In these cases, 
agents must coordinate their intentions so that they can act together, it is insufficient for each 
individual to simply have an intention to do something with the others. Consider the problems 
teams have when members fail to adhere to a team plan, or those which would occur if the friends 
intending to travel together failed to coordinate their actions. Without the meshing of the 
intentions of those involved, there is a danger that each member will develop their own 
(potentially conflicting) ideas of what the shared intention should be, rather than a group sharing 
an intention to perform an action together. 
May argues that in these situations, individual responsibility models cease to be useful, 
because ‘the causal contribution of each person often cannot easily be ascertained, except to say 
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that all parties played a necessary causal role in the harm, and that no one party played a sufficient 
role’.49 Even in very small groups, it may be difficult to discern precisely whose idea a particular 
aspect of a shared plan of action was as members develop shared intentions collaboratively. In 
cases where the intentions are irreducible to individual members, shared-intention accounts argue 
that those sharing the intentions constitute a responsibility-bearing group. 
What kinds of shared mental states can unify agents in this way is disputed. May argues, 
for example,  that shared attitudes amongst group members are sufficient for members to share in 
group harms, such attitudes providing support for group actions even in cases where only a few 
members act on these intentions.50 Other theorists have argued that attitudes alone are insufficient 
for the level of group unity required to hold a group morally responsible. Instead it is suggested 
that by forming shared intentions, agents bond together in important ways. Alonso has suggested 
that shared intentions involve mutual reliance amongst members,51 whilst Sadler states that we 
become ‘bound to each other in an especially gripping way that is distinctive’.52 This distinction 
comes from the fact that in the case of shared intentions in the sense used by collectivists, it is not 
simply the case that two people happen to develop the same intention, for example to take a walk, 
but that they have the shared intention of taking a walk together.53 Similar examples include two 
people developing the shared intention of jumping into a pool together, an intention neither may 
have developed alone.54 The intentions involved are argued to be distinctive from individual 
intentions because they unite agents around a common cause, they require a level of coordination 
between agents to developed intentions together. In this way, shared intention approaches to 
collectivism focus more on group relationships than specific group organisational structures. 
A more relaxed membership requirement allows for a wider range of groups to be 
included in the analysis. For example, a shared-intention account may help explain responsibility 
ascriptions in difficult cases, such as random groups. Held has suggested that in some cases 
random groups of individuals can be held morally responsible for failing to act in a given 
situation. The kinds of groups she has in mind are people who are distinguished from ‘the set of 
all persons’ by a particular characteristic, geographic location at a particular time for instance, but 
                                                        
49 May, Sharing Responsibility, p. 39. 
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51 Facundo Alonso, ‘Shared Intention, Reliance, and Interpersonal Obligations’, Ethics, 119 (2009), 444-475, (p. 446). 
52 Brook Jenkins Sadler, ‘Shared Intentions and Shared Responsibility’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 30 (2006), 
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53 Gilbert frequently uses this example as a paradigm case of a shared intention. 
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that lack the decision-making processes or structure of more common groups.55 Examples include 
a group of passengers on a subway, or pedestrians passing an accident on a street. In certain 
situations, we may think that such random collectives should act together as a group to assist 
someone. Holding these kinds of random groups responsible has been criticised as misusing the 
idea of ‘collective’56 and the idea of ‘random’,57 but there remain cases where many are inclined 
to think that a collection of people should act together, such as to join together to save someone 
trapped under rubble or drowning in a river. Despite not meeting traditional group criteria, we 
might still want to be able to support the intuition that agents should form a group in these kinds 
of situations. Shared intentions may provide a means of doing so. 
All shared-intention accounts therefore need to explain membership requirements, how 
groups are formed and maintained, and provide a good explanation of how the intentions and 
mental states of members support holding the entire group morally responsible, rather than 
singling out individual group members. To do this, accounts require a strong argument for 
collective responsibility that explains how group unity can support group moral responsibility and 
what it means to hold a group morally responsible. Without such an account of the basis on which 
the group can be held accountable, responsibility will have to be worked out on an individual 
agent basis, which is particularly difficult in complex group contexts. One of the most thoroughly 
argued and well known attempts to ground collective responsibility on shared mental states is that 
offered by Gilbert. In the following section I shall therefore discuss her account in detail and 
examine the problems that occur when trying to analyse responsibility for social structural harms 
through her model. 
 
2.3 Gilbert’s Plural Subject Approach  
Gilbert’s account is interesting as it draws on both types of collectivist accounts, she 
argues that some groups meet the criteria for agency because they are so closely bonded by 
common mental states. She starts from the position that when something satisfies the criteria for 
agency, it should be viewed and treated as an agent. However, instead of focussing on decision-
making organisational structures which mimic individual agents, Gilbert develops an approach 
based on unified groups acting as if they were individual agents.  After arguing that many common 
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small social groups fall into this category, she goes on to suggest that larger social groups can be 
similarly united through shared mental states, enabling them to meet the criteria for agency. 
Starting with a discussion of the extent to which social groups dominate our lives, Gilbert’s 
account is intended as an explanation as to the great influence that social interaction has on how 
individuals act. She begins with an analysis of our ‘everyday concepts’ regarding social groups. 
Taking her lead from Durkheim, Weber, and other sociologists, Gilbert wishes to establish that 
our everyday references and conceptions of certain social groups as being able to act in the world 
are not meaningless or misguided. The role played by social groups in our understanding of agent 
actions and interactions is an important one, and for Gilbert, our frequent use of social collective 
concepts is both appropriate and justified. 
We often refer to social groups as single entities, to which we attribute interests, 
intentions, and actions. Families, town councils, sports teams, states, and army corps are all 
examples Gilbert suggests as being treated in this way.58 This is our ‘everyday’ concept of group 
agents. We have little difficulty in using these concepts in daily life, they are widely understood 
and shared by agents. Social groups are extremely important to us, shaping how we see ourselves 
and others. Gilbert argues that these special social groups are an integral part of our moral lives, 
and as far as they act in the world for ill or good, are appropriate subjects of praise and blame. 
In order to establish the kinds of groups that can bear agency, Gilbert makes a distinction 
between collectives, which are groups in the weakest sense, and ‘collectivities’, which she 
describes as tightly bonded social groups. Gilbert uses the term collectives to refer to any group 
of individuals who lack sufficient social bonds, but it can also refer to random collections of 
individuals. She argues that collectives are unable to achieve group agency because this is based 
on establishing strong social bonds between group members. Social bonds allow for the 
development of common interests, the formation of group intentions, and for group members to 
act in the world as a unified whole. Collectivities, then, are just such groups, where members 
share common mental states and so share a common sense of group membership and unity as a 
collective entity. Gilbert calls these collectivities ‘plural subjects’. 
Gilbert states, then, that some social groups share mental states that so unite them as a 
group that they can act as a single unit, and therefore meet the criteria for agency. She suggests 
that the argument for holding these groups morally responsible for their actions is common 
practise and quite intuitive. Her position can be broken down in the following way: 
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1.! Anything that satisfies the criteria for agency is an agent. 
2.! The relevant criteria for agency are the ability to have interests, form intentions and other similar 
mental states, and to be able to act on these. 
3.! Some groups of people (collectivities) can share common mental states. 
4.! Collectivities can know that all their members share a common mental state, can hold a common 
collective intention, and act on this accordingly. 
5.! Collectivities therefore meet the criteria for agency 
When the shared mental state is common across group members and can be identified as 
a state concerning the group qua collectivity rather than qua individual members, and when 
members know this to be the case and act on this group intention rather than their individual 
intentions, a group has achieved the status of a ‘collectivity’ and can be held responsible as an 
agent.59 Gilbert’s argument rests then on establishing the ways in which such collectivities come 
about.  The nature of the mental states that are capable of uniting agents in this way, and the 
knowledge agents have regarding groups and group members, are the main focus of her 
discussion. 
Through an analysis of the ways in which an agent’s mental states are affected by the 
social ties in which they are involved, Gilbert argues such collectivities are not only possible, but 
a common part of everyday life. Agents will often belong to several different groups at once, and 
such memberships will affect the ways in which agents act. The extent to which a member’s 
actions are influenced by group membership will depend on the social bonds produced within the 
group, stronger bonds having greater effects. In collectivities, members will act on the intentions 
and interests of the group to which they belong, considering these at the group level rather than 
at the individual level. This Gilbert refers to as the use of ‘we’ concepts in a group, and the correct 
usage of these concepts is essential for plural subjects.60 
Gilbert argues that other methods of group formation, such as the repetition of social 
interactions, are inadequate foundations on which to build a collectivity. Through examples of 
groups of agents repeating social interactions, she argues that such interactions by themselves are 
an insufficient basis for social bonds. She discusses a group of mushroom pickers all living in the 
vicinity of a wood.61 Each individual engages in brief but polite social exchanges when their paths 
cross, but have no other dealings with one another, no social ties, familial affiliation, or other 
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connection which binds them as a group. Whilst such individuals may form a group in some sense, 
‘all those individuals who live near the woods’ for example, their social exchanges do not provide 
grounds for describing them as a collectivity, nor would they have reason to see themselves as a 
group of that kind. Social exchanges alone fail to give members of an interacting group a sense 
of group identity, a common interest, or purpose. Although such groups would be social in the 
sense that all members perform social interactions with one another, they are only trivially social. 
Such interactions fail to develop the social relationships and bonds that are necessary for 
collectivities.   
Shared mental states are therefore at the heart of Gilbert’s analysis of collectivities. It is 
through the development of common mental states that collectivities are formed and are able to 
act. Sharing mental states with others allows group members to share in a common identity, to 
share in common goals, and share a sense of being united with like-minded others.  This sense of 
belonging is an important part of our social lives, as often demonstrated in our tendency to identify 
ourselves through our various group memberships. When it comes to the types of mental states 
which can perform this uniting role, Gilbert is quite vague. Collectivity members share ‘in some 
action, belief, attitude, or other such attribute’.62 Whilst beliefs and attitudes seem viable 
candidates for this unifying role due to their ability to motivate agents more generally, the 
suggestion that actions are sufficient is problematic. Given Gilbert’s earlier rejection of social 
actions as an inadequate foundation for collectivities, more detail regarding the types of actions 
that would satisfy the criteria for shared mental states is required. Unfortunately, such detail is 
not offered. Gilbert’s argument appears to be that so long as a mental state performs the unifying 
role required in a collectivity, the precise nature of this mental state is of lesser importance than 
the effect it has on creating a group. 
Gilbert states that one of the core identifiers of plural-subjects is whether or not members 
of the group are adequately bonded. One way of establishing this is through an analysis of the 
relationships between group members and how members view their connection to the group. 
Gilbert explains these relationships by describing the way group members can identify themselves 
and others as belonging to a particular group, part of which involves what Gilbert sees as the 
correct use of ‘we’ concepts by the members involved.63 The ability of group members to apply 
the concept ‘we’ to themselves and the group(s) to which they belong is therefore not a trivial 
matter, it is this understanding of belonging to a group and the development of this kind of shared 
mental state that is the foundation of plural subjects. Without a sense of group identity, which 
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only comes about through the conscious recognition of certain shared mental states, Gilbert argues 
that ‘collectivities’ cannot exist due to a lack of cohesion amongst members. This accounts for 
the importance she places on a thorough analysis of how this we-concept is best understood and 
utilised regarding plural-subjects or ‘collectivities’. When a group meets the criteria for 
collectivity, its members can correctly us the term ‘we’ to refer to themselves. Gilbert designates 
this special usage for collectivities as ‘we*’.64 
A number of scenarios are examined to establish the appropriate and inappropriate usage 
of ‘we’ and ‘we*’.65 Gilbert’s argument is not from semantics or grammar, nor is it intended to 
be. It is rather an examination of when the individuals included in the group being referred to as 
‘we’ are connected with one another in what Gilbert argues is an appropriate way. Through 
analysis of the collectivity concept being utilized when one is able to correctly identify oneself as 
a member of a ‘we’-type group, Gilbert aims to identify the conditions necessary to establish 
plural-subjects and groups that can be seen as agents in their own right. I shall therefore focus on 
one example given by Gilbert that is intended to highlight the kinds of relationships and intuitions 
she believe we foster regarding we-type groups. After outlining this scenario, I shall attempt to 
draw out the intuitions to which Gilbert appeals, and explain the importance of the correct usage 
of the concept of ‘we’ on Gilbert’s account. 
The restaurant case: Gilbert asks us to consider the scenario of a dinner taking place after 
a conference. Two of the party, Tony and Celia, are engaged to be married. Tony asks 
Celia ‘Shall we share a pastry?’ This seems intuitively acceptable, according to Gilbert. 
But then Bernard, another member of the party, hardly known to Celia but sitting next to 
her, turns to her and asks ‘Shall we share a pastry?’ Gilbert sees this use as inappropriate 
since it refers to a ‘group’ or ‘collectivity’ that she argues does not exist.66  
Gilbert is making an appeal to our intuitions regarding group membership, the question 
is, on what do these depend? If we consider the restaurant case, whether or not we agree that 
there is no ‘we’ to which Bernard may refer depends entirely on whether we accept Gilbert’s 
intuition that this is an ‘inappropriate’ use of a ‘we’ concept. Whilst Tony and Celia have the kind 
of relationship to one another that could allow them to be referred to as a collective of some kind, 
Gilbert argues that no such connection exists between Bernard and Celia. This aspect of the 
example appears to be intended to highlight the necessity for certain types of relationship to be 
established before the use of ‘we’ is justified. This usage will still be context dependent. There 
are scenarios in which Bernard could refer to Celia and himself as ‘we’ in an appropriate way, if 
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for example he was referring to both of them as part of the same conference in an utterance such 
as ‘we are taking part in an academic conference’. Since they do not know each other well, these 
instances would necessarily be impersonal. What seems to be intuitively troublesome about the 
restaurant case for Gilbert is the over-familiarity of Bernard’s suggestion.   
Gilbert is attempting to draw attention to what she argues are common intuitions 
regarding group relationships. Her examples do address some of the ways we understand group 
membership, the nature of the relationships within certain groups, and the ways members within 
those groups interact. There are many ways we can place people into groups: through an 
identifiable physical feature, through geographical location, habits, biological features, shared 
birthday, the list goes on. Whilst labelling people in this way may be helpful from a social sciences 
perspective, members of many of these kinds of ‘groups’ would not see themselves as members 
of a group at all, and would not refer to themselves and others of the group as ‘we’. These groups 
lack solidarity and self-identification through sharing common mental states. The correct 
application of the concept of ‘we’ is a defining characteristic of group membership. Membership 
cannot be externally imposed on Gilbert’s account, and groups are therefore necessarily self-
identifying.67  
This aspect of self-identification and established relationships is the guiding force behind 
Gilbert’s understanding of the concept of ‘we’. She suggests that one way of identifying 
collectivities is to consider whether members of the collectivity can appropriately express the 
group’s shared mental state, such as a belief or intention.68 Members must also openly 
acknowledge to one another their group membership, it is necessary that all members express that 
they share the common mental state and are therefore members of that particular group.69 Here 
we can see the role of and importance of shared mental states for Gilbert’s account. Through close 
identification with other members in the form of shared attitudes, intentions, and goals, 
collectivity members can speak on each other’s behalf by speaking for the group as a whole. The 
shared acceptance of being able to speak on behalf of other members captures a lot of the 
intuitions Gilbert appeals to in the above restaurant example. The ability to do this rests on 
common knowledge amongst members which in turn requires an established relationship amongst 
members that allows members to act and speak for the group. It also, however, reveals one of 
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several problems with Gilbert’s account, namely that whole groups can be held accountable for 
the actions of individual members.70 
In order for any shared mental states to ground strong social bonds, group members must 
be aware that such shared mental states exist. Without this common knowledge, mental states 
would be unable to fulfil their unifying role. Gilbert argues that all group members must share in 
the collectivity’s common knowledge in order for a collectivity to exist.71 Furthermore, all group 
members must know that all other group members share this common knowledge.72 This final 
requirement places a rather heavy burden on groups that is difficult to fully satisfy. By outlining 
such high epistemic requirements for agent knowledge regarding other group members’ 
knowledge, rather than, for example, accepting agents’ beliefs regarding the mental states of other 
members, Gilbert has made the attainment of collectivity status incredibly hard to achieve.  
 
2.4 Problems with Plural Subjects  
Despite Gilbert’s appeals to a more intuitive understanding of collective responsibility, 
her account faces several problems, particularly due to the high epistemic demands it places on 
group members. In this section I shall focus on those issues that are particularly problematic for 
the possibility of using Gilbert’s account for an analysis of social structural group harms. The first 
three criticisms focus on the epistemic demandingness of her account: the common knowledge 
requirement, specific shared mental states, and inaccurate membership beliefs. The fourth 
concerns the problem of willing acknowledgment of membership amongst members. 
 
i.! Common Knowledge 
‘Common knowledge’ plays a significant part in Gilbert’s conception of collectivity self-
identification. Gilbert appeals to the idea that group members must know that they belong to a 
collectivity, and that they share certain intentions or attitudes with one another in the form of 
shared mental states. They know this because group members are defined by their common 
knowledge of these shared mental states. This raises many questions regarding the nature of this 
common knowledge, including how group members come to have this knowledge, how certain 
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they have to be that such knowledge is shared, and how similar the shared mental states need to 
be.  
In order to examine these problems, let us first consider Gilbert’s formulation of what 
constitutes ‘common knowledge’: 
It is common knowledge among, A, B, and C that p, if and only if (by definition) (1) the 
fact that p is open* to A, B, and C, and (2) A, B, and C, have noticed this.73 
Open* is described by Gilbert as the state of being accessible to all agents if they were capable 
and able to exercise sound reasoning. She suggests expressions like ‘“everything is out in the 
open” […] reflect the grasp of the concept of openness*’.74 Each individual involved needs to 
possess the knowledge, which seems to be a reasonable condition given that each individual must 
possess the common knowledge being shared, otherwise there would be no grounds on which to 
say that they are sharing in the mental state.  
However, the further condition that each member must know that all other members have 
this knowledge presents problems for collectivity membership. Gilbert does not think that it is 
sufficient for members to simply believe that others have common knowledge of shared mental 
states, they must know that all members share common knowledge and that they therefore form 
a collectivity. This is a very strong condition to place on members. Having a reliable grasp and 
understanding of one’s own mental states can often be difficult enough, but the necessity to be 
able to evaluate the mental states of many others, others you may not ever come into contact with, 
and assess their similarity and compatibility with one’s own mental states seems not only 
unrealistic but rather an impossible demand.75 Therefore, requiring the acknowledgement of 
common knowledge of all members for the formation of collectivities, especially large ones, 
makes the status of collectivity unobtainable for most groups.  
Gilbert’s interest in common knowledge is an important aspect of her argument, this 
shared knowledge is intended to open up collectivities and make them capable of including more 
individuals than other forms of collectivism allow. Her argument for groups based on common 
knowledge, however, fails to broaden the number of responsibility bearing groups because of the 
tight constraints placed on the way in which such collectivities can come about. Collectivities 
must self-identify and all members must be aware of their membership and the membership of 
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the others of their group. Since such a high level of common knowledge regarding other members 
is hard to achieve, Gilbert’s account fails to broaden group membership to incorporate large 
groups in the way she intended.  
Common knowledge excludes social structures from qualifying as responsibility bearing 
groups for Gilbert because social structure members do not require any common knowledge to 
participate. Individual participants must be able to follow at least some of the accepted practices 
and customs used by fellow participants in order to engage with others within the social structural 
framework. They may have little knowledge of other participants from whom they are further 
removed, and they may never be moved to consider what mental states other participants hold 
regarding their shared social structure. Participants do not require common knowledge regarding 
the social structure itself, they may be aware of different aspect of the structure, different 
processes and effects that are related to the structure, and have different ideas regarding the nature 
of the structure and their involvement in it. The knowledge possessed by participants is therefore 
highly unlikely to meet the common knowledge requirement of Gilbert’s collectivities.  
 
ii.! Shared mental states 
Further to common knowledge requirements, Gilbert’s account requires plural-subject 
members to hold specific shared mental states. Knowledge of these mental states allows the 
creation of collectivities, Gilbert argues that they provide the foundations on which individuals 
come to form strong social bonds which unite them and enable them to form collectivities. Given 
their importance to Gilbert’s account, it is essential to establish what specific kinds of mental 
states can form such bonds. Here Gilbert’s explanation of which mental states can perform this 
role is rather vague. She states that shared ‘action, belief, attitude, or other such attribute’76 could 
form the basis of shared mental states to form collectivities. However, it seems doubtful that all 
mental states could perform this function. These states are meant to form the foundations of strong 
social bonds, and, as Gilbert states, provide a type of ‘unity’ amongst members of the collectivity. 
Therefore the shared mental state would have to be sufficiently motivating to compel individuals 
to form social bonds of the kind that can unite them into plural-subjects. 
One consequence of Gilbert’s position is that collectivities are self-identifying through 
knowledge of shared mental states; group membership cannot be decided externally. Groups have 
‘self-knowledge [and members] will all properly think of themselves as us*’.77 There is an 
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interesting consequence to this conception of collectivity identification and formation: such 
mental states would have to be pre-existing in the members forming the collective. This is because 
they form the conditions necessary to create the collectivity in the first place. This, however, is 
not the way all groups are formed. Membership of some paradigmatic social groups, such as 
family or religious groups, often comes from birth. Also, many group intentions seem to be 
developed through social interaction, where members modify their intentions in collaboration 
with others. Brewer criticises Gilbert’s account of the development of shared mental states, 
particularly beliefs, arguing that it confuses the process of group formation. Brewer suggests that 
‘[w]e arrive at shared beliefs by deliberating together about what propositions warrant our 
assent.’78 In the case of many social groups we do not, he argues, necessarily decide what we 
believe and then go and seek out others who share these beliefs.79 
Group self-knowledge may have its benefits, it does not allow for external group 
membership ascriptions for instance. This is important when considering the problem of 
discrimination or prejudices against agents on the basis of group membership. By denying the 
validity of external membership identification individuals and groups are free to self-identify 
without external judgments of what constitutes membership of a given group. However, 
membership still rests on the ability of individuals to correctly identify shared mental states with 
others. This is difficult enough in small groups, but gets much more difficult in larger groups. 
Since it is up to the collectivity to identify uniting mental states and legitimate members, adequate 
knowledge and understanding of the shared mental states is very important. Similarly to the 
condition of common knowledge, the condition that all members must be united by shared mental 
states also bars social structures from collectivity status. It is quite possible for participants in 
social structures to hold a variety of mental states, many of which could of course be similar, but 
there need not be any one mental state which is shared by all participants. Individuals may 
participate for their own reasons, acting on their own intentions and attitudes, without sharing 
mental states with others. 
 
iii.! Inaccurate membership beliefs 
The problem of inaccurate membership beliefs can occur in at least two ways. Agents can 
hold inaccurate beliefs regarding whether or not they are part of a particular collective, and they 
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can hold inaccurate beliefs regarding other members of the collectivity. Inaccurate belief 
problems are particularly damaging for any attempt to use Gilbert’s account to analyse social 
structures, where many participants may have inaccurate beliefs regarding other group members, 
or may be unaware of some groups to which they belong. 
Gilbert argues that collectivities, and therefore responsibility-bearing groups, only exist 
when the following conditions are met: 
Human beings X, Y, and Z constitute a collectivity (social group) if and only if each 
correctly thinks of himself and the others, taken together, as ‘us*’ or ‘we*’. 80   
This is in keeping with Gilbert’s discussion of the appropriate use of ‘we’ conceptions. The 
restriction of collectivities to only those groups where all members are using the concept correctly 
leaves us with a number of questions. What status do groups have where some members of the 
group are using the concept incorrectly? If a member of the collectivity incorrectly assesses the 
status of one individual, excluding them from the group, is that individual excluded, or is there 
no longer a true collectivity to which they could belong? Neither are desirable outcomes, nor does 
it seem agreeable that a collectivity’s existence, or an individual’s membership of such a group, 
could rest on such insecure foundations.  
If the first question is considered, following Gilbert’s argument, only those individuals 
correctly using the same ‘we’-concept are members of the collectivity in question. Other 
individuals may share mental states with members of the collectivity, but if they do not share the 
same conception of who constitutes the ‘we*’ to which they are referring, they seem to be 
excluded from collectivity membership. This puts a lot of responsibility on the individual to 
ensure that they have a very good understanding of exactly which mental states unite the 
collectivity, and who has membership of the group to which they want to belong.  It is less of a 
problem for membership, however, than the second question raised above: what is the status of 
individuals excluded by other members? One of the benefits of Gilbert’s conception of 
collectivity membership is that group members are self-identifying; membership and association 
are not externally imposed. However, with the introduction of the condition that other members 
must correctly identify a group member, individuals could conceivably be excluded from groups 
to which they may feel they belong, and have good reasons for believing themselves to be 
members. We therefore encounter a difficulty in identifying collectivity members, unless in very 
small groups where membership is easier to establish and, possibly, shared mental states. This, 
then, provides further grounds for excluding social structures from being plural subjects. 
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iv.! Unwilling membership 
The final problem I shall discuss is that of members being unwilling to acknowledge their 
membership of particular groups. Going beyond the need for members to be able to appropriately 
utilise ‘we’ concepts, Gilbert states that to become the member of a plural subject one must 
“openly express one’s willingness to do so with certain others”.81  This places the emphasis on 
individual members of collectivities to declare their membership of a group. Placing group 
membership in the hands of the individuals involved helps avoid some of the problems associated 
with conceptions of group membership based on externally imposed criteria and assessment. 
Allowing individuals to choose with whom they form groups allows them to exercise their 
freedom of choice. It also avoids labelling individuals as group members who do not recognise 
any foundation for such group membership to hold between them. However, when a key condition 
for membership rests on the individual’s willingness to openly acknowledge group membership, 
the bonds of collectivity membership are in danger of being somewhat undermined in some 
groups.  
Gilbert’s earlier criteria, that members share common mental states with certain others, 
where knowledge of this shared mentality is common to all involved, grounds membership in 
facts regarding a set of agents’ mental states. However, if membership rests on individuals’ 
willingness to ‘stand up and be counted’, membership seems less binding than Gilbert’s earlier 
conditions. Having shared mental states and common knowledge of these along the lines outlined 
by Gilbert allows group members to form close bonds, but this further condition of individual 
acknowledgement does not appeal to such strong social relationships, allowing agents to deny 
social bonds seemingly at will. 
In cases where group activity is benign, deciding group membership on the basis of an 
individual’s willingness to be acknowledged as a member seems unproblematic. Little is at stake 
when the group in question performs only acts that bring about positive outcomes, for instance. 
In contrast, deciding group membership through members’ self-identification would be extremely 
problematic for nefarious groups. It is unlikely that individual members would be as willing to 
make their membership of some groups public knowledge. An example of this can be seen in the 
case of the Ku Klux Klan, where many members kept their identities secret, even from other 
members. Where a group is identified as prejudiced, harmful, or undesirable in some other way, 
relying on members to identify themselves as participants in these groups is unlikely to give us 
an accurate account of actual group membership. We would not, however, wish to support the 
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idea that members of nefarious groups cannot be held responsible simply because their members 
choose not to make their membership publicly known. 
The two main difficulties with Gilbert’s statement regarding ‘open acknowledgement’ 
therefore concern the issue of to whom individuals need to express this acknowledgement, and 
how we are to understand cases where people do not wish to make such an acknowledgement.  In 
the former case, it is problematic to require this criterion; whilst people may be happy to openly 
and publicly acknowledge membership of groups that bring about positive ends, they might not 
be so willing to make public knowledge of membership of groups that are perceived to be 
prejudiced, harmful, or harbouring ‘negative’ mental states. For groups with possible or perceived 
‘nefarious’ intentions, members may indeed be willing to ‘openly’ express their willingness to 
form a collectivity with certain other likeminded people, but only in private. This would still 
satisfy Gilbert’s criteria, and would be in keeping with earlier discussions regarding collectivities 
bonding due to shared mental states. As long as such ‘open acknowledgement’ is only required 
with regards to other members, the ‘certain others’ to which she refers, and not a public 
acknowledgement, Gilbert’s account would still hold. If, however, Gilbert’s account is 
understood to require such public acknowledgement, we are faced with the problem of 
understanding unwilling collectivity members. 
Requiring such ‘open acknowledgements’ to define collectivity membership in all 
collectivities might make denying certain group associations rather easy. We are faced with the 
question of how we are to understand cases where an individual shares the kinds of mental states 
and associations with other members of the group that conform to Gilbert’s account of collectivity 
membership, but does not wish to openly acknowledge membership of the collective. Such denial 
could be both public and to other collectivity members. Cases where this might happen include 
those where individuals might be in a position to benefit from membership of a collectivity, but 
where they do not wish to contribute towards it.82 In these situations it is possible that individuals, 
regarded as group members by most other measures, could through denial dissociate themselves 
from the group.  
Despite sharing in mental attitudes, intentions, and goals with group members, the ability 
to be able to ‘escape’ collectivity membership through refusing to acknowledge it is problematic 
for Gilbert’s account of collective agency. If social bonds through mental states, which form the 
foundations of plural-subjects, can have their ‘uniting’ power overridden through denial, they do 
not seem to form a sound foundation for group agency. In these cases, requiring individuals 
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involved to acknowledge their membership or at least association with harmful practices would 
allow individual members of the collectivity to deny association, an outcome that weakens the 
possibility for collective agency arguments from Gilbert’s position. Therefore, having this form 
of individual responsibility to acknowledge collectivity membership as a necessary condition is 
problematic when it comes to analysing collective agency, the very concept that Gilbert’s plural-
subjects are meant to help us understand. 
Gilbert attempts to incorporate the widest possible groups of agents into her collectivist 
account. As long as groups are unified to the extent that they can act as if they were one agent, 
they can be held collectively responsible as a group. However, groups without such unifying 
bonds cannot meet this criterion and cannot therefore be held responsible as a group. In these 
cases, on Gilbert’s account responsibility is necessarily individual. If this is so, many collective 
contexts, in which agents act together to bring about certain states of affairs but do so without 
extremely strong social bonds, are not analysable collectively for Gilbert. This is problematic 
given the importance of interaction with others on an individual’s range of options and actions, 
as well as cases where specific group actions and effects on the world are irreducible to the actions 
of specific individuals. Whilst Gilbert’s account is therefore more inclusive than most other 
collectivist accounts, it still cannot adequately explain responsibility ascriptions in large-scale 
harms brought about by groups of people who coordinate and organise their interactions to a high 
degree but fail to form collectivities.  
 
2.5 Isaacs’ Collective Contexts  
In quite a different argument for collectivism, Isaacs has suggested that collective 
responsibility can only adequately be addressed by a two-level theory of moral responsibility.83 
Her position avoids many of the criticisms aimed at collectivist attempts to explain groups in 
terms of group-agency or shared mental states. Isaacs argues that on one level we can analyse an 
agent’s individual responsibility for their acts and omissions. This level is the more widely 
accepted and traditional form of individual moral responsibility. However, Isaacs also argues that 
a purely individualistic approach to moral responsibility fails to address the collective nature of 
some of our endeavours. For this reason, she proposes an additional collective level of analysis 
for those situations where a group is responsible for bringing about a state of affairs through their 
coordinated efforts. 
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Isaacs proposes that an adequate account of moral responsibility in collective contexts 
needs to be both individualist and collectivist, a two-level theory that leaves no aspect of analysis 
out. Acknowledging the role that groups have in our lives is integral to Isaacs’ position. She 
regularly points out that working together allows us to act in ways we would be incapable of 
acting in isolation, ‘from moving a grand piano to significantly reducing humanity’s carbon 
footprint’.84 Rather than allowing us to simply achieve more, Isaacs observes that some of our 
actions are necessarily collective, such as performing orchestral works or playing a game of street 
hockey.85 In cases like these, the individual actions of participants only make sense when 
considered as contributions to the collective actions of which they are a part.86 Collective analysis 
alone is not enough, as it would not provide an adequate account of individual responsibility for 
contributions to the collective. Therefore, the individual contributions to these collective actions 
also require analysis, particularly of how they relate to the wider collective action, and thus Isaacs 
presents a two-level theory with both collectivist and individualist aspects. 
Isaacs argues that an analysis of collective responsibility intended to fully capture the 
effect collectives have on our understanding of moral responsibility must incorporate collectives 
as agents. She sees this as the only way that necessarily collective actions can be adequately 
analysed.87 Isaacs cites several examples of necessarily collective actions, actions that can only 
be performed by collectives. These fall broadly into two groups. Some are physically necessarily 
collective, both playing orchestral music and team sports cannot physically be done alone, they 
require multiple participants.88 Other actions are necessarily collective in the sense that the 
collective endeavour is not something that would have been chosen by any of the individuals 
involved if acting alone. For example, when writing a paper with someone, she suggests that 
neither party alone might have come to the conclusion they collectively decided on. As Isaacs 
puts it, ‘our interactions take us places where no one of us would even think to go alone’.89 In 
these cases, Isaacs’ argument is that we cannot separate out the independent intentions of the 
individuals when certain collectives collaboratively form intentions.  
In both types of cases, Isaacs argues a collective agent is required in order to account for 
the action performed. No individual agent can play a team game, no individual agent can write a 
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collaborative paper. It is worth noting that it is not only necessarily collective actions that can be 
performed by a collective agent. Isaacs also argues for collective responsibility in cases where an 
act is performed collectively, but where it could conceivably have been performed by multiple 
agents acting randomly, in parallel, or by isolated individuals.90 Isaacs is not concerned primarily 
with necessarily collective acts, her main concern is whether or not an action was performed 
collectively. 
Whilst collectives are an essential part of our lives for Isaacs, not all collectives have the 
same moral status. During her discussion, Isaacs analyses several different types of collective, 
arguing that some are capable of being responsibility-bearing entities, whilst others are not. 
Isaacs’ criteria for a collective to be capable of agency are quite broad. Members of a collective 
can share a trait such as a common interest, but the most important and essential criterion for 
Isaacs is organisation towards a common goal. Where agents are united in an organised institution, 
or where they coordinate their efforts to achieve a common goal, their actions become that of a 
collective. Organisations, like corporations or NGOs, are therefore the least contestable 
candidates for moral agency and are a large focus of Isaacs’ discussion.91 By organisation, Isaacs 
has something more specific than coordination in mind. Collectives require structure such as clear 
decision-making procedures and well-defined specific roles for members.  Without this kind of 
organisation, Isaacs rejects the possibility of a group being capable of agency and responsibility. 
Collectives that have intentional structures are legitimate bearers of moral responsibility because 
they are capable of intentional action, which Isaacs argues demonstrates that they can exhibit 
agency.92 
Apart from the focus on organisation, this collectivist aspect of Isaacs’ analysis is 
certainly less restrictive than alternative collectivist accounts. The conditions for a collective to 
be capable of bearing responsibility are far less demanding than those of authors such as Gilbert. 
Common knowledge, for example, is reduced to a sufficient number of members having good 
grounds to believe that other members are also working towards the collective goal.93 Compare 
this to Gilbert’s account, where all members must share in the knowledge, and know that all other 
members share this knowledge. Isaacs provides a far more flexible approach to collectivism with 
less demanding criteria to fulfil. She argues that ‘we may understand collective intentions as states 
of affairs, identifiable in part by their functional roles’.94 Part of the reason for Isaacs’ less rigorous 
outline of the specific ontological status of a responsibility-bearing collective seems to be that 
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these collectives are only one part of her analysis, it is the intentions held by members of 
collectives that are her main concern.    
Despite the less stringent criteria for establishing a responsibility-bearing group, 
collectives remain central to Isaacs’ theory. The two-level theory is intended to aid us in the 
identification of the perpetrators of harm in cases where the harm is collectively brought about. 
In some cases, individual member’s contributions to the harm can seem insignificant and of no 
consequence, if viewed in isolation they can appear harmless. However, Isaacs suggests that if 
we view the same action as part of a wider collective endeavour, we can see that the apparently 
inconsequential act is one of many contributions to a wider harm. Collective harm is contextual, 
only by examining the collective action and effects can we understand the moral nature of both 
the collective action and the contributing actions of individual agents involved. The conclusion 
of Isaacs’ line of argument is therefore that individual acts require contextualisation, an 
explanation of their collective nature, in order for them to be fully understood. Without this 
collective context, our moral responsibility ascriptions are inadequate. 
What we have then is an account that is designed to work on two levels. Isaacs intends 
that we analyse collective responsibility first by establishing whether the act in question was 
performed by a collective. When this is the case, we can explain the responsibility as being held 
by that collective because the collective is the agent that performed the act in question.95 Once the 
collective’s responsibility has been established, we can then turn to the individuals comprising 
the collective to assess their individual contributions to the collective act. Each individual’s 
responsibility regarding this collective act will differ according to their relationship to the wider 
collective and the nature of their participation.96 When both levels of responsibility have been 
analysed, the responsibility ascriptions can be thoroughly and accurately understood. 
 
2.6 Limits of Isaacs’ Two-Tier Theory Approach 
Isaacs’ account initially appears quite promising for an analysis of large-scale harms 
caused by social structures. She gives a lot of weight to the effects of participating in a group on 
individual agent responsibility, and does not restrict responsibility-bearing groups to only those 
that have a very specific shared mental state. This allows many more groups to be analysed as 
collectively responsible and helps to explain responsibility ascriptions in collective contexts 
where individualist approaches struggle to identify responsible agents. However, the two-tier 
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account offered by Isaacs faces a number of problems when it comes to making sense of the nature 
and role of each tier, the relationships between the tiers, and which groups actually meet the 
criteria required for collective agency. 
 
i.! Ontological complexity 
My first concern with Isaacs’ position is the ontological status and function of the second 
(collective) level of her theory. Initially it appears that having a collective level of analysis 
provides invaluable explanatory power when evaluating collective harms; insignificant actions 
take on a different moral importance when viewed as part of a wider collective harm. However, 
the advantage of appealing to the collective level comes at a significant cost in terms of 
ontological complexity. Rather than providing an explanation of individual moral responsibility 
ascriptions, we are faced with explaining the status of an extra collective responsibility-bearing 
entity and the individual responsibility bearers of which it is comprised. It is necessary to ask 
what exactly these extra collective entities provide to the analysis and whether they are really 
essential to our moral understanding.  
Isaacs suggests that in collective contexts, treating a collective as an agent provides a 
responsible party, a moral agent against whom we can make claims regarding harms that have 
been caused collectively. She argues that: 
Collective agents, not their members, are the agents who perform collective actions. 
Therefore, collective moral responsibility is needed in order to account for moral 
responsibility for collective actions.97  
Isaacs proposes that, without positing a collective agent, we cannot adequately explain who 
performed the collective action and therefore who is responsible for it. A strong motivation for 
Isaacs’ second level is therefore the explanatory power the collective level offers. She cites the 
way in which Davidson, Feinberg, and Strawson have all discussed the role that context and 
explanation play in understanding an agent’s actions and argues that the work of these authors 
demonstrates the importance of context to adequate evaluation. 98 She suggests that in some cases 
the only way we are able to provide an accurate analysis of an individual agent’s behaviour is 
through a broad and thorough description of the context of an agent’s action. 
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However, the collective level of Isaacs’ theory is not solely a descriptive tool, and it does 
more than simply provide background information to explain the collective context of a particular 
action performed by an individual. Isaacs explicitly argues that some collectives are themselves 
agents, capable of moral and immoral action.99 Rather than supporting her argument for group 
agents, Isaacs’ discussion of Davidson, Feinberg, and Strawson does more to demonstrate that 
her position fails to provide clarity when making responsibility ascriptions in collective contexts. 
This is because the presentation of an extra entity is not essential to our understanding of the fact 
that some of our actions are collective and are performed with and influenced by others.  
Consider a collective act, such as a game of street hockey. Isaacs suggests that without 
the collective agent we are missing a vital part of the explanation of the situation, the collective 
agent of the team provides the contextual explanation that grounds all the actions of the 
participating individuals. I might, for example, stand in front of the net and try to prevent any 
goals from being scored. Explaining what I am doing, and why I am doing it, requires some 
contextual information. It also requires some other people to join in the match; if I stand in front 
of goal when no-one else is playing, I am not taking part in a match at all. Certainly, no one 
individual can play a match of street hockey by themselves. 
When we analyse a collective action by explaining the actions of individuals through the 
wider collective context, we gain a greater and more accurate insight and understanding as to the 
intentions and motivations of the individuals. This contextualisation is possible without the need 
for a collective agent. Rather, we can suggest that there are some actions that can only be 
performed with other people. A game of hockey is something that cannot be performed alone. We 
can explain the importance of coordinating our actions with others and the ways in which this 
allows us to achieve more, and changes our individual intentions and goals as we join a wider 
group, without having to posit the collective agent as separate to the individuals involved.  My 
actions as a goalkeeper are perfectly comprehendible when explained in terms of my desire to 
play a team game with others, and the required actions I need to perform in my role as a particular 
member of that team. Suggesting that a collective agent is required here to explain our collective 
endeavour of playing a game of street hockey does not add anything helpful to the explanation of 
my, or my teammates’, actions.  
The unnecessary nature of positing an extra collective agent, rather than simply providing 
a collective context, can also be seen in Isaacs’ discussion of how we are to identify praise and 
blameworthy agents. Isaacs argues that collective agents are required because some actions are 
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performed by collectives and cannot be understood in terms of the actions of the individuals who 
form the collective. For example, when the Terry Fox Run in Canada raises $20 million each year 
for charity, the collective raises this money, no individuals do so. Therefore, Isaacs argues, if we 
do not allocate moral praiseworthiness for the fundraising at the collective level, then we are left 
with a situation where no-one is responsible for raising $20 million.100 She argues that in cases 
like this collective agents are necessary in order to identify the correct recipients of praise and 
blame. However the suggestion that collectives do not simply provide explanatory background, 
but are themselves moral agents, makes the analysis of responsibility ascriptions in cases of 
collective harm more, rather than less, complicated. This is because we have an extra 
responsibility-bearing entity to consider, one which cannot act to address the harms in which it is 
implicated without its constituent members acting. 
Collective acts only come about through the various actions of the collective’s individual 
members. If we wish to analyse the success or praiseworthiness of the collective action, we must 
look at the overall result of the collective action to assess its consequences, but this overall result 
only comes about through the actions of individual participating members. Whilst it is true that, 
in the case of the Terry Fox run, no individual raises $20m, and that therefore no individual is 
morally praiseworthy for raising $20m,101 we can identify who is morally praiseworthy for raising 
this money through an analysis of  which agents were involved in the collective action that led to 
$20m being raised. We can provide this explanation of moral responsibility ascriptions in 
collective contexts without appeals to a collective agent. 
The information we can provide regarding an agent’s part of a wider group activity, the 
context in which the action is performed, is often invaluable in allowing us to make an accurate 
assessment of the moral import of that action. For example, the context of the Terry Fox Run 
allows us to identify the actions of the participating individuals as contributions to a successful 
charitable event. This extra information can make us view this act in a different light. The question 
is then whether seeing this action as a contribution to the collective act of a collective agent 
provides us with more, or more helpful information that would allow us to make a more accurate 
analysis of the morality of the situation. There seem to be no compelling grounds for this extra 
conceptual leap. 
If we were to take Isaacs’ next step and accept that the team is a collective agent, the 
explanatory benefit provided by the collective contextualisation would in fact be reduced. This is 
because the introduction of the further, somewhat complicated, collective agent and the 
                                                        
100 Ibid. p. 55. 
101 Ibid. 
45 
 
corresponding relationships between this agent and its constituent members will require its own 
analysis in addition to the analysis of the individual participants. The collective agent, the second 
level of analysis, becomes an extra aspect that requires further explanation, rather than just 
providing contextual information that helps inform our moral analysis of the contributing agents’ 
actions. As with other collectivist accounts, there remains a tension in Isaacs’ work regarding the 
relationship between collectives as independent agents and their constituent members. This 
tension obscures the explanatory power of the two-level approach.  
 
ii.! The relationship between members and their groups 
The second concern I have regarding Isaacs’ theory is the relationship between the 
responsibility ascriptions of individual agents and those of the collectives to which they belong. 
This relationship is crucial, as both levels interact and inform any analysis of the other. She argues 
that either level on its own is insufficient to provide a complete account of responsibility 
ascriptions in group situations. For Isaacs, we cannot understand the moral status of an agent’s 
contribution to a collective action without understanding the relationship between the individual 
and the group of which they are a member. These relationships are important in a number of ways. 
For example, she argues that in some cases individual acts only derive their moral status from the 
collective acts to which they belong, and individuals’ responsibilities are shaped both by the types 
of collective of which they are members and their position within those collectives. All of these 
connections are problematic in Isaacs’ account. 
Isaacs states that the acts of individuals who are members of a collective sometimes get 
their moral features from the collective act of which they are a part.102 An example she uses 
frequently is that of a contribution to genocide. An isolated murder, whilst morally wrong, is 
morally more significant if that murder is a contribution to genocide. The act performed by the 
collective agent informs the moral nature of the individual contribution. In the case of genocide, 
since genocides are necessarily carried out by collective agents for Isaacs, individual 
contributions can only be adequately understood through these collective actions. She argues that 
genocides are not simply cumulative, and that the collective act of genocide is different in 
character from the murders or individual acts of genocide of which it is comprised.103 Without the 
wider collective action of genocide, we would not be able to adequately evaluate the individual 
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acts that contribute to the atrocity, we would not be able to appreciate the moral significance of 
an act as a contribution to genocide.104  
There is, however, an alternative way of viewing this relationship between the individual 
and wider collective. We are only aware of the different nature of these acts once we are aware 
that they are not in fact isolated, and instead are part of a wider collective effort to try to eradicate 
a group of people.  We are only made aware of what Isaacs describes as a difference in character 
between the acts once we have the information regarding their relation to associated acts 
performed by other group members. When we have this further explanation of the context in 
which the act is performed, we analyse the act differently, though the act itself does not change. 
Contextualising the act as part of a wider group action does affect our moral evaluation of the act. 
In this way establishing that there is a relationship between an individual and a group informs our 
analysis and can be essential to accurately assessing the morality of an agent’s action.  This is 
possible without positing a collective agent. The interactions of the agents involved is intelligible, 
and the resulting harm is explicable, without further appeals to a unified agent that causes the 
harm as a whole.  
The relationship between collective agent responsibility and the responsibility of 
individual members is further complicated when we consider Isaacs’ discussion of the importance 
of position and power for collective agent members. Isaacs states that participants with different 
associations to a collective have different levels of power within the group, and so some members 
have more ability to affect change within a collective than others. Leaders, for example, are seen 
as more responsible for collective actions than other members because a collective’s organisation 
empowers them to act in ways that they would not be able to but for the roles they inhabit in the 
structure.105 Leaders have more influence in collective decisions, and a greater ability to effect the 
collective goal, because they occupy a position of power in relation to the other members of the 
collective. This higher degree of influence, for Isaacs, means a greater degree of responsibility. 
Holding leaders more responsible than other group members seems perfectly reasonable and a 
common practice in our moral evaluations. However, it highlights a problem in Isaacs’ account 
with her desire to maintain a distinction between the moral responsibilities of collective agents 
and of their constituent members. 
A collective’s intentions and decisions are thought to be that of the collective itself for 
Isaacs, and not that of its leader or leaders. Isaacs argues that collective decisions and intentions 
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are different in kind from the decisions and intentions of their individual members.106 If this is so, 
the necessity of identifying the ways in which some individual members have had more influence 
over a decision or intention than others, in order to establish who is morally responsible for 
addressing the harm caused collectively, undermines the suggestion that collective decisions and 
intentions are fundamentally different from the decisions and intentions of individual members 
and that collectives can be held morally responsible in their own right, as Isaacs wishes to 
maintain. Isaacs’ suggestion that we can hold some agents more responsible for their role in 
forming collective intentions than other members requires us to analyse their individual 
contribution to the collective intention. In doing so, we seem to be reducing the collective 
intention to some kind of aggregate of participating agents’ intentions, where leaders and those 
with a bigger role in the collective bear more responsibility for their larger input into the collective 
intention. If this is the case, then the argument that individual and collective intentions are 
different kinds of intentions is more difficult to maintain. 
Whilst it is common practice to hold those in a position of power more responsible than 
other members, this discussion of position and power in collective contexts demonstrates the need 
for moral analysis at the individual participant level and the difficulty of justifying the need for 
responsibility-bearing collective agents. Although Isaacs argues that we need a collective agent 
in order to explain responsibility ascriptions in collective contexts, we cannot explain how 
collectively caused harms can be addressed without an appeal to the individual participating 
members. Stating that a collective is responsible may give us a convenient focus for our analysis, 
but as soon as we question what is required of a morally responsible collective, we are forced to 
assess its members and identify those in a position to act. The collective agent appears redundant, 
it is impotent in its ability to address its responsibilities and analysis of its actions immediately 
requires an analysis of its constituent members.  
The suggestion that collective intentions are necessarily different from the intentions of 
the individuals involved is hard to maintain, especially as Isaacs rejects any kind of collective 
mind in which to house them.107 Whilst I agree with her belief that the intentions of group 
members whilst they are part of a collective are different from the intentions the agents would 
have were they not group members, the suggestion that the collective intention is somehow 
different and independent from the agents’ intentions is difficult to support. Agents curb and 
modify their individual preferences when they have to cooperate with others. This results in 
individuals having different intentions than they would in isolation. The intentions we form as 
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group members, the intentions broadly shared by the group, are not different to the individual’s 
intentions, but they are different to what the individual agents might have intended were they not 
group members. 
 
iii.! Identifying responsibility-bearing groups 
The final problem that I shall discuss regarding Isaacs’ theory is that of which groups she 
believes qualify as collectives. Throughout her discussion, Isaacs refers to a range of different 
collectives in order to draw out morally relevant similarities between different group types. One 
of the common features examined by Isaacs is group organisation. For a group to qualify as a 
collective agent and therefore be collectively responsible, group members have to interact in 
structured, organised ways with the aim of achieving a common goal.108 Isaacs suggests that only 
organised collectives working towards a specific goal can qualify as collectives capable of bearing 
responsibility. Where this condition does not hold, there is no collective responsibility only 
individual responsibility. Throughout her discussion, she differentiates between organised and 
coordinated collectives, and random groups or people performing parallel actions. Isaacs’ use of 
the terms ‘coordinated’ and ‘organised’ is implicitly narrow in scope. From her discussion, ‘goal-
orientated’ might be a better way of defining the kind of coordination and organisation she has in 
mind. Working towards a common goal is therefore an essential part of Isaacs understanding of 
an organised collective. Without a single common goal, she argues, people are only acting in 
parallel with one another. 
This distinction is somewhat misleading. Isaacs fails to differentiate between non-goal-
orientated organised interaction and random action. This is a significant oversight given the 
importance of collective contexts to her overall account. It is perfectly possible for a group of 
individuals to coordinate and organise their actions without having a specific common goal. 
Instances of these high levels of organisation allow agents to do far more than they would be 
capable of doing alone. An example of a highly structured human activity that requires a great 
deal of organisation and cooperation from participants is driving. Within a given territory, such 
as the UK, car owners must coordinate their actions and cooperate with other drivers to be able 
to use the roads. There is a set of rules and a framework that participants must follow. Failure to 
do so results in an individual being excluded from the group of legal drivers.  
The acts of participants are not random, each participant interacts with other road users 
in a very structured way. Their acts are also not being performed in the pursuit of one, unified 
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collective goal. Each participant can have different goals, intentions, and motivations for 
participating in the group. Some members may participate for convenience, or in order to avoid 
punishment for not following the rules. It would be disingenuous to suggest that the people 
participating in this activity are acting randomly, there would be far more accidents and chaos on 
the roads if this were the case. However, since this kind of group of coordinated agents does not 
fit with Isaacs’ definition of collectives as being organised around a common goal, on her account 
they would be described as a random collection of agents working in parallel. This seems a rather 
unfair description of the kind of agent coordination and cooperation required for the level of 
organisation this activity requires and which participating agents have been able to achieve. 
Isaacs’ restriction of collective responsibility to goal-orientated groups excludes many of 
the kind of collective situations that we might think the perfect cases for her two-level analysis. 
In particular, it rules out social structural harms brought about by multiple agents participating in 
highly organised social processes, where the individual contributions of agents may appear 
unimportant, but taken together produce huge harms. In these cases a collective context, which is 
able to explain the moral significance of these individual contributions through the harm caused 
by the wider collective of which they are a part, is essential for a full analysis of the situation. 
However, Isaacs argues that a lack of common goals means that in these situations the activities 
of those involved cannot be analysed collectively, and are instead only analysable on an individual 
level. 
For instance, as a result of her analysis, Isaacs rejects the possibility of global warming 
being a collective harm, though she does argue that it can only be addressed collectively. She 
maintains that humanity causes global warming but without wrongdoing as there is no collective 
agent.109 This is because contributors to global warming are not part of an organisation,110 and 
there is ‘no joint or coordinated effort behind the outcome’.111 This is true, insofar as there is no 
coordinated effort to achieve global warming. However, this does not mean that the agents 
responsible for causing global warming are not acting collectively and are not organised or 
coordinating their efforts. There is a significant difference between a group of people not being 
coordinated and not being coordinated to achieve a particular goal.  
Global warming is a consequence of our current lifestyles, it is largely a result of our use 
of fossil fuels. The production of fossil fuels is a highly organised system of processing and 
distributing fuel around the world. These actions are not random and uncoordinated, but they do 
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not fit Isaacs’ description of collective action and so fall out with her analysis. To say that 
humanity’s actions concerning global warming are performed in parallel or randomly is to 
massively underplay the level of coordinated interaction that allows people to cause so much 
environmental damage in the first place. As Isaacs observes, ‘aggregating individual intentions 
does not take seriously the interrelations between the intentions of individuals.’112 This, however, 
is exactly what Isaacs seems to do in the case of global warming and other large-scale multi-agent 
harms.  
Throughout her discussion, Isaacs highlights some deep problems facing current 
collective responsibility accounts. Both sides of the debate face problems when trying to address 
group harms, missing essential aspects of the morality of these complicated situations. The 
motivation and worries that lie behind Isaacs’ account are, I think, justified. However, if we are 
to take Isaacs’ line and posit collective agents as essential for contextualising contributions to 
collective actions, the explanatory role provided by this wider context becomes lost. Her account 
makes the assessment of individual contributions harder to determine, and renders some collective 
endeavours as non-collective despite the high level of coordination they involve. I agree that 
contextualisation is essential for adequate analysis of actions performed by group members, but 
collective agents do not aid the development of accurate contexts. 
  
2.7 Conclusion 
Collectivism attempts to offer an account of collective responsibility that captures the 
central role of groups in our lives. Collectivists have suggested different grounds for group 
agency, suggesting that shared intentions, attitudes, nationality, or other shared traits provide the 
basis of a collective agent. Throughout this chapter I have discussed some of the most inclusive 
accounts of collective agency. In Gilbert’s work we find a well-argued justification for group 
agency based on common knowledge. However, her account is unhelpful in an analysis of social 
structural harms for two main reasons. Firstly, the epistemic demandingness of Gilbert’s position 
calls into question whether any groups could actually attain the level of shared epistemic states 
Gilbert requires. Secondly, whilst her account rejects the inflexibility of accounts like that of 
French, it is still unable to accommodate social structures and loosely organised groups.  
In Isaacs’ alternative collectivist approach we encounter another set of problems which 
leave it unable to incorporate structural harms. Firstly, Isaacs’ suggestion that we require extra 
responsibility-bearing entities in the form of collective agents does not actually seem necessary 
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to our analysis of moral responsibility ascriptions in collective contexts. Secondly, her focus on 
goal-orientated groups ultimately excludes many organised collective endeavours which would 
benefit from analysis at the collective level.  
Collectivist accounts struggle to provide a convincing general account of collective 
agency and are unable to incorporate contemporary large-scale harms into their analysis. Despite 
the collective nature of social structures, they do not fit traditional ideas of what constitutes a 
‘group’ and therefore are not compatible with collectivist account. In order to fully explain 
responsibility ascriptions in cases of social structural harm, I suggest we must turn to 
individualism. However, individualist accounts also struggle to explain responsibility ascriptions 
in social structures due to the nature of individual participating acts.  In the next chapter I shall 
discuss why individualism often faces this problem, focusing on one particular attempt to 
overcome this difficulty and incorporate social structures into an individualist framework.  
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3: Young’s Social Connection Model  
3.1 Introduction 
Having considered the collectivist approach to collective responsibility problems and 
found it unsatisfactory, particularly for an analysis of social structural harms, we are left with the 
more traditional approach of individualism. In this chapter I examine one particular individualist 
account, that of Young, who attempts to overcome problems that many individualist accounts 
encounter regarding under-determination of responsibility ascriptions in cases of structural 
harm.113 Young argues that collective responsibility is based on structural participation, and results 
in a specific type of responsibility she labels ‘political’ which is different from moral and legal 
forms of responsibility. I suggest that Young’s account draws out many of the most salient reasons 
that participation in social structures bestows responsibility upon participating agents. It focuses 
on the collective nature of our lives and the responsibilities this generates whilst remaining 
distinctly individualistic. However, I suggest that the type of responsibility for which Young 
argues is both unsustainable and unnecessary. Her account provides much of the foundation for 
an explanation of individual moral responsibility in cases of social structural harm without the 
need to appeal to new or alternative forms of responsibility.  
All individualist approaches to collective responsibility, then, argue that collective 
contexts can be analysed at the level of individual agents, rejecting the need for responsibility at 
the collective level. Whatever the nature of the group involved, all collective actions are 
ultimately performed by individuals, and it is therefore argued that the responsibility for those 
actions lies with the individuals involved. Individual agent responsibility is at the heart of much 
traditional moral thought, where agents are held to be the proper objects of blame or praise 
depending on their acts and omissions. Individualism sits better with these traditional accounts of 
moral responsibility and avoids many of the problems associated with collectivism; individualists 
avoid blaming innocent group members for the actions of others, or accounting for group agents. 
However, individualism regarding collective responsibility is not without problems. The main 
shortcoming of these accounts concerns responsibility ascriptions in cases where individual 
contribution to a collective harm is unclear, immeasurable, or epistemically unavailable to us in 
some way. In these situations, individualists are unable to adequately attribute responsibility for 
collective harms. This is a particular problem for large-scale harms, like those caused by social 
structures, where a great many individuals contribute to a harm but where the actual harm each 
individual produces cannot be identified or is minute. 
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In an attempt to address the gap in standard individualist approaches to collective 
responsibility between harms and responsible agents, Young develops an account that focusses 
on the collective nature of our daily lives, particularly the large social structures which provide 
the framework for much of our social interactions. These structures, she argues, cause widespread 
injustice and harm, and result in most members of society bearing responsibility for harms caused 
by the structures in which they participate daily. Many harms have no ‘isolatable perpetrator’, but 
instead result from millions of people participating in institutions that cause harm.114 Due to the 
lack of identifiable specific agents who can be held directly responsible for causing particular 
harms, Young argues that traditional responsibility models are unable to adequately explain 
responsibility ascriptions in cases of structural harm. She therefore develops an alternative 
account of collective responsibility based on participation in social structures, in which 
individuals bear responsibility for harms caused by the social structural processes of which they 
are a part.  
Young’s account has a number of distinguishing features. Her focus on structure over 
individuals is unusual for an individualist account, as is her rejection of traditional models of 
responsibility in cases of large-scale harms. Her most controversial, and problematic claim, is that 
collective responsibility is what she describes as ‘political responsibility’. This is a distinct type 
of responsibility arising from participation in social structures, which is held by all participants 
and focuses on the duty to make such structures less harmful. It does not bring with it notions of 
praise and blame in the way that moral responsibility does, nor does it entail guilt. Collective 
responsibility for Young, then, is a responsibility to support social justice through the 
development of fair and harmless social structures. Participation in harmful structures is currently 
all but unavoidable, however this is not something agents need to feel guilty about, nor 
blameworthy. Political responsibility instead requires agents to endeavour to work with others to 
improve these structures.  
The distinction Young tries to maintain between moral and political responsibility, 
however, faces a number of problems which I argue leave it unmaintainable. For example, Young 
attempts to develop a kind of responsibility that ‘is more forwards-looking than backwards-
looking’115 and rejects praising or blaming individuals for their previous involvement in collective 
harms. This is motivated by wishing to avoid the problem of attempting to discern the precise 
harm caused by specific individuals, which is unlikely to be possible, and also has a pragmatic 
motivation. Young worries that blaming people is unproductive and leads to defensiveness and 
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‘blame-switching’.116 Whilst blame can potentially demotivate, it can also provide agents with a 
specific reason to act. Understanding that previous actions have been blameworthy and that this 
generates a responsibility to address those wrongs can provide powerful motivation. Also, if the 
actions of an agent are identified as culpably causing harm and therefore blameworthy, the 
possibility that the agent might be demotivated by this analysis makes them no less responsible 
and blameworthy. Refraining from making responsibility ascriptions for this kind of reason fails 
to take moral responsibility seriously and fails to treat individuals as full moral agents. 
In order to draw out the arguments for individual moral responsibility in collective harms 
from Young’s account, I begin with an analysis of Young’s ‘social connection model’ in section 
2. I start with an examination of the motivation behind Young’s account, discussing some of the 
reasons for her development of an alternative form of responsibility. I then analyse her ‘social 
connection model’, particularly the five characteristics she argues distinguish political 
responsibility from moral responsibility.  I argue that the distinctions Young draws are difficult 
to maintain, and that the arguments for conceiving of responsibility for participation in harmful 
structures as a separate form of responsibility is unsustainable. In section 3 I focus on the first of 
two aspects of Young’s account which I believe are most insightful and useful to an account of 
responsibility for structural harms, that social structures can be the generators of collective 
responsibility. Through a discussion of a variety of descriptions of social structures, I provide a 
more detailed analysis of their nature and their effects than is offered by Young. In section 4 I 
discuss the second of Young’s insights, namely the importance of participation in harmful 
institutions to an account of collective responsibility, analysing the way individuals become 
responsible for collective harms through participating in social structures. I conclude that from 
Young’s work we have a good foundation for the development of an account of individual moral 
responsibility for social structural harms. 
 
3.2 Young’s ‘Social Connection Model’ 
Young attempts to develop an individualist account of responsibility that can 
accommodate analysis of large-scale harms caused by social structures, an account which 
ultimately suggests that such harms result in a new form of responsibility. In order to support this 
position, Young describes the way in which many contemporary harms are brought about 
collectively through participation in social structures, and provides an account of political 
responsibility that is held by all participants, but does not result in traditional practices of praise 
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and blame. In the first half of this section I begin with an outline of Young’s motivation for 
developing an account of collective responsibility based on social structures and a new form of 
non-liability responsibility. This includes a discussion of Young’s argument for the necessity of 
structural analysis for harms where individual contributions appear unproblematic or harms 
appear to be a matter of luck. In the second half, I turn to a discussion of Young’s account of 
political responsibility and the ways in which she argues it differs from traditional forms of moral 
and legal responsibility. I argue that the new form of responsibility Young develops is both 
untenable and unnecessary, many aspects of her account actually support holding individuals 
morally responsible for their participation in social structural harms. 
 
i.! The motivation for a social structural account of responsibility 
The motivation for Young’s social connection model stems from her belief that some 
harms in the world are structural in nature. Identifying a harm as structural means that it is the 
result of an organised social institution or process, where the interactions of many different agents 
result in harm and disadvantage to some people. This may be so even when each participant 
believes their actions to be unproblematic as they are ‘acting within institutional rules and 
according to practices that most people regard as morally acceptable’.117 Structural harms are 
distinct from individual harms, which have an identifiable perpetrator and where there is a clear 
causal link between the perpetrator and a specific harm. In the case of structural harms, individual 
contributing actions may appear unimportant, insignificant, or only very distantly connected to a 
structural harm. These acts, whether or not they appear innocuous, all contribute to social 
structures. When those social structures result in harm, making responsibility ascriptions can be 
particularly difficult. Young argues that by holding participants in social structures responsible 
for their contribution to structural harms and injustice, we can overcome the problem of 
identifying responsible agents where there is a lack of clear and direct causal links between 
specific perpetrators and harms.  
In order to illustrate one of the ways in which structural harms may come about, Young 
presents us with Sandy’s Story.118 Based on Pogge’s condo example,119 Sandy is a single mother 
who, despite the best efforts of those she interacts with to assist her, is vulnerable to homelessness. 
Sandy’s situation arises from a lack of affordable, safe housing near her place of work, and her 
inability to afford private transportation or an adequate deposit due to her low wage. No-one 
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Sandy encounters treats her unfairly, everyone acts within established norms surrounding 
property letting, and some go out of their way to try to help her. However, she is ultimately left 
unable to secure housing for herself and her children. Young argues that despite the fact that no-
one directly treats Sandy unfairly, many people would agree that there is something wrong with 
her situation.120 The problem for Young is that the structure governing housing practices leads to 
harm, so that however we may judge the individual interactions themselves, the structural process 
of which they are a part will result in some people being disadvantaged or harmed.  The harm is 
the result of the coordinated interactions of many agents performed as part of an established social 
structural practice, it is foreseeable, it is not random, and not beyond the ability of agents to 
change through collective endeavour. Sandy’s predicament is therefore a case of structural harm. 
Identifying and addressing cases of structural harm raises many problems.  Young argues 
that the prevailing view has become to attribute many cases of structural harm to bad luck or to 
blame the individuals involved for their own misfortune.121 In some cases people do contribute to 
their situation, but Young argues that for many people their poverty and disadvantage is due to 
circumstances out of their control. In these and many other cases, Young argues that individuals 
are adversely affected by social institutions that advantage some but often disadvantage many 
others. Through a discussion of welfare and housing policies in the United States, Young aims to 
establish that many social structures have developed to the disadvantage of the poorest people 
involved in the structure. In the case of housing, due to the limited amount of homes available in 
desirable areas, house prices increase the more competition there is for these properties, leaving 
many people priced out of areas with better amenities and schools. Young highlights the vast 
inequalities in access to education in the USA as a consequence of this process.122 Her discussion 
suggests that holding individuals responsible for their lack of access to basic services and a decent 
level of education early in life, which in turn leads to reduced ability to obtain high paid work in 
adulthood, is unfair and unjustifiable. 
Another significant problem for addressing social structural harm examined by Young is 
the tendency to put disadvantage and harm down to a matter of bad luck. In her discussion of 
Dworkin and other luck egalitarians’ analysis of injustice, Young is at odds with their 
understanding of the role of luck in matters of justice. There are a great many things that fall to 
luck, but reducing all disadvantage to luck has the effect that people tend to think of the sources 
of misfortune as a matter of fate.123 She suggests that treating economic forces as a matter of luck 
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‘artificially reifies them,’124 we begin to see them as forces of nature and therefore beyond human 
control. Considering Sandy’s situation, Young argues that Sandy is not the victim of ‘sheer bad 
luck, as though a hurricane had blown her house away’.125 Sandy is vulnerable to homelessness 
not because of some kind of force majeure, but rather due to the predictable outcome of current 
house letting policies.  These policies are devised and implemented by agents, and they are 
capable of being changed by agents. Viewing structural harms as matters of luck misrepresents 
the roles agents perform in bringing these harms about and unjustifiably removes them from 
ethical consideration. 
One of the reasons structural harms are seen as a kind of natural force by many 
participants is that the vast numbers of agents involved, and the relatively small contribution of 
each individual, makes the ability of any individual to alter or control the structure appear 
impossible. Since the structural process is therefore seen as something that is beyond human 
control, agents do not see themselves as in any way personally responsible for the harm structures 
bring about. Young states that whilst the individual actions of participants do not directly cause 
harm to others in social structures, their actions contribute ‘indirectly, collectively, and 
cumulatively’126 to bring about the harm. Structural harms only come about because agents 
participate in them, social structures are neither natural forces nor separate entities operating 
independently of agents, rather they are the result of certain organised ways of agents interacting.  
For Young, our responsibility stems from participating with others in systems of ‘interdependent 
processes of cooperation and competition’127 within which we all live our lives. Therefore, 
although individuals are not directly responsible for specific harms caused by social structures, 
they do cause structural harms along with other agents through continued participation in 
structural processes.  
Structural harms, then, are appropriate subjects of moral evaluation due the involvement 
of individual agents in bringing them about. Understanding the specific role agents have in 
structural harm, and the way in which their contribution is to be evaluated, forms the core of 
Young’s social connection model. Young argues that this new model is necessary because social 
structural harm does not fit into traditional responsibility models. She argues that moral and legal 
responsibility falls under a ‘liability’ model,128 where responsibility is assigned to agents whose 
actions can be causally linked to those states of affairs for which we wish to discern responsibility 
ascriptions. As we have seen, this direct link between specific agents and harms is missing in 
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cases of structural harm. Although it is not possible to link individual acts with individual harms, 
Young suggests it is not hard to identify agents who participate in social structures.129 Structural 
harms are collective in nature, they require the contributions of many agents through participation 
in social processes. We therefore require a form of responsibility that reflects this collective 
characteristic of structural harm, whilst still attributing responsibility to the individual agents who 
help bring these harms about. 
Young bases her account of social connection on the work of Hannah Arendt. Through 
an analysis of Arendt’s work on German responsibility for World War II, Young identifies a type 
of responsibility that arises from membership of a political community. Arendt argued that all 
members of a community share a responsibility for the actions of that community, and have a 
responsibility to actively participate in the community. 130 Arendt rejected the idea that political 
responsibility could bring with it notions of guilt and blame, these are the reserve of moral 
responsibility and can only be directed at individuals. Political responsibility, on the other hand, 
is held by all members in virtue of their membership, it is collectively held and must be 
collectively discharged with other community members. Whilst Young rejects responsibility from 
membership alone as a form of mystification,131 she accepts the idea that agents bear a particular 
kind of responsibility that derives from social structural engagement. It is the participation and 
therefore the involvement of agents which bestows political responsibility on them, Young argues 
that agents must do, or fail to do, something in order to be held responsible. Therefore, on Young’s 
account, once an agent is identified as a participant in a harmful social structure, they bear political 
responsibility for any harms that structure brings about. 
 
ii.! Young’s political responsibility 
Having discussed the motivations behind Young’s account, we can now examine the five 
distinguishing characteristics that Young argues make political responsibility distinct from 
liability model forms of responsibility. The first of the distinguishing features she suggests is that 
political responsibility is non-isolating. Moral responsibility singles out individuals for judgment, 
whereas for Young, political responsibility falls on all participating agents. Political responsibility 
does not require us to identify specific individuals who have performed actions which contravene 
any social or moral norms, it is a responsibility we all bear regardless of the manner of our 
participation. Young does acknowledge that agents may be morally responsible for their 
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individual contributions if these are morally problematic, but by virtue of their participation, all 
agents bear political responsibility. Each bears individual responsibility, but the responsibility is 
collective because it is held by every participating member.132 
There are a number of problems with this feature of political responsibility. Firstly, whilst 
Young suggests that not singling individual agents out helps avoid problems of blame and guilt, 
it seems that we are required to single out at least some of an agents’ contributing acts in order to 
establish whether or not they are indeed a participant in a social structure and therefore a 
responsibility bearer. Without this level of analysis we would be unable to identify which agents 
were involved in a social structure.  
Young’s discussion of her non-isolating condition also fails to address whether agents 
who are forced to participate through some form of duress, are tricked into participation, or 
accidently participate, should be held responsible in the same way as those who voluntarily 
participate. An important feature of individualism is often argued to be that agents are only held 
responsible for their own acts and omissions, and that their individual circumstances and reasons 
for acting should be taken into account. A common criticism of collectivism is that people are 
held responsible for harms, regardless of their individual relationship to the harm, if they are 
identified as members of a responsible group. Since we have seen that Young rejects Arendt’s 
argument that we bear responsibility simply through membership as being a form of 
‘mystification’, Young’s suggestion that all participants are responsible for structural harms, 
regardless of the circumstances of their participation, can be criticised for itself being closer to 
Arendt’s position than Young cares to admit.  
The second of Young’s characteristics is that political responsibility judges background 
conditions. Young argues that liability-type responsibility tries to identify individuals who stray 
from accepted societal norms and punishes them accordingly.133 Political responsibility, on the 
other hand, calls into question the societal norms themselves. In Young’s example of Sandy, if 
we only consider the individual interactions involved, we will find it hard to identify any harmful 
actions. This is because Sandy is left disadvantaged by the social structure related to housing, 
rather than as a direct result of her interactions with letting agents and other participants in that 
structure. One of the main problems with structural harms is that we all contribute to them simply 
by following ‘the accepted and expected rules and conventions of the communities and 
institutions in which we act.’134 Since agents are all acting within the established rules of the 
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structures in which they live, they find it difficult to appreciate that there is anything wrong with 
their actions. By judging the structures themselves, Young argues that the social connection 
model can address harms that liability models of responsibility struggle to identify.  
Young suggests that in many cases, agents may actually view their contributing actions 
as morally praiseworthy. She presents another housing example where parents trying to secure 
the best education for their children push up house prices in areas with good schools. This prices 
low-income families out of the area, and results in their children facing disadvantage through a 
lack of access to good education.135 The actions of the parents involved is praiseworthy in relation 
to their children, but the fact that it adversely effects poorer children is not something we would 
generally expect those parents to take into consideration. Even if they do understand that they are 
contributing towards this disadvantage, parents may feel that they are powerless to do anything 
about it on their own and therefore have little other option.136  
There is again a problem with Young’s discussion which here lies in the awareness of 
more affluent parents in their role of disadvantaging children from poor families. She suggest 
both that we would normally take the parent’s actions to be praiseworthy, whilst at the same time 
admitting that some may understand that their actions harm others but feel they have no other 
options. However, these two stances are quite different. On Young’s account, there is no 
difference between those parents who are aware that they are contributing to denying children an 
adequate education and carry on regardless, and those parents who are unaware of their 
contribution for non-culpable reasons. Whether or not parents are aware of the adverse effects of 
their actions makes no difference to Young’s account, since singling out the acts of the individual 
for evaluation is not part of the social connection model. Further, since the object in this example 
is the structure that leads to the disadvantage, rather than the contributing actions, the parents’ 
awareness of and attitude towards those contributions is not under evaluation. On Young’s 
account, agents are equally as responsible for the disadvantage whether they deliberately or 
unwittingly helped bring it about.  
The third characteristic Young puts forward in support of political responsibility is that it 
is more forward-looking than backwards-looking. Liability models, Young argues, are concerned 
with blame and guilt, they look back at what agents have done wrong and punish them 
accordingly. The social connection model, on the other hand, is not concerned with past actions, 
but rather with changing social institutions so that in the future they will be less harmful.137 Young 
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argues that, since it is not possible to trace the exact contributions and harms caused by specific 
individuals, there is no point trying to get all and only those involved to proportionally redress 
their harms.138 Instead, everyone who has participated bears political responsibility to change 
social structures.  
As with her non-isolation characteristic, Young’s desire to avoid backwards-looking 
considerations raises a number of difficulties for her account. Failing to identify all and only those 
who have participated leaves us unable to ascribe responsibility only to participants. This is 
problematic for an account which argues that agents bear responsibility on the basis of 
participation. Young’s attempt to avoid backwards-looking considerations is also controversial 
because part of her motivation for doing so is to avoid the problem of demotivating people or 
prompting people to engage in ‘blame-switching’.139 By failing to identify individuals deserving 
of praise or blame for their actions, no-one is made to feel guilty about their participation nor able 
to push the blame onto other agents. However, this approach to developing an account of 
responsibility fails to treat individuals as fully capable moral agents. When individuals are 
identified as participating in a social structure, they are at the same time identified as bearing 
some responsibility for the effects that structure. When that structure has caused harm, agents 
should be held responsible for their part in bringing this about, regardless of how this might make 
them feel. Deciding responsibility ascriptions on the basis of whether or not agents will be 
motivated to address them is rather putting the cart before the horse.  
Attempting to place the temporal emphasis in one direction rather than the other also 
raises particular problems regarding an agent’s discharging of duties relating to structural harm. 
Nussbaum observes that the argument for a forward-focussed form of responsibility is 
conceptually hard to maintain. She suggests that such a distinction leads to a situation where 
people get a ‘free pass indefinitely, since no task they have failed to shoulder ever goes on to the 
debit or guilt side or their ledger’.140 The problem lies in not being able to hold agents accountable 
for past failures, so that every time an agent fails to discharge her responsibilities regarding 
structural harm, we cannot blame her for failing to do so, as such singling out of specific acts and 
omissions is not a part of political responsibility. The only way we could hold agents responsible 
would be to employ a liability model of responsibility, overriding Young’s social connection 
model. Doing so would bring into question quite what the function of Young’s account is in this 
situation. Political responsibility lacks the ability to call agents up on their failure to discharge 
those responsibilities that political responsibility requires of them. It ultimately fails to offer 
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motivation for agents to take up their responsibilities for structural harms. Whether they try to 
discharge their responsibilities or not, they will neither be blamed for failure nor be judged to 
have discharged their responsibilities as political responsibilities are always ongoing, whatever 
their actions. 
Young’s fourth characteristic of political responsibility is that it is a shared form of 
responsibility. Political responsibility is necessarily collective, agents can only bear this 
responsibility when they are participants in a social structure.141 This feature is evident in Young’s 
other characteristics, especially the non-isolation condition, where all are held responsible 
regardless of the nature of their contribution. It is borne individually, but also with others who 
themselves individually bear it. It is each individual’s participatory acts which bestow this 
responsibility on them.  This responsibility is shared because these contributory acts are 
performed with many others. Young attributes some of the motivation for this kind of 
responsibility to the work of Larry May.142 May distinguishes between shared responsibility, 
which is concurrently but personally held by agents who each contributed to a harm, and 
collective responsibility, which is non-distributed and where a group may be held responsible for 
a harm without any of its constituent members being themselves responsible. Young distinguishes 
her form of shared responsibility from May’s mainly by the different types of harms they are both 
addressing. May discusses past harms with identifiable perpetrators, whilst Young argues her 
account is designed to address ongoing harms. 
This feature of political responsibility does not necessarily distinguish it from other forms 
of liability model responsibility because it is possible for agents to share both moral and legal 
reasonability for harms they jointly bring about with others. It does, however, distinguish Young’s 
position from other types of collective responsibility, namely collectivist accounts. Whilst some 
of the characteristics of Young’s account appear to undermine important aspects of individualism, 
particularly by not taking the specific actions of the individual into account when assessing 
responsibility ascriptions, arguing for shared rather than collective responsibility holds each 
individual responsible for their contribution to harm. 
The final characteristic Young discusses as distinguishing political responsibility from 
other responsibility models is that political responsibility can be discharged only through 
collective action. Political responsibility requires agents to join with other participating agents to 
collectively alter the harmful structures in which they participate. Young argues that this feature 
follows from the shared natured of political responsibility, since no agent alone bears it or brings 
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these harms about, no agent alone can address it. It is the requirement that agents must work with 
other members of society to address the responsibilities surrounding social structures which 
Young argues makes this responsibility distinctly political.143 Unlike liability models, where the 
onus is on individuals to address their own responsibilities, the social connection model requires 
a collective endeavour from all participants to address any harms caused by social structures. 
The need to discharge this responsibility collectively again raises questions regarding 
agent motivation and abilities to discharge responsibilities. Individuals alone cannot address 
structural harms according to Young, they must work with others in order to have any effect on 
these social institutions. However, as May observes, when faced with situations requiring 
collective action, ‘people often feel no sense of personal responsibility, and hence they fail to do 
anything to solve the problems’.144 If an agent is considered to be unable to effect change alone, 
their contribution to a solution to the problem may appear insignificant and provide little 
motivation to join with others in order to change social institutions. Additionally, since an agent 
is not blameworthy if they fail to address political responsibilities, and whether or not they attempt 
to do so, will continue to bear the responsibility as long as others in their social institutions engage 
in harmful practices, bearing political responsibility to effect change appears to offer little 
motivation to address harms caused by social structures.  
Another consideration for the requirement that political responsibility be discharged 
collectively is the case of isolated responsibility dischargers. Consider an agent who is aware that 
the social structure in which she is participating is harmful. When she tries to address this harm 
through institutional change with her fellow participants, her calls to action fall upon deaf ears, 
her fellow contributors are unwilling to join her to address the problem. It seems that in this case 
the agent is unable to discharge her responsibility. Political responsibility leaves agents facing the 
possibility of bearing never-ending forward-facing responsibilities so long as other participants 
fail to take up their responsibility. It also raises the additional problem of the reliance on the 
willingness of others to act in order to be able to discharge personal political responsibilities. On 
Young’s account political responsibility can be difficult or in many cases impossible to ever 
discharge. 
Along with the five distinguishing characteristics of political responsibility cited by 
Young, an important feature of the social connection model that is apparent from Young’s 
discussion is that political responsibility is all but unavoidable. The basis for this can again be 
seen in Arendt’s work, where she argues that we cannot escape political responsibility because 
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we cannot live without belonging to a community, we can only exchange one community for 
another and therefore political responsibility for one community with another.145 She describes 
political responsibility as ‘the price we pay for the fact that we live our lives not by ourselves but 
among our fellow men.’146 The unavoidability of political responsibility, although not cited by 
Young as a distinguishing feature, makes it quite different from liability forms of responsibility. 
Whilst an agent can generally avoid bearing responsibility to address a moral or legal harm by 
avoiding acting illegally or immorally, an agent cannot avoid political responsibility. Even in 
cases where an agent did everything within her power to change social institutions and avoid 
harming others through any structured social exchange, whilst other agents continue to perpetuate 
harmful social structures, the agent’s responsibility is never fully discharged. This particular 
feature of political responsibility is interesting due to the high demands it places on individual 
agents. Throughout Young’s discussion, she rejects applying liability forms of responsibility on 
agents for cases of social structural harm as unfairly demanding, but Young’s own model bestows 
an unending form of responsibility on agents that no actions of theirs can ever fully discharge.  
Young’s argument for collective responsibility can be summarised as follows:  
1.! Some harms are the result of structured social processes involving the participation of large 
numbers of people.  
2.! In these cases no distinct individuals have directly brought about the harm, but rather the harm is 
a result of a multitude of minute participatory acts.  
3.! The participatory acts themselves need not be morally blameworthy for the social institution to 
cause harm.  
4.! Social structural harms do not therefore fit traditional individualist responsibility models.  
5.! Young suggests a responsibility model based on participation, where agents bear political 
responsibility for their involvement in social structures.  
6.! This responsibility is distinct from moral and legal responsibility in that it is non-isolating, it 
judges background conditions, is forward looking, shared, and discharged collectively. 
Many of Young’s observations regarding individual agents’ roles in social structural 
harms are particularly insightful. However, Young’s suggestion that these connections lead to a 
weaker form of responsibility is, I would argue, unsustainable. The distinctions she draws to 
differentiate political responsibility from the liability model cannot be maintained, and Young 
fails to provide an adequate reason that we should downplay agent’s participation in structural 
harms.  This being the case, in the following I shall analyse the two most insightful aspects of 
Young’s argument, the role of social structures and the importance of participation, in order to 
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establish their importance to a full account of moral responsibility in cases of social structural 
harm. 
 
3.3. Social Structures and Harm 
Despite the problems with Young’s attempt to develop a new form of responsibility, her 
work provides some compelling arguments for a participation-based collective responsibility for 
social structural harms. In order to develop her ideas further, in this section I shall analyse the 
nature of social structures in more detail, expanding on Young’s analysis and discussing some of 
the other descriptions of social structures that can be found in the literature. I explain the ways in 
which these structures lead individuals to participate in large-scale harms, often through 
seemingly harmless action, and some of the reasons why agents fail to recognise that their actions 
involve participation in social structures. 
 
i.! The nature of social structures 
Young grounds her argument for collective responsibility in our involvement in social 
structures. She argues that our social interactions can be judged by the ways in which the 
institutions of which they are a part effect both participants and nonparticipants alike. We 
therefore bear responsibility to those harmed by these social structures, as well as having a 
responsibility to address problems with the structures themselves. Young suggests that the 
responsibility we bear regarding social structures is supplemental to our responsibility regarding 
our individual actions. Our actions may, if considered in isolation, appear morally unproblematic, 
but contribute to a harmful social structure. We therefore each bear collective responsibility for 
our contribution to social structures alongside our individual responsibility for our actions.  
Given that social structures play such an important role in our moral lives, we require a 
clear explanation of what constitutes this broad range of organised human interactions. Young 
does not provide a detailed description of exactly what constitutes a social structure in her 
account, alternating between references to structures, processes, and institutions. She argues that 
structure is ‘notoriously difficult to define’, and opts not to offer a precise definition but rather to 
build an account throughout her discussion.147 Whilst it is possible to gain a general understanding 
of what Young has in mind, developing a more substantial account will help draw out the way in 
which social structures and those participating in them can be argued to be the proper subjects of 
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moral evaluation. I shall begin with a discussion of other accounts of social structures which will 
be useful in filling the gaps in Young’s account. 
One of the most widely discussed structural accounts of responsibility is that presented 
by Rawls. Young identifies Rawls’ social institutions as sharing some features in common with 
her account of social structures. Rawls describes a social institution as a ‘public system of rules 
which defines offices and positions with their rights and duties, powers and immunities, and the 
like’.148 These rules inform citizens which actions are permissible and forbidden, and what 
penalties violations will incur. The examples of social institutions he lists include ‘games and 
rituals, trials and parliaments, markets and systems of property’.149 Whilst this appears to be quite 
a wide ranging definition that would be able to incorporate all manner of social structures, Rawls’ 
account is criticised by Young in a number of ways. Young voices concerns regarding the more 
narrow focus found in Rawls, she argues for a broader conception to accommodate international 
social groups, as well as viewing structures as a perspective on society, rather than as a distinct 
section of a society.  
Young states that she broadly agrees with Rawls that there should be a distinction 
between moral analysis at the institutional and individual level. However, she argues that Rawls’ 
account has a too limited scope and focus on national institutions.150 Since many contemporary 
structural harms involve people from around the world, limiting institutions to national 
boundaries will not allow us to adequately analyse these particular social structures. She also finds 
Rawls’ perception of institutions to be incorrect, arguing that they are not a separate part of 
society, as Rawls’ account suggests, but rather a particular way of observing social practices 
within society.151 This distinction is important to Young’s analysis. Any attempt to present 
institutions as separate and distinct part of society, rather than as a way of categorising social 
interactions, misunderstands the nature of social institutions for Young. Social institutions are the 
frameworks in which we interact with one another, rather than distinct practices that we can opt 
in and out of at will.  
An alternative conception has been offered by Pogge, who holds a more globally-oriented 
view of social structures and describes social institutions in a suitably broad fashion. Pogge 
suggests that social systems are more like rules governing games. They ‘define and regulate 
property, the division of labour, sexual and kinship relations, as well as political and economic 
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competition’.152 This loose definition enables Pogge to incorporate international organisations into 
his discussion, both formal and informal. He argues against a state-based conception of 
institutions, pointing to the global nature of many social and economic structures, which would 
be difficult to account for on a more restricted view. In this way his position seems closer to the 
all-encompassing theory Young has in mind.  
Their accounts share many similar concerns regarding international structures and the 
problems individuals face in addressing the large-scale harms with which we are currently faced. 
However, the main difference between them is Pogge’s focus on specific examples of powerful 
institutions, including governments, corporations, and certain NGOs, which work to the 
advantage of more affluent countries. For Young, Pogge’s account seems to share a similar flaw 
with Rawls’, in that it does not place enough importance on the way in which all members of 
society perpetuate structural harms, instead focussing on particular powerful organisations and 
the unjust international order they produce.153  Whilst Young suggests that these organisations 
play an important role in structural harms, focussing on their contribution at the expense of 
individual contribution fails to adequately take into account the role all members of social 
institutions play in bringing about these harms. Therefore, whilst Pogge’s account is closer to 
Young’s in terms of its global scope, its focus on organisations over individual participants leads 
to its rejection by Young.  
The effect of globalisation on traditional views of social, economic, and political 
institutions is also discussed by Scheffler. Scheffler discusses the tension between our everyday 
view of human relations as being ‘primarily small-scale interactions, with clearly demarcated 
lines of causation, among independent individual agents’ and the globalisation of our societies.154 
He argues that this conception has become naturalised, since it was largely the case until the last 
century, and effects our ability to understand the large-scale, international social institutions of 
which we are now all a part. This is particularly problematic when we try to insist that states can 
maintain closed institutional systems, separate from other countries, given the amount of 
interaction and interdependence on which we now all rely.155 It is hard to justify the denial of 
ethical consideration to those outside a state with whom we interact in order to pursue our goals, 
but then reject as our responsibility when this interaction harms them. Scheffler’s concerns 
regarding attempts to limit the scale of social institutions are similar again to Young’s motivation 
for developing the social connection model. Although Scheffler does not develop his own 
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institutional account, many of his observations and arguments regarding responsibility to others 
support Young’s work. 
Whilst accounts of social structures do vary, we can identify important common themes 
and considerations running through some of the literature. These include the idea that social 
structures provide rules and guidelines that govern human interactions. Structural rules allow 
individuals to coordinate and organise their actions on both small and huge scales. Social 
structures can operate across borders and can incorporate agents on a global scale. These 
structures can be formal or informal, they can be cultural, political, economic, or social. Many 
have developed to facilitate institutions that allow participants to do far more within the structure 
than they could outside of it. Since all participants are aware of what is expected of them, large 
numbers of agents can interact with each other through established structures following rules 
which allow them to pursue their personal goals alongside many other agents.  
Social structures remain difficult to define, but any account needs be broad in its scope 
to be able to incorporate the many different ways agents have developed of organising and 
coordinating their social interactions. Social structures are, then, the coordinated interactions of 
groups of agents, governed by rules outlining accepted social exchanges in particular situations, 
and prohibiting other exchanges in particular situations. Structures can exist on any scale, from 
small communities to international organisations, but require a widespread knowledge and 
understanding of which exchanges are viewed as appropriate and when this is so amongst the vast 
majority of participants. Without a high level of knowledge of and following of the rules amongst 
participants, a social structure would struggle to persist. Structures are not separate entities from 
agents, but are rather the frameworks within which participants interact with one another.  
One example of a social structure, which I shall discuss in more detail in chapter 5, is that 
of the global clothing industry. This structure is incredibly highly organised and operates on an 
international scale. Most people participate in it in some way, in more affluent countries this 
usually takes the form of purchasing items produced in developing countries. This structure can 
be identified by the rules that govern exchanges within it. Agents wishing to buy goods do so 
through retailers, there is a supply chain between these retailers and manufactures across the 
world, with the different contributions of various agents taking places through established 
structural rules. As a consumer of these items, I cannot go directly to the factories to obtain the 
goods I want, nor am I able to access them at intermediate stages of their distribution to retail 
outlets. Factory workers cannot sell the goods they produce directly to consumers, agents 
operating at different levels of the structure are unlikely to ever have any direct interaction. No-
one’s participation in this structural process is random, all exchanges require a lot of organisation 
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and coordination in order to allow the process to function on such a large scale. Participants must 
follow the rules that govern interaction within a social structure in order to be a part of it.  
It is the existence of these rules, whether more or less formal, that distinguishes social 
structures from more random exchanges. Where interactions lack the defining characteristics of 
traditional groups, we may be tempted to label the exchanges as random. Many social structures 
involve collections of agents interacting which, whilst organised, lack the cohesion of groups. 
Participants may not be acting towards any shared goal, or they may lack any common knowledge 
other than a general understanding of the rules governing the structure in which they are 
participating, such as is the case in the global clothing industry. This lack of a unifying element 
to their interactions can make structural interactions appear non-collective. However, this 
misjudges the nature of the interactions involved in structural exchanges. Structures rely on the 
organised interactions of participating agents, actions must be coordinated in order for the social 
structure to function. Were the actions of participants random, the high level of coordination many 
structures achieve would be unlikely to spontaneously occur. Thus, whilst social structures may 
fail to meet the criteria for groups as often presented in collectivism, they are neither random nor 
the result of the actions of isolated individuals. 
The ability of social structures to facilitate large-scale coordination amongst individuals 
can bring many benefits, extending agency by allowing agents to coordinate their efforts to 
perform actions and produce many goods and services that would be unavailable to isolated 
agents. Social structures improve and enrich agents’ lives in many ways. For example, both 
governance and healthcare are social structures that bring with them important benefits, but are 
only available through the coordinated efforts of many individuals. The vast technological 
advances that have taken place over the last century have only been achievable due to a massive 
amount of coordination between agents through vast social interdependence and interaction 
involving participation in many intricate social structures. This interdependence has become a 
part of daily life for most agents. It has changed our relationships to others as well as the way in 
which we lead our lives and meet our daily needs. Anderson argues, for example, that 
contemporary attempts to identify individual contributions to methods of production ‘represents 
an arbitrary cut in the causal web’, because nowadays everyone’s contribution depends on what 
everyone else is doing.156 We therefore benefit from the contributions of many other participating 
agents when we interact through social structures, but identifying the precise benefit each 
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contributor brings is not possible, because contributions are deeply intertwined and 
interdependent. 
Whilst social structures can produce much good in the world, they also allow us to 
produce greater harms than the less well coordinated actions of multiple agents could. Since social 
structures are able to facilitate the organisation of vast numbers of people, they are able to 
coordinate the actions of those involved to create harms on a global scale. Young’s example of 
Sandy facing vulnerability to homelessness is an example of the way in which structural processes 
can lead to harm.157 Whilst outside of a social structure, Sandy may become homeless due to 
eviction by a particular landlord, or by being refused accommodation by another, in an 
uncoordinated social exchange it would be far less likely that she would be left systematically 
unable to meet her housing needs. One of the differences that is important to an analysis of the 
problem with Sandy’s situation is that her predicament is predictable from the rules governing 
the structure of the housing sector. Before Sandy finds herself homeless, we can predict, given 
her background, level of education, type of employment, family commitments, and the current 
housing market in her area, that finding suitable housing will be extremely difficult for her. Were 
her situation brought about through a matter of luck or random exchanges, we would be unable 
to make such predictions regarding her ability obtain adequate housing. Through observations 
regarding the effects of social structures on vulnerable participants and non-participants alike, it 
becomes apparent that our participation in these structures raises serious questions regarding our 
responsibility to others. 
 
ii.! Participation and individual responsibility 
So far, I have been discussing the nature of social structures and the way in which they 
shape our daily lives, both by allowing us to achieve many goals that would be unavailable to us 
in isolation, as well as facilitating great harms. Whether producing benefits or harms, social 
structures are a result of agents’ coordinated interactions, rather than distinct entities operating 
separately from individuals. Only the continued participation of individuals allows social 
structures to perpetuate. Therefore, participants play an important role in the benefits and harms 
brought about by social structures. Participating in social structures can now be seen to have 
profound effects on agents’ individual responsibilities towards others. This occurs in a number of 
ways. One of these has already been mentioned, the fact that participating in social structures 
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expands agency. May states that when a person joins a group, ‘they greatly expand what they can 
accomplish in the world, but they also expand what they are responsible for’.158 When an 
individual is able to effect more agents through participation with others, they become responsible 
for this increased impact on the world. Participating in social structures can therefore expand that 
for which an individual is responsible. 
A second way in which participation effects individual responsibility for harm is that 
structural harms can lead to participants collectively bringing about harms without any participant 
intending this harm as a shared goal. In these cases, agents contribute to a social structure for 
various personal reasons, none of which are the resulting harm. Scheffler argues that this is not 
an uncommon result of social institutions, where important outcomes are produced by the actions 
of many agents, where few if any intend the outcome.159 In situations like this, agents may object 
to the suggestion that they bear responsibility for an outcome they had no intention of bringing 
about, and to which their contribution is only one of many others which resulted in the harm.  This 
kind of appeal relates back to the earlier observation that many agents find it difficult to appreciate 
their contribution to large-scale harms, particularly because many people still view social 
interactions as largely direct and personal, rather than indirect and structural. Whilst it remains a 
problem that people may fail to appreciate their role in structural harms they did not intend, this 
in itself does not necessarily lessen their responsibility for contributing to these harms.160 
The third effect of structures on participants I shall mention here is the way in which 
structures shape the options available to those involved in them. Scheffler again observes that 
agents are often unaware of the ways in which social structures shape their actions,161 a problem 
frequently also raised by Young. The ways in which structures shape agents’ actions are vast. By 
providing rules for interactions between agents, the options that agents feel are open to them are 
narrowed. Although agents are able to ignore the rules of social structures, this may result in 
penalties, and agents may be reluctant to break with established rules, which is itself a form of 
influencing participating agents’ actions. Agents’ actions are also shaped by the kinds of social 
structures available to them, and the goods and services that these structures have produced. 
Whilst social structures increase the options available to agents, this is only in line with what the 
structures have made possible for participants. We are often unaware of this influence that social 
structures have over our lives for two main reason, we face problems of perception regarding 
social structures, and they have largely been normalised into everyday life. 
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iii.! The problems of perception and normalisation 
Given that social structures play such prominent roles in our lives, the question may be 
asked as to why they do not have a greater presence in our discussion of agent responsibility. 
Young argues that part of the reason for their absence in much of the debate is a matter of 
perception. We find it difficult to see social structures because they are not a distinct part of 
society.  They are rather a ‘way of looking at the whole society’.162 They are a way of examining 
relations and interactions, of identifying patterns of behaviour and interdependence. Young 
argues that we do not experience social structures directly, nor the way in which they affect our 
choices and options.  Agents do not find particular rules constraining and they fail to identify the 
ways in which rules combine to constrain their options in a range of ways.163 This is often due to 
agents’ tendency to evaluate their individual interactions with specific others, rather than 
evaluating the broader framework and patterns that govern this interaction.  
This failure to recognise structures can result in agents being unable to identify the correct 
sources of harm. Young examines this failure through the problem of structural vulnerability to 
homelessness. She discusses the increasing tendency in society to blame vulnerable people for 
the harms they suffer, without regard to social processes that work to many people’s 
disadvantage.164 Agents understandably wish to be able to identify the reasons that some people 
suffer harms and disadvantages when others do not. However, the difficulties agents have in 
recognising the extent of social interactions and the far reaching consequences of many social 
structures means that they are unable to make an accurate analysis of the root causes of structural 
harms. This leads to people being disproportionally blamed for harms they suffer, because whilst 
some agents may bear some responsibility for their situation, there will at the same time be many 
contributing factors towards their situation that are a result of wider structural forces beyond their 
individual control. Where agents fail to recognise this, the integral role social structures play in 
responsibility ascriptions will continue to be overlooked.      
As well as the failure to recognise social structures, the issue of normalisation presents 
major problems to our perception of social structures and their role in our lives. Young argues 
that our relationship to most social structures is so engrained that we do not think that we have an 
alternative but to act as we do.165 We see our cultural norms and socioeconomic structures as a 
natural and normal part of life, and do not question their rules because we are so accustomed to 
them. Such a view of social structures is problematic because it leads to complacency regarding 
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the harms caused by social structures. When structures are widely regarded to be natural, agents 
fail to seek an alternative way to organise social structures in order to make them less harmful. It 
is hard for agents to recognise that the social structures in which they currently participate are just 
a few examples of the many ways agents could organise themselves. 
One reason agents tend to view social structures as a natural and normal aspect of life is 
their indoctrination in them from birth. Agents are raised within social structures; they are not 
presented with a list of options regarding the social structures available to them when they reach 
adulthood. Instead, they are usually raised within a community with clearly defined social 
structures which most agents follow. May observes that it is difficult for people to hold vastly 
different views from their fellow community members,166 and this leads to a reluctance to question 
structural norms in most people. Many agents also find it difficult to fundamentally change their 
attitudes, particularly attitudes with which they have been brought up, because these form part of 
an agent’s personal identity. Many of an agent’s daily actions are performed unconsciously, and 
Narveson suggests that these actions are frequently the result of being raised in specific 
communities.167 
May argues that we are also further disinclined to change our attitudes where this would 
involve a major overhaul of our lives and dispositions.168 Many agents in affluent countries benefit 
overall from the current social structures we have in place, and are therefore reluctant to 
fundamentally change their way of life. A reluctance to question values and community practices 
that would entail drastically altering community life has occurred often throughout history. 
O’Neill sites several such instances where specific groups have been denied agent status within 
society, including ‘for foreigner or foe, for heathen and heretic, for serfs and slaves, for those of 
other race or culture, for women, for children and 'dependents', for animals and artificial 
persons’.169 Where these denials have been overcome, agents within these societies have often 
struggled to accept the changes required of them in order to alter their social structures. Pogge 
discusses contemporary arguments that have been presented in an attempt to excuse affluent 
citizens from helping those disadvantaged and harmed by social structures in which they 
participate, some of which echo historical arguments denying certain groups moral 
consideration.170 The reluctance to alter social structures to which agents are accustomed has been 
a problem for some time.  
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Young’s account points towards the importance of the role of social structures in our 
lives. Whilst her discussion of these structures is somewhat vague, a more detailed explanation 
of the nature of these structures aids an understanding of them, the effects they have on individual 
participants, and the effects that they have on disadvantaged participants and non-participants 
alike. Social structures have come to play a central role in our daily lives, and through a variety 
of social structures we interact with people locally and globally. Whilst this can bring us all great 
benefits, it can also lead to our participation in harm.  Overcoming problems we often encounter 
identifying social structures and our roles in them can help the identification of agent 
responsibilities regarding structural harm. In order to better understand the importance of 
individual contribution to structural harm, the following section will examine the relationship 
between agent participation and collective responsibility. 
 
3.4. Participation and Collective Responsibility 
Having discussed the nature of social structures and the role they play in causing large-
scale harm, an analysis of the relationship between participating agents and the collective 
responsibility they bear from involvement in social structures is now required. Young argues that 
participation is an essential part of collective responsibility, rejecting Arendt’s claim that 
membership alone can bestow collective responsibility on an individual. By participating in a 
social structure, an agent becomes responsible for the effects of that structure. In order to 
understand the nature of this responsibility and the importance of participation, in this section I 
shall expand some of the arguments presented by Young to support an account of collective 
responsibility. I shall explain why participation, even in cases where the individual contribution 
appears negligible or morally praiseworthy, brings the agent responsibility for the collective 
harm.  
The first reason that individual participation is so important to social structures lies in the 
fact that these structures are the result of and reducible to the actions of individuals. Although the 
relationships involved may be very complicated, and it may not be possible to discern precisely 
what specific effect any particular participatory act has to the collective structure, structures 
would not exist were it not for the actions of the individuals of which they are constituted. This 
position is the central tenet of individualist accounts of collective responsibility. It is particularly 
important to remember the significance of participation in cases of social structural harm because 
the often small participatory acts of individuals can lead agents to believe their participation is 
unimportant. This undervalues the role agents play in perpetuating social structures. Although 
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any one individual participatory action may not be able to change the entire social structure, many 
individual contributing acts can bring dramatic changes. 
Observing and analysing these two perspectives on individual contributing acts is an 
important part of Young’s account. Both are required in order to provide a full moral evaluation 
of the act. On the one hand, we may assess the action and its direct consequences on those 
immediately involved. On the other hand, we may view the action as a part of wider social 
structures to see how it perpetuates these, and in turn the harms or benefits such structures create. 
In this way, analysing actions which contribute to structural harms requires examining them from 
two perspectives. The distinction between levels should not be conceived of as producing distinct 
and separate levels,171 but rather as an analysis of the context in which an action is performed. 
This is in much the same way that one may question as to the context of what we may perceive 
to be an isolated action. We may ask whether it was performed under duress or whether there 
were extenuating circumstances. For example, were an individual to steal food, we may take into 
consideration whether that person had a moral or legal means to obtain it, or whether (and why) 
this was not possible for them.172 These factors influence how we assess the individual’s actions.  
Similarly, when assessing an action that contributes to a social structure, the action may 
be viewed differently when it contributes to a large-scale harm than it would if it were performed 
in isolation. Returning to Young’s example of parents pushing up house prices in desirable areas, 
the actions of the parents on the individual level appears praiseworthy; they are trying to secure 
safe accommodation and good amenities for their families. When their actions are viewed as part 
of the social process which leaves many poorer families unable to secure adequate housing, 
however, the praiseworthiness of the parents’ actions is less certain. Although any individual 
parent’s choice may not push disadvantaged families into undesirable housing, the actions of 
many parents has a devastating effect on some members of the community. If we fail to observe 
the wider implications of participating in social structures and only focus on the direct effects that 
individual actions have on immediate others, we will fail to be able to acknowledge the ways in 
which contributing acts are the constituent parts of a process that can have far reaching 
consequences for others.  
It is the act of participation, then, then bestows responsibility on the participant for the 
effect of the structure. An act that is performed as part of a social structure can be evaluated in at 
least two ways, and the importance of this observation relates to the individual’s involvement in 
                                                        
171 As is suggested by Isaacs, see chapter 2. 
172 Young makes a similar observation regarding Sandy’s situation, she may be responsible for some of the factors 
which have led her to face homelessness, but this does not lessen the responsibilities regarding the social structures 
which have led to her situation (Responsibility for Justice, chapter 2). 
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the structure. Whether the action itself is selfish, altruistic, has a large or small effect on others, 
is a separate but important consideration. An important first step in understanding responsibility 
ascriptions in cases of social structural harm is identifying those agents who participate in the 
structure. Establishing this connection allows us to identify the agents involved in the harm and 
who therefore bear some of the responsibility for it. After this, we can turn to considerations of 
their responsibilities regarding the other perspective of their action, namely the direct 
interpersonal impact of their action and questions of individual responsibility. 
In cases of collective responsibility, particularly cases of social structural harm, 
identifying participants is important because many agents’ contributions will appear very small 
indeed. A focus on the act of participation rather than the specific contribution is necessary, as a 
focus on the direct impact of each individual participatory act would result in participants bearing 
little or no individual responsibility for the harm caused by the social structure. We would be left 
with a situation where many agents participate in a harm, but no-one bears any responsibility for 
it. As social structural harms are not random, we can identify the collective endeavours which 
bring these harms about, such a conclusion is clearly unsatisfactory. There are problems, however, 
with holding agents responsible for contributing to collective harms through social structures. 
This is especially so when agents are performing what appear to be altruistic acts and where agents 
do not benefit from the social structure in which they are participating. In both of these cases, one 
may object to holding the participant responsible for contributing to the collective harm. 
When an agent performs an altruistic act, we usually view such behaviour as morally 
praiseworthy. Acting for the good of others is morally valuable, it is most often supererogatory, 
and overall is thought to leave the agent in a non-blameworthy position regarding that act. The 
same can be said for many acts which, in isolation, appear to be morally praiseworthy. Performing 
a morally praiseworthy act is often argued to warrant praise towards the individual and remove 
any cause for blame regarding this action. When an act contributes to social structural harm, 
however, that an act appears to be morally praiseworthy, based on its immediate effects on others 
for example, is no guarantee that an agent is non-blameworthy in relation to the act. Participatory 
acts in social structures help perpetuate the harms these structures cause, this is the case whether 
the individual acts in isolation appear praiseworthy or blameworthy. We can assess an agent’s 
acts as praiseworthy in isolation, but also observe that they contribute to a collective harm for 
which they bear some responsibility, despite the praiseworthiness of their action. 
It is possible to think of other examples where contextualising what appears at first to be 
a straightforward case of acting altruistically calls into question the praiseworthiness of the action. 
For instance, a person stopping to save a drowning child, considered in isolation, is a praiseworthy 
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act.173 But suppose that person was rushing to save 100 children, that they were the only person 
who could help them, and that the delay of saving the drowning child left them unable to help the 
others. Although saving the drowning child is praiseworthy, choosing to save 1 child over 100 is 
not straightforwardly so.174 The importance of including an analysis of the context of an action 
can help us avoid overlooking the contribution of acts which in themselves may appear to be 
morally praiseworthy, but that contribute to harm.  
Contextual analysis of the wider structure of which an action is a part can lead to what 
appears to be a counterintuitive conclusion: people may bear responsibility for a structure in 
which they participate but from which they suffer harm. Young argues that we all participate in 
and ‘usually benefit from the operation of these institutions’.175 There are a significant number of 
people, however, who not only do not benefit, but are harmed by the social structures in which 
they are involved. Vulnerability to homelessness, for example, is a common problem around the 
world. Agents participate in the social processes that create this vulnerability, whether they 
benefit or are harmed by it. We may ask, then, why an agent should be held responsible for 
participating in a social structure by which they are harmed. The answer lies again in the 
importance of the act of participation, regardless of the personal ramifications of the wider social 
structure. The agent would also bear responsibility for the structure had they personally 
benefitted.  
It may be thought that holding an agent responsible who benefits from the social structure 
is justifiable, as they have profited in some way from a harm, whereas an agent who is harmed 
has participated but suffered. This would mean that the morality of participating in structures that 
harm agents would depend on whether the individual agent benefits or suffers as a result of the 
structure. This view gives no consideration to how the agent benefits or harms others through 
their contribution, instead presenting a rather self-interested account of the morality of social 
structural harm. We do not usually assess an action’s moral worth by the amount we may profit 
by it, and there seems little reason to do so in this case. A better approach to the problem of 
assessing the responsibilities of those who participate but suffer would be to acknowledge that 
their actions helped bring about the harm, but that their capacity to address their responsibilities 
is limited due to their own suffering as a result of the social structure. This avoids the path of 
assessing responsibilities based on personal benefit or harm. 
                                                        
173 Peter Singer, ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1 (1972), 229-243. 
174 We can alter this example in several ways to examine its praiseworthiness. If others were immediately able to save 
the drowning child if the rescuer had not acted, the decision to save 1 child over 100 seems even more questionable. 
175 Young Responsibility for Justice, p. 92. 
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Thus far I have examined the connection between participation and individual 
responsibility for collective harm. The importance of this relationship lies in the consequences of 
our actions as part of broader social structures, which results in our participation in harm we 
would be unable to bring about alone. This participation in harmful social structures result in us 
playing a part in bringing about harm to others, harm for which we are therefore responsible. We 
do not do this alone, many other agents are involved in bringing about these same harms. Much 
of our involvement in social structures will be heavily influenced by some of these others, we will 
chose to perform certain actions because of the actions of others. May discusses the importance 
of acknowledging this interaction and interdependence and the ways in which it effects our 
choices. The ‘behaviour and attitudes’ of other members of one’s community are ‘a function’ of 
what we do, and as a result of this effect we have upon each other ‘we are all implicated in most 
of the actions taken by our fellow community members’.176 
The idea that many of our responsibilities stem from this close interdependence with 
others can be difficult for some to accept. There is a tendency in discussions of responsibility to 
view the individual as somewhat isolated from other agents, as independent of their peers and 
able to act in total isolation, with total freedom, without the influence of others. This view 
completely underestimates the role that others play in shaping our lives and the options available 
to us. We provide the same influence to other agents’ lives, and therefore where we coordinate 
our actions with others through organised interactions, we taken on responsibility for our 
involvement in these and any harm they cause.  
Throughout this section I have discussed the ways in which participating in harmful 
structures bestows responsibility on the individual participants for that harm. I have not suggested 
that the responsibility we bear in regards to this contribution to harm is a special kind of 
responsibility, that it is different from our common conceptions of responsibility for harming 
others. There is no reason to posit a new form of responsibility to explain why we should be held 
responsible for contributing to harm. Young’s account provides good grounds on which to argue 
that our participation in social structures bestows responsibility on us for the harm they cause. 
Although we do not intend to cause this harm directly, we can be ‘complicit in ends we do not 
intend when we intentionally perform acts that help bring them about’.177 We are not performing 
random actions, or accidently coordinating with other agents, we most often follow rules and act 
in accordance with what is expected from other participants in social structures.  We usually do 
                                                        
176 May Sharing Responsibility, p. 177. 
177 Robert Jubb, ‘Social Connection and Practice Dependence: Some Recent Developments in the Global Justice 
Literature: Iris Marion Young, Responsibility for Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011; and Ayelet Banai, 
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so willingly, or unreflectively, and aim to fulfil our goals through interaction with others within 
these structures. That we do not specifically intend to harm others does not remove our 
responsibility for the harm we help bring about. 
 
3.5. Conclusion  
Many individualist accounts struggle to adequately account for responsibility ascriptions 
in cases of collective harm because they are susceptible to under-determination in terms of these 
ascriptions for the harms caused by groups. This is particularly problematic in cases where the 
individual participating acts of agents appear to make very little impact on the greater harm, but 
where very serious harms are the result of many of these small contributions. It is through an 
account of collective responsibility for cases such as these that Young attempts to bridge this gap 
in individualism. Young argues that in cases of structural harm, all participants share in the 
responsibility to address the harmful social structures of which they are a part. The social 
connection model does not require a clear causal link between specific participating agents and 
particular harms, all participants bear this responsibility regardless of the extent and manner of 
their participation in the social structure.    
Young’s argument that participation in social structural harms results in political 
responsibility, which she maintains is distinct from moral responsibility, is untenable. Each of the 
five characteristics she presents face problems, including issues such as agent motivation and 
ability to discharge responsibilities. Whilst Young presents pragmatic reasons for rejecting moral 
responsibility for structural harms, including concerns over blame-switching, she fails to offer 
convincing theoretical reasons for denying a more traditional form of responsibility in these cases. 
Ultimately, Young presents strong reasons for establishing individual responsibility in collective 
contexts, but the kind of responsibility she goes on to defend is unsatisfactory and unnecessary. 
There are many very insightful observations regarding structural harms throughout 
Young’s account. When the relationship between social structures and large-scale harms is made 
clear, the great harms in the world in which they result become difficult to deny. Social structures 
exist and continue to harm due only to our ongoing participation in them. Our roles in bringing 
about and perpetuating these harms therefore bestow responsibility on us to address them. 
Participation in social structures influences how we interact with others, often in profound ways. 
Whilst they allow us to achieve much more in the world than we would be able to in isolation, 
they also bring with them the risk of causing far more harm to others than we would be able to 
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alone.  We face problems when it comes to issues of recognising social structures because they 
are such a major part of our everyday lives and have become normalised within our society. 
Participation in social structures bestows responsibility on the individual. Individual 
actions can be assessed in terms of their immediate effect on others, and as contributions to wider 
social structural processes. Participating agents can bear responsibility for social structural harms 
when their contributing action appears morally praiseworthy, or when they themselves suffer as 
a result of the structure. In both cases, the participatory act, which helps perpetuate the harmful 
structure, brings with it responsibilities for the effects of the structure on others. Whilst Young 
suggests the responsibility we bear in this regard is political, there is little reason to believe that 
contributing to these harms is not question of moral responsibility for those involved.  
An analysis of Young’s account, then, provides some of the foundation for what I shall 
call an expanded individualist account. By moving our focus away from the direct interactions 
between individuals to the relationship between individuals and their participation in wider social 
structures, we can develop a more accurate account of the ways in which agent participation 
contributes to structural harm. This account will help establish the basis of individual moral 
responsibility for the harms in which agents participate through social structures.   
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4: Explaining Collective Contexts: Expanding Individualism 
4.1 Introduction  
Throughout the discussion so far, I have argued that a particular set of collective harms 
are ill-served by the current collective responsibility debate. Harms resulting from social 
structures cannot be analysed within a collectivist framework, as the agents involved do not form 
a traditional group united by common interests or intentions. Nor can they be adequately 
accounted for within a traditional individualist framework as responsibility ascriptions are left 
underdetermined, due mainly to the seemingly inconsequential nature of each individual’s small 
participation in the wider harm. I have suggested that the work of Young offers a way forward: 
social structural harms require us to broaden our understanding of an individual agent’s 
responsibility when participating in collective contexts.   
In the previous chapter I discussed the ways in which Young’s social connection model 
provided some foundation for a participation-based account of collective moral responsibility for 
social structural harms. In this chapter I shall begin by examining why focussing on individual 
difference-making fails to adequately account for moral responsibility ascriptions in collective 
contexts, and argue that an agent’s intentions can be an important consideration in moral 
evaluation where individual difference-making accounts fall short. In order to help explain agent 
responsibility in these collective contexts I turn to a discussion of a context-based account of joint 
responsibility presented by Bjornsson in the Explanation Hypothesis.178 Bjornsson examines cases 
where individual agents can be held jointly responsible for harm based on their knowledge and 
attitudes regarding their involvement and relationship to a harm, rather than the actual difference 
they make to the situation. He argues that there are many cases where our responsibility 
ascriptions are deeply affected by an agent’s knowledge and motivations regarding their 
involvement in a harm.  
The Explanation Hypothesis provides further support for a participation-based account 
of collective responsibility, where agents bear responsibility for their involvement in collective 
harm when this results from a fault in their knowledge and/or motivations regarding their 
participation in social structures. Building on aspects of the work of both Young and Bjornsson I 
argue that responsibility ascriptions in collective contexts are best analysed through an expanded 
individualist account. This requires us to identify those harms that are brought about through the 
participation of many agents in social structures. Once we have established that a harm is 
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Responsibility’, Nous, 46 (2012) 326-354. 
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collective in this way, we can analyse individual agents’ responsibilities regarding this harm 
through examining their knowledge of and attitudes towards their involvement in the harm. 
I argue that expanded individualism more accurately reflects an agent’s responsibility 
ascriptions in a globalised world. An agent’s moral responsibilities regarding social structural 
harm are not linked directly or predominantly with the specific impact of the individual’s actions. 
In the case of social structural harms, an agent’s individual contribution will most likely cause no 
specific individual any great harm. Instead, an agent is responsible for participating in social 
structures, and bears responsibility for any harms which these structures cause. This is because 
social structures only continue to exist through the ongoing participation of their constituent 
agents. An agent’s moral responsibility will be determined by the nature of the collective 
interaction and harm produced, and an individual’s responsibility will vary depending on their 
position in the structure. The central claim throughout this discussion is that agents bear moral 
responsibility for most participation in social structural harms because engaging in social 
structures which are known to cause harm is itself immoral. 
In order to explain what this expansion of individualism entails, and on what it is based, 
in section 4.2 I begin this chapter with a discussion of the problem of attempting to use individual 
difference-making conditions to analyse cases of social structural harm. I explain why this 
approach struggles to account for moral responsibility ascriptions in social structures, particularly 
when individual contributions are minute or indiscernible. To address this shortcoming, and to 
suggest an alternative foundation for individual responsibility in collective contexts, I introduce 
Bjornsson’s Explanation Hypothesis in section 4.3.179 Bjornsson provides a good basis for 
explaining why an individual agent’s participation in a harmful social structure is morally 
problematic, focussing on an agent’s motivations and attitudes towards their participation, rather 
than the specific harms they may or may not bring about. In section 4.4 I examine the ways in 
which Bjornsson suggests we can evaluate an agent’s responsibility, particularly focussing on 
collective contexts. Finally, in section 4.5, I outline expanded individualism, an account of 
collective responsibility that enables us to analyse responsibility ascriptions in cases of social 
structural harms. This account is participation-based, grounded in an agent’s knowledge and 
attitudes towards participation in social structures, and takes seriously the effect on individual 
moral responsibilities of participating in large-scale collective harms. 
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4.2 The Rejection of Individual Difference-Making  
Individualist accounts of responsibility place their focus on the actions, motivations, and 
effects of individual agents. It is argued that, since only individual agents are able to be the bearers 
of moral responsibility, only those harms which an agent has clearly brought about should be 
considered when discerning that individual’s moral responsibilities. This approach, however, 
does not help explain responsibility in cases of social structural harm, where many individuals 
help bring about a collective harm but no particular individual causes any another agent direct 
harm. The relationship between participating agents and social structural harms cannot therefore 
be thought of in terms of individual difference-making, since at the individual level such 
difference-making will not be found.  
Difference-making is in one sense important to an account of social structural harm as it 
is required in order for us to be able to identify the cause of large-scale harm and those responsible. 
To do this it is necessary to look to the effects of the structural processes that stem from the actions 
of many individuals, rather than looking to individual contributing actions. In this section I shall 
begin with a discussion of some of the reasons why identifying individual instances of difference-
making has been seen as so important, before moving on to an explanation of the ways in which 
such an approach is problematic when analysing responsibility in collective contexts. I end the 
section with an argument for the importance of developing an alternative to difference-making 
theories of responsibility for cases where harms are more accurately understood as the result of 
agents’ motivation, or lack thereof, to act morally, rather than through analysing the direct causal 
contribution each of an individual’s actions makes to a state of affairs. 
 
i.! The traditional focus on individual difference-making 
In traditional difference-making theories, an individual agent’s actions must usually 
causally contribute to a harm in a readily identifiable way, their actions must ‘make a difference’ 
to whether or not the harm occurs, or the nature of the harm, in a meaningful way. In cases where 
an agent’s contribution makes no easily discernible and specific difference to the outcome of a 
given situation, it may be argued that holding that agent morally responsible for the outcome is 
unfair.180 At the heart of traditional conceptions of individualism lies the idea that agents may only 
be held responsible for harms they have caused.181 In order to be held morally responsible it is 
                                                        
180 Steven Sverdlik, ‘Collective Responsibility’, Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the 
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therefore suggested that an agent needs to have made some kind of difference to a situation and 
that they need to have acted in some way that affected the outcome in order to be responsible for 
it.  
This, however, is a very narrow view of the relationship between an agent and the states 
of affairs of which they are a part. An agent can effect the outcome of events through direct 
actions, but they can also effect outcomes through facilitating or simply encouraging others to 
act, or even through failing to act.182 A failure to act can be deliberate or unintentional, it can be 
the result of a misunderstanding or culpable negligence. An agent failing to act can have just as 
great an effect on an outcome as a positive contributing action. Most individualist accounts do 
not therefore rely solely on the requirement that an agent must perform an action that produces a 
harmful outcome in order to be responsible for a harm. Instead they require that an agent’s 
involvement in the state of affairs must result in a harm, whether that involvement entails action 
or inaction, before the agent can be held responsible for harm.183  
When considering an agent’s relationship to a particular state of affairs, an agent can be 
morally responsible for both their actions and inactions, depending on the circumstances. We are 
interested in actions and inactions which the agent chooses based on their motivation regarding 
the situation in question. In this way we are able to incorporate an agent’s failure to act in 
situations where we think action was morally required on their part. We also avoid blaming people 
for actions and inactions that are involuntary or performed under duress. For example, an agent 
may be said to perform an action when they flinch at something unexpected. We would not 
normally wish to argue that this action is a deliberate and intentional act based on the agent’s 
knowledge and motivations. A physiological response is not necessarily one which we would 
think of as blameworthy if it did result in harm, because it is unintentional and not performed by 
an individual due to a morally faulty motivation.  
The inclusion of some form of responsibility for motivation, for example in the case of 
attempted harm, is necessary even to difference-making accounts in order to accommodate 
circumstances where an agent has acted in such a way as to cause harm, but unbeknownst to them 
the harm has already been done. If we consider cases where harm is over determined, such as two 
agents shooting another agent at the same time, an individualist would be unlikely to hold that 
one of the agents does not bear any moral responsibility for the shooting because their shot was 
                                                        
182 See Gregory Mellema, ‘Collective Responsibility and Qualifying Actions’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 30 
(2006), 168-175, for an interesting account of the various ways an agent can directly and indirectly contribute to a 
collective wrong doing, including through encouraging others to perform harmful acts. 
183 Narveson, for example, argues that an agent’s responsibility is greatly affected by group membership, but that 
ultimately agents can only be held responsible for their individual actions within a group context.  
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unnecessary for causing the agent’s death. Only holding individuals morally responsible for harms 
for which they are also causally responsible is an overly simplified conception of responsibility 
that few individualists, if any, would support. It also misunderstands the central concern of 
individualism, namely that agents should only be held responsible for harms in which they are 
involved in significant ways. Usually this will require some causal input, but agents can also be 
significantly connected with a harm in other ways, such as in over-determined cases, which can 
bring with them moral responsibility. The important concern for individualists is that an agent 
must be involved in the harm themselves, agents should not be held responsible for the actions 
and harms of others. 
 
ii.! Individual difference-making in collective contexts 
When considering cases of collective harm such as those caused by social structures, 
traditional individualist accounts can struggle to make adequate responsibility ascriptions. It is 
usually believed to be necessary to establish the kind and extent of harm an agent has caused 
before determining their responsibility, but in many cases of collective harm this may not be 
possible. Establishing whether or not an agent contributed to a collective harm is usually easier 
to decide, but when many agents are involved in bringing a harm about, the consequences of each 
and every individual’s participatory actions may not be isolatable from the consequences of the 
actions of others.184  
In cases of collective responsibility where individual contributions appear to have no 
clear impact, maintaining a difference-making condition can make it very difficult to make any 
responsibility ascriptions. An agent appears to make no contribution to a harm because each of 
their individual participatory acts seems to make no difference, the harm would occur whether 
they continued to contribute or not. However, agent involvement in a state of affairs can be 
complex, it can be comprised of direct and indirect acts and omissions, and it can be very small 
whilst still being a participatory act. If we consider apparently insignificant contributing actions 
and the wider pattern of participation of which they are a part, looking at the impact that these 
contributions have when combined with those of other agents performing similar actions, minute 
contributions can form part of large and serious contributions to harm.  
There are two similar, but separate kinds of indiscernible contributions to social structures 
that are important for the purposes of this discussion. One involves the kind of small contribution 
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86 
 
which is hard to measure, such as is made by the agents in Parfit’s Torturers example.185 The other 
type of contribution is that which is makes no discernible difference.186 In the former kinds of 
cases many accounts would only support holding an agent responsible for their participation in a 
minimal way, very little blame would lie with the agent for making a contribution which is so 
small as to be immeasurable. In the latter kinds of cases, holding an agent responsible at all is 
widely held to be unfair and unjust; where no harm is caused, we cannot hold an agent responsible.  
This, I suggest, is to misrepresent the situation under consideration. There is indeed harm 
being caused, we can see this by considering the impact of the wider social structures in which 
individuals participate. Focussing on the individual without sufficiently contextualising their 
actions and analysing the wider implications of their participation does not provide an adequate 
analysis of the importance of an individual’s contributing acts. Whilst it is more widely accepted 
that agents can bear responsibility for minute contributions (though I shall argue that they bear 
more responsibility in collective contexts than is usually supposed), the suggestion that in cases 
of contributing to social structural harms agents can bear moral responsibility, even when their 
individual contribution makes no discernible difference to the outcome, is less widely accepted. 
In cases where an agent’s actions appear to have no effect on the outcome, it is generally 
argued that they should not be held responsible for that outcome. Blaming someone for a harm 
that would occur regardless of whether or not they make their contribution appears to go against 
our usual concern for fairness and our practices of praising and blaming people as have been 
discussed so far. However, the idea that agents bear responsibility in cases where their 
contribution makes no discernible difference to a harm, though controversial, is not without some 
support in our everyday moral reasoning. There are certain circumstances where we do find it 
appropriate to blame someone for some action-or-inaction X even when X makes no difference to 
the outcome Y, in the sense that Y would have happened with or without X. This can be seen in 
our reaction to the shooting case above, we still hold the second shooter responsible for their 
action even though their action does not contribute to the death of the victim. In these situations 
it is the agent’s motivation that causes them to be appropriate subjects of blame. It is the action 
or inaction that leads them to participate in the harm that is morally problematic, despite their 
contribution failing to change the outcome of the collective harm. 
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Although the argument for maintaining a difference-making condition stems from a 
desire to only hold agents responsible for situations they have brought about and to avoid blaming 
them for harms that are not their doing, such a condition does not capture many of the more subtle 
aspects of our moral reasoning. It is vulnerable to underdetermining responsibility ascriptions in 
cases where agents make very small contributions to a harm, and more importantly for this 
discussion, it does not capture cases where an agent’s contribution to a harm makes no discernible 
difference in itself, but is one of many participatory actions which taken as a whole cause harm. 
In these cases, despite the lack of clear and specific direct harm that each contributing agent 
causes, we can identify that the actions performed by an agent along with many other agents bring 
about serious harm, harm which would be avoided were the participating agents to act differently.  
The idea that an agent’s actions have to make a discernible difference regarding a harm 
in order to justify our holding them morally responsible appears to be prevalent in much of our 
thinking about large scale multi-agent harms. It seems to be widely accepted that, since individual 
participating actions, such as buying a sweat-shop manufactured top, make no discernible 
difference to any particular individual, performing such contributing actions is not a very 
blameworthy activity. This view is especially prevalent in cases where participation in harm is 
widespread. When many agents are contributing to a harm, it seems that agents are less likely to 
give as much consideration to their participating actions, and not view them as seriously as they 
would if these actions were being performed as part of a small-scale interaction. Since the impact 
of each agent’s action in a social structural harm appears small and insignificant, agents view 
their contribution as unimportant and often believe that changing their behaviour would have no 
effect on the harmful outcome. 
 
iii.! Difference-making and intentions 
Focusing on difference-making as a source of agent responsibility neglects another 
important aspect of our practices of analysing responsibility ascriptions, we are often concerned 
with an agent’s intention and motivation in relation to a particular situation. Where an agent acts 
negligently, or with indifference to how their actions may harm others, we sometimes hold them 
responsible even if their individual actions have not caused harm. If an agent drives whilst drunk, 
we can describe their behaviour as immoral because it is irresponsible and puts both the agent and 
others at risk. We would see this as blameworthy behaviour even when no-one is actually harmed. 
It is the nature of the action and the motivation behind it that is morally problematic, not 
necessarily the difference it makes, in situations such as this. 
88 
 
Our blaming attitudes are therefore not restricted to agents who actually cause harm, but 
also extend to those who risk harming others, particularly through reckless, negligent, or selfish 
behaviour. Through upholding these practices, we discourage agents from acting in ways that we 
know are likely to cause harm. In the case of drunk driving, blaming people for acting immorally 
whether or not they actually hurt anyone discourages agents (we hope) from acting in this way, 
since we know this behaviour has a high risk of leading to serious injury. If we only blamed 
people for drunk driving when they actually hurt someone, agents may be less discouraged from 
this activity; so long as they did not hit anyone, their behaviour would be morally acceptable.  
Maintaining this position would not be as effective in discouraging undesirable behaviour, our 
blaming and praising practices would hold far less sway if they were only used in cases of actual 
and specific harm.  
The importance of developing an accurate understanding as to the motivations and 
attitudes of an agent can now be seen more clearly. Measuring an agent’s difference-making 
contribution to a situation gives us an inadequate account of that agent’s relationship to the harm 
under consideration. This is due to the fact that difference-making alone does not provide us with 
enough contextual information regarding the agent’s involvement. Even in situations where we 
are able to discern the precise harm an agent has caused, we still look to their intentions and 
motivations to explain their blameworthiness for the situation. Consideration of the motivations 
and attitudes of participating agents are therefore of central importance to our moral evaluation. 
 
4.3 Bjornsson’s Explanation Hypothesis 
Assessing an individual’s responsibility for participation in social structural harms can 
be difficult for traditional accounts of responsibility, particularly when assessing the relationship 
between participants and large-scale harms. Relying on an individual difference-making 
condition does not aid analysis in these situations, but examining an agent’s motivations for their 
involvement often plays an important part of our evaluation process. Therefore, in order to draw 
out the salient aspects of the relationship between an individual and a collective harm that bear 
on an account of an agent’s moral responsibilities, we need to look beyond the direct effects of 
the individual’s actions to the nature of the wider processes in which they participate and their 
attitudes towards their relationships to these harms.  
In this section I shall examine an account of moral responsibility in certain collective 
contexts that focusses on agents’ attitudes and motivations towards a harm. Bjornsson develops 
an account of joint responsibility in particular contexts where agents contribute to harm but where 
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their individual contributions neither control nor necessarily make any difference to the outcome. 
He argues that in some situations we hold agents responsible for the attitudes that lead them to 
contribute to harm rather than the difference made by their individual contribution. Bjornsson 
suggests that our practices of praising and blaming certain behaviours are aimed at encouraging 
motivational structures that lead agents to avoid potentially harmful activities. In this way, we 
blame people for performing some actions that have not actually caused harm because they are 
instances of actions which are potentially harmful and which we therefore wish to discourage. 
Consequently, this account helps explain some common intuitions regarding harmful collective 
contexts where individual contributions make no discernible difference. 
 
i.! Bjornsson’s account 
One reason that it is often seen as problematic to hold agents morally responsible for 
participating in social structural harms is their lack of ability to, as an individual, significantly 
affect or control the outcome of collectively produced ends. Where agents lack this control, it 
might be tempting to argue that they should not be held responsible for the ends brought about as 
they were unable to control the situation. However, the implementation of the condition that 
agents only be held responsible for ends which are totally within their control would vastly restrict 
the extent of agent responsibility.187 Since this is not a condition that we would want to impose on 
isolated individual moral contexts, it is difficult to justify its use in collective contexts. Bjornsson 
provides an interesting explanation of the way in which we might explain responsibility 
ascriptions in precisely these collective situations where agents lack individual control over the 
outcome. His account of how we ascertain which agents are morally responsible for a state of 
affairs is particularly useful when considering many large-scale contemporary harms, in which 
huge numbers of people may be involved, but where few if any can be identified as causing 
specific harms to specific individuals.  
Bjornsson presents the Explanation Hypothesis as an explanatory psychological account 
of our moral judgments, rather than a semantic or metaphysical account of what these judgments 
are or ought to be.188 It is designed to explain our practices of blaming and praising individuals 
for their actions, for discerning ‘whom to hold responsible for what’.189 He suggests that much of 
our interest in moral responsibility lies in our desire to hold people responsible for certain types 
                                                        
187 For a discussion of the problem of individual control and moral luck, see Bernard Williams, Moral Luck: 
Philosophical Papers 1973-1980, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) and Thomas Nagel, Mortal 
Questions, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979). 
188 Bjornsson and Persson, p. 329. 
189 Ibid. p. 328. 
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of behaviour. Such a desire leads us to wish to encourage some behaviours and discourage others. 
In order to do this, Bjornsson argues, we need to establish particular types of connection between 
an agent’s motivational structure and certain forms of behaviour. If our practices of holding agents 
blame- or praiseworthy are to shape agents’ motivation to act morally, these practices need to,  
be directed towards the sort of motivational structures that (a) explain these events in 
systematic ways and (b) respond in the appropriate way to the agent's being held 
responsible and [...] (c) in fact [be] a significant part of the explanation of such an 
event.190 
These three conditions form the basis of the Explanation Hypothesis. Considering our moral 
intuitions in various situations, particularly in cases involving the participation of multiple agents, 
Bjornsson suggests that many widely held intuitions are best explained through an analysis of this 
relationship between the agent and their motivational structure regarding the situation under 
consideration.  
Each of these criteria is used by Bjornsson in quite a specific way. Therefore, whilst at 
first this outline for responsibility ascriptions appears very broad, Bjornsson’s interpretation of 
each of these requirements is very particular, drawing out distinctive features of agent motivation 
and responsibility judgments. The requirement that an agent’s motivation must play a part in the 
explanation of the event, rather than simply the agent’s (in)action, highlights the importance of 
agent’s attitude towards a situation, rather than merely their causal contribution. When engaging 
in moral analysis in order to establish the agent’s intent, we wish to establish whether the agent’s 
action was performed out of a desire to do good, whether it was an accident, or whether they had 
in fact intended to cause harm. Their action alone cannot always give us this information, we must 
ask why they acted as they did.  An agent’s motivation and attitude towards a particular situation 
plays a significant role in their participatory actions, therefore directing praise or blame at 
motivational structures is an important part of shaping agent action. In order for this relationship 
to work effectively, it is necessary to establish how certain motivational structures lead to specific 
events. 
The second criterion, that our practices of praising and blaming agents must respond in 
the appropriate way to the agent’s being held responsible, highlights the importance of reactive 
attitudes to Bjornsson’s account.191 It is important in Bjornsson’s account that we support 
motivational structures that encourage the kinds of behaviour we find morally acceptable, and 
discourages immoral behaviour. It is also necessary that agents are able to respond appropriately 
                                                        
190 Ibid. p. 328. 
191 See Strawson. 
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to our responsibility ascribing practices. Blaming agents for things they cannot do, or holding 
individuals who are incapable of agency responsible for their actions are both practices which 
would undermine our attempts to shape motivational structures.192 Demanding the impossible and 
blaming the incapable does not encourage morally desirable behaviour because those involved 
are unable to meet the requirements asked of them. Agents cannot reasonably be expected to be 
motivated by impossible demands; if praising and blaming practices are to encourage certain 
types of behaviour they must provide motivation to act in ways which are comprehensible and 
achievable by those to whom they are directed.        
Criterion (c), the need for an action to be part of a significant explanation, refers to 
specific explanatory conditions that are readily and consistently identifiable as significant to 
particular events. We may point to a wide range of contributing factors to an event, but some 
contributions will strike us as more relevant for an analysis of agent responsibility than others. 
Bjornsson discusses potential explanations of why a house burns down, noting that when 
presented with a list of contributing factors including that the house was made of combustible 
materials, that there was oxygen in the air, and that the house was struck by lightning, the most 
important and relevant contributing factor is clearly the lighting, although this alone would not 
be sufficient.193 When deciding which factors are significant in a particular event, Bjornsson 
argues we often look for a factor that is ‘more surprising or out of the ordinary than the 
background conditions’.194 This is because we are highly selective when it comes to explaining 
why an event occurred, and have a tendency to look for ‘attention grabbers’. This desire to provide 
an explanation as to why something happened is central to our thinking about moral responsibility 
and forms the basis of Bjornsson’s Explanation Hypothesis.195  
 
ii.! The Lake 
Bjornsson begins his discussion of the Explanation Hypothesis by rejecting the idea that 
agents need to have individual control over a situation in order to bear moral responsibility for it. 
He lists several examples of situations where this is not the case, including voters in a referendum, 
citizens who topple a dictator, and consumers for the good or bad practices of the companies they 
patronize, ‘even though, as individuals, they could not have significantly affected those outcomes, 
practices or effects’.196 In these kinds of cases, the events are best explained through the actions 
                                                        
192 Bjornsson and Persson, p. 331. 
193 Bjornsson Joint Responsibility, p. 191. 
194 Bjornsson and Persson, p. 332. 
195 Bjornsson Joint Responsibility, p. 191. 
196 Ibid. p. 182. 
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of all those involved, even though no individual may have made a substantial contribution to the 
outcome. Despite the lack of a decisive contribution from any particular individual, situations that 
constitute these kinds of collective contexts only occur through the contributions of multiple 
agents. Had the agents’ actions been different, the situation would have changed.  
In order to draw out the relevant aspects of the kinds of situations highlighted, Bjornsson 
offers an example called The Lake: Alice, Bill, and Cecil all paint their boats on a lake, and each 
pours excess solvent into the water without the others’ knowledge. They all know this could affect 
the wildlife, but did not want to bother disposing of the solvent safely and hoped nothing bad 
would happen. However, the solvent diffused through the lake and rose to levels high enough to 
stop micro-organisms reproducing, damaging the food chain and eventually leading to the death 
of all the fish. Although solvent from one of them would not have been enough, solvent from any 
two would have created fatal levels of pollution in the lake.197 By examining possible 
responsibility ascriptions of this scenario and several variations of it, Bjornsson argues that the 
ascriptions that most closely fit our intuitions and our practices of holding people responsible are 
those linked to an agent’s motivations regarding the particular situation.  
Considering The Lake, it seems clear that the people responsible for polluting the lake 
and causing the death of the fish are Alice, Bill, and Cecil. It is their actions combined, not any 
one of their individual actions, which kills the fish. Singling out any one or two of them would 
unfairly let off the others, despite the fact that the actions of any two of them would be sufficient 
to cause the same effect. They also all share responsibility even though individually their 
contribution was insufficient to cause the outcome. Bjornsson argues that the best explanation of 
responsibility in this case is that all three are jointly responsible for the outcome. We wish to hold 
them all responsible not because of the individual effect of each of their actions, but because they 
all failed to be motivated to act in a way that would not cause potential harm to others and the 
environment. The nature of their action and their attitude towards the effect it would have on 
others is blameworthy, rather than the individual effects of their actions. In the case of The Lake 
we can describe the agents involved as acting immorally because pouring pollutants into a lake is 
irresponsible and displays a lack of concern for both the environment and others who might be 
using the lake. Considering Bjornsson’s analysis, our practices of praising and blaming 
individuals are grounded in our desire to encourage some behaviours and discourage others. 
Although the individual effect does not necessarily reflect the blameworthiness of an 
individual’s contributing actions, an agent’s responsibility and blameworthiness will be effected 
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by the nature and severity of the collective harm. Where an agent’s action is not part of a collective 
harm, their responsibility may be quite different. For example, in The Lake, if only one agent had 
performed the polluting action they would be responsible for acting immorally for pouring 
harmful substances into the lake, but since their isolated action would be insufficient to kill the 
fish they would not be responsible for that. Equally, if all agents had poured less solvent into the 
lake, and thus had not polluted the lake enough to kill the fish, they would be blameworthy for 
deliberately pouring harmful substances into the lake, because doing so is known to be dangerous 
for people and the environment. However, since their actions would not have done as much 
damaged (i.e. would not kill all the fish) they would be less blameworthy for their actions.  
Bjornsson provides a scenario where only one agent acts in this way, but where natural 
pollutants are present in the lake which will kill the fish regardless of additional pollution, so that 
again the individual agent’s contribution itself is insufficient to cause the death of the fish.198 
Bjornsson suggests that in this case we are not inclined to hold the agent jointly responsible for 
killing the fish, though we would hold him responsible for polluting the lake. It matters that the 
cause of the death of the fish was non-agential, and that the agent’s actions made no difference to 
the death of the fish because they were killed by a natural event. In the first lake example where 
all the contributors were agents, we analyse responsibility for the harm caused differently. In that 
case we hold all agents responsible even though the harm was overdetermined and any one 
individual could have failed to act without effecting the outcome.  
There are a number of different types of situation where an agent can bear moral 
responsibility without being able to make a difference to the outcome. The examples that are 
discussed by Bjornsson are of one particular type, where the number of participating agents 
exceeds the number of agents required to perform the harm. These examples can be further 
divided into cases where the contributions occur at the same time or over a long period, and where 
agents are aware that they are contributing to a collective harm and cases where they are not 
aware. In the case of The Lake, the actions occur around the same time but the agents were not 
aware that their individual acts were contributing to a collective harm. They did not know that 
others were contributing to the pollution, nor were they aware that their actions would lead to the 
death of the fish. In this way, it is also not necessary for participants to see themselves or be seen 
by others as constituting a ‘group’ as we commonly understand them. Bjornsson says of the 
individuals in The Lake that ‘we have no reason to think that they form a group the members of 
which empower each other. For all we know, they might see each other as enemies’.199 They bear 
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joint responsibility for creating a collective harm without needing to have intentionally 
contributed to a collective action. 
Reflecting on Bjornsson’s criteria, our praising and blaming practices hold the agents 
responsible for the following reasons. Firstly, their actions explain the death of the fish in a 
systematic way because pouring pollutants into lakes damages wildlife. Secondly, holding agents 
responsible for harming wildlife discourages this kind of behaviour and encourages agents to act 
in a way that demonstrates concern for others and the environment. Thirdly, their motivation does 
indeed play a significant part of the explanation of the death of the fish because their lack of 
motivation to avoid harming others led them to take unnecessary risks which resulted in harm. 
Had the agents involved had different motivational structures, their actions would have been 
different.  
When analysing the case of The Lake, each of the participating agents’ actions may have 
been redundant when we consider that the actions of the other participants were enough to cause 
the harm regardless of how many extra agents contributed. This makes it appear that only some 
of the agents bear responsibility, because the harm can be explained by the actions of a subset of 
participants. The actions of additional participants therefore appear superfluous. Describing the 
scenario in this way misconstrues the actions of those involved, and singling out only the required 
number of agents needed to bring about the harm unfairly excuse others whose actions could 
equally have been singled out as responsible for bringing about the harm. In this case there is also 
no principled way to pick out ‘the subset that made a difference’, since no such specific subset 
exists. When none of the contributing agents’ actions will be the deciding factor in whether a 
harm is caused, it seems that they should all be held responsible for contributing to the harm, even 
where this leaves the responsibility ascriptions overdetermined and we are unable to isolate the 
specific harm that each individual’s action brought about.  
 
iii.! The importance of agent motivation 
The idea that agent motivation profoundly effects our praising and blaming practices is 
at the heart of the Explanation Hypothesis. We care, when making moral responsibility 
ascriptions, about the motivation and attitudes of the agents involved. Considering cases like The 
Lake, Bjornsson suggests that, 
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we might say that some morally "faulty" aspect of behaviour explains the outcome, but 
the behaviour seems faulty only because it is explained by the wrong sensitivity to values, 
or the wrong motivational structure.200 
This can be further demonstrated by examining variations on The Lake. If the agents were not 
aware that the substance they poured into the lake was a potentially harmful solvent, we might 
assess their responsibility differently. This in turn will depend on whether or not their ignorance 
is culpable. For example, if they simply could not be bothered to read the label of the substance, 
we will still view their actions as demonstrating the wrong motivations and attitude towards 
others. Alternatively, if the substance is incorrectly labelled as environmentally safe, we would 
not necessarily think that the agents were morally blameworthy for the harm to wildlife the 
substance caused. The only real difference in the two scenarios is the knowledge and motivation 
of the agents involved, their actions and the effects remain the same. 
If we are to judge an agent’s responsibility in some cases through an examination of their 
attitudes and motivations, we require some kind of basis for deciding which motivations are right 
and which are wrong. Bjornsson suggests that this basis can be found in our desire to encourage 
some behaviours and discourage others. Motivations and attitudes which regularly lead to 
undesirable ends are ones we would usually wish to avoid. Agents who do not show concern for 
the way in which their actions affect others are arguably at higher risk of harming others, since 
they are not motivated to ensure that their actions cause no harm. Similarly, agents who cause 
needless suffering to animals, either out of indifference or for their own amusement, are thought 
to hold the wrong attitude towards the treatment of animals. We think people should care about 
whether or not their actions hurt others, and that they should care about the suffering of animals 
that are capable of feeling pain. We therefore wish to encourage attitudes of care and compassion, 
of concern and interest for the welfare of others.  
Singer has drawn upon problems concerning our sensitivity to values in his work on 
poverty.201 His example of saving a drowning child is often discussed to highlight inconsistencies 
in some of our moral reasoning. When he suggests that we would take issue with an individual 
who refused to save a drowning child because doing so would damage their expensive suit, he is 
drawing on what Bjornsson refers to as a ‘wrong sensitivity to values’. It is perfectly reasonable 
for an agent to care about their personal possessions and wish to care of them. The problem with 
the actions of the agent lies in their motivational structure, we think they should care more about 
the life of the child than getting their clothes muddy. Were an agent unable to see that it is more 
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important to save the life of a child than to keep one’s clothes clean, we would question whether 
they were actually a moral agent, whether or not they had the capacity to be a member of the 
moral community.202  In this situation it would be hard for us to simply ‘agree to disagree’, the 
person would seem incapable of understanding the requirements of morality. A moral agent would 
see the other person’s motivation and attitude towards the plight of the child as wrong. 
Understanding an agent’s motivation and attitude towards a situation often plays an 
important role in our evaluation of their corresponding responsibility. Bjornsson’s work suggests 
that in some circumstances agent motivation is the most important aspect of our evaluation of an 
individual’s moral responsibilities. A large part of Bjornsson’s discussion rests on the idea that 
our evaluation of the morality of a situation is greatly influenced by what Strawson refers to as 
our ‘reactive attitudes’. Strawson’s original example discussed the different evaluations we might 
make of an individual stepping on one’s hand, in one case accidentally, the other deliberately. 
The pain felt is the same in both instances, but our blaming practices are different.203 Bjornsson 
draws on this idea that an agent’s motivation can be highly influential in our moral evaluations 
and examines whether this might explain our praising and blaming practices in problematic 
situations. 
Throughout his work, Bjornsson draws on examples in which, he argues, it is difficult to 
explain why our moral intuitions lead us to find people morally responsible. He is particularly 
interested in cases where harms are brought about by multiple agents, where the contribution of 
any individual agent alone would not be enough to bring about harm. In cases such as The Lake, 
if we were to argue that we blamed the agent because their actions killed the fish, we would be 
offering an incomplete and unfair explanation or our responsibility ascriptions. No single agent 
caused the death of the fish, the actions of all of the agents taken together did so. Further, in cases 
where the individual withdrawal of any one agent from the situation would have made no 
difference, we are presented with the further problem regarding focussing on the difference any 
one individual made. This is the problem that in cases where the harm would be caused if all but 
one individual contributed, focussing on the contribution of only one contributor runs the risk of 
seeing their contribution as unimportant, or at least less important, because any one of the 
individual contributors’ actions could be viewed as the redundant contribution, the one that could 
have been left unmade whilst the harm was caused by the actions of all the others.  
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When we have a conflict between the possibility that an agent’s contribution may be 
irrelevant to the harm caused, whilst simultaneously holding the intuition that their actions are 
morally problematic, Bjornsson argues that many traditional approaches to evaluating moral 
responsibility struggle to explain why this is so. When we view an agent’s (in)actions as morally 
wrong, in these cases we may not be blaming them for the effects of their actions, but for their 
moral reasoning and motivations governing their conduct in the situation.204 Of course, the idea 
that agent intention is important to ethical evaluation is not new, but Bjornsson’s suggestion that 
it helps shed light on our moral evaluations of situations where the agent’s actions alone have not 
caused harm does help explain some of our intuitions regarding agent participation in some 
collective harms. In the kinds of examples Bjornsson examines, it is the agents’ willingness to 
participate in the harm, or indifference to whether or not they are participating in a harm, that we 
find morally problematic.  
Bjornsson’s focus on agent motivation rather than action and outcome can appear to make 
his account rather subjectivist in nature. Although motivation is important to his account, it is not 
the sole consideration, and therefore Bjornsson does not fall into the ‘pure subjectivist’ camp. An 
agent’s responsibility depends on their relationship to the collective harm in which they 
participate, so whilst their individual motivations and actions need not affect the outcome, an 
agent’s motivations only become blameworthy or praiseworthy when they are part of a collective 
context. In this sense an agent’s motivations are not the sole subject of analysis, even though in 
most cases of contribution to collective harm the individual agent’s (in)actions may have no effect 
on the harm itself, and therefore the individual’s motivations will be more important for an 
analysis of their moral responsibility regarding the harm. 
In the kinds of cases discussed by Bjornsson, the harms would not have come about if 
more than one of the individuals involved had held different motivations towards the situation, if 
they had been more morally sensitive to the effects of their actions or inactions on others. In these 
multi-agent scenarios, a solitary individual developing the correct moral sensitivity would not be 
enough to stop the harm. These harms are the result of the actions of multiple agents, and therefore 
multiple agents are required in order to address them. An important aspect of addressing these 
harms is understanding the way in which they come about through agents’ motivations towards a 
situation, and not necessarily because any or each individual’s contribution makes a measurable 
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causal difference to the overall harm. In this way Bjornsson’s work rejects the idea that moral 
responsibility rests on difference-making.  
Bjornsson is, of course, not the only philosopher to seek an alternative to difference-
making in order to account for agent responsibilities in cases of collective harm. An attempt to 
provide an alternative foundation for responsibility ascriptions in collective contexts has been 
suggested by Kutz. In his work, Kutz argues that an agent’s complicity in a collective undertaking 
leads to them sharing in responsibility for any harm this brings about, even in cases where their 
individual actions make no difference to the causation of that harm. Part of Kutz’s motivation, 
similarly to Bjornsson, lies in the importance we place on the reactive attitudes and our practices 
‘of demanding reasons from those whose acts infringe upon our interests’.205 He supports the idea 
that we are interested in an agent’s motivation, rather than their casual connection to a harm, and 
therefore rejects the idea that in order to be blameworthy for a harm an agent needs to make a 
difference to whether or not it occurs. 
To establish a basis for holding individuals responsible for their involvement in harms in 
which they make no causal difference, Kutz develops an account based on shared intentions. 
According to The Complicity Principle,206 an agent is responsible for a harm when they 
intentionally participate with other agents in collective action, regardless of whether the 
individual’s contribution actually causes harm. Like Young, Kutz bases responsibility on 
participation,207 but he also argues for a form of individualist collective responsibility centred on 
common ends. On his account, individuals bear responsibility for their complicity in collectively 
produced harms. This relies on all participants holding a common goal, the participants must be 
united by some shared aim or intention to which they all aspire. This condition forms the basis of 
Kutz’s account, identifying responsibility-bearers for the collective harm and providing a basis 
for blame, namely shared harmful intent, rather than relying on causal contribution.  
Whilst Kutz’s account provides some interesting discussion regarding the responsibility 
of marginal group members in collective action scenarios, his account fails to provide an account 
for responsibility ascriptions in many large-scale harms, especially social structural harms.208 The 
requirement of a particular shared goal, aim, or intention excludes social structural harms because 
these can be collectively produced without all or even most of the participants holding specific 
shared intentions or goals. Kutz argues that social structural harms are what he calls ‘unstructured 
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collective harms’,209 where agents can only be held responsible for their individual contributions 
because no shared intent exists which would allow these harms to be evaluated collectively. This 
approach, I will argue, undervalues the collective nature of many of the social structures which 
cause large-scale harms. 
 
4.4 The Explanation Hypothesis and Establishing Responsibility  
Although Bjornsson did not intend for his account to be taken as a normative assessment 
of moral responsibility ascriptions, his work provides valuable support for an explanation as to 
why we should view participation in harmful social structures as far more morally problematic 
than we currently do. The Explanation Hypothesis provides a direction for moral inquiry, 
Bjornsson highlights the importance of some of our intuitions regarding an agent’s knowledge 
and motivations when assessing moral responsibility in collective contexts. In order to identify 
the specific circumstances in which we find an agent’s motivations morally problematic, and in 
which circumstances praise or blame are warranted, the relationship between agents, their 
motivations, and their actions requires further clarification. In this section I shall therefore analyse 
Bjornsson’s conditions for moral responsibility in more depth and examine the ways in which his 
work supports a participation-based account of collective responsibility that focusses on the 
importance of agent motivations in collective context. 
 
i.! Establishing conditions for moral responsibility 
Bjornsson argues that understanding moral responsibilities requires us to do more than 
look at the end result of an agent’s relationship to a state of affairs. Assessing an agent’s moral 
responsibilities regarding a state of affairs requires us to establish the circumstances of each part 
of the following proposition: 
Person p with knowledge k and motivation m performs action a 
To establish the blame or praiseworthiness of the agent, all of these factors need to be taken into 
account. Both the agent’s knowledge and understanding of their involvement in the state of affairs 
and the motivations on which they are acting are essential to a complete analysis of the agent’s 
responsibilities. Attempting to establish an accurate responsibility ascription without information 
on each part of the above would be impossible, because each part is equally important when trying 
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to establish whether an agent is praise-or blameworthy regarding their conduct. In the following 
each of these aspects of moral evaluation shall be addressed in turn in order to explain their role 
in our moral understanding.210  
Although much of Bjornsson’s discussion focusses on the motivations of the agents 
involved in a harm, an agent’s knowledge of the situation is an important aspect of the analysis 
of their blameworthiness. An agent’s knowledge has a strong influence on their motivations, 
which will be formed on the basis of the information the agent possesses. For example, when 
considering an agent’s relationship to a harmful group, whether or not an agent has contributed 
to a group in the knowledge that the group is causing harm, or whether an agent was culpably 
ignorant that the group they were joining caused harm would lead us to find an agent more 
blameworthy for joining the group than if the agent lacked this knowledge for non-culpable 
reasons, if they were tricked into participating, for instance. When assessing an agent’s knowledge 
regarding their participation in a harmful social structure or other collective context, we wish to 
establish a number of things. We are interested in the agent’s knowledge and beliefs regarding 
the group and its activities, but we are also interested in what we judge an agent should know 
about a group to which they belong or are planning to join. If an agent is unaware of a group’s 
intentions and actions, we would want to know why they lacked this knowledge, whether they 
had been misled or whether they had failed to make adequate inquiries into the nature of the group 
concerned. An analysis of the most important questions regarding agent knowledge and group 
harms is therefore essential to help draw out the central concerns and establish in what way an 
agent’s knowledge effects their responsibility for collective harms. 
 
ii.! Willingly participating in harm 
The first example of agent knowledge regarding participation in a collective context that 
I shall discuss is that of an agent wishing to join a group which is known to cause harm. We would 
find the agent’s willingness to join a harmful group problematic even in cases where the 
individual was not directly causing harm.  Whilst we would normally find a person more morally 
responsible for willingly directly causing harm without mitigating circumstances, we would still 
find someone who joined a group known to be causing harm as doing something morally 
questionable. We would want to know their reasons for seeking membership, and would find 
claims that they did not support the harmful activities of the group difficult to believe. This is 
                                                        
210 I shall assume that the person whose conduct is under analysis is a capable moral agent unless stated otherwise. 
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because we see the act of joining a harmful group as demonstrating at least tacit support for the 
group’s activities.  
Consider, for example, that an agent wished to join the Ku Klux Klan but stipulated they 
would not join any lynch mobs. We would still find their desire to join an organisation such as 
the Ku Klux Klan immoral. This is because the group is founded on racist principles and has 
previously been involved in violent attacks against people of colour. Given the nature of the 
group, there is no real reason for an individual to join them apart from to support its racist 
principles. When we consider this in terms of our practices of praising and blaming people to 
encourage and discourage behaviour, willingly joining a harmful group lends support to the 
group’s behaviour. If we wished to blame the group and discourage their activities, we would 
normally not wish to associate or be associated with them. People tend to leave, or at least distance 
themselves from groups to which they belong whose activities they find morally questionable.  
If we therefore consider cases where an agent fails to leave a group when they discover 
that the group is causing harm, there are a number of questions we may ask regarding their 
continuing membership, their role in the group, and their knowledge and participation in harm 
caused. This case is more complicated in many circumstances than that of joining a group, 
particularly when an agent has been a member of a group for a long time, or the group is closely 
linked with the individual’s sense of self and identity. Leaving a social group or club is quite a 
different experience for an agent than leaving a kinship or religious group, for example. There 
are, of course, some groups that agents are unable to leave, such as ethnic groups. However, these 
are not groups in a sense which is relevant to agent responsibility ascriptions and so are not groups 
whose membership can be morally problematic.211 In groups where leaving is an option, but one 
that has dramatic implications for the individual, the question of dissociation can be difficult. It 
raises questions regarding how much of a sacrifice we think it is appropriate to ask of people to 
avoid involvement in harm. But more importantly, it also fails to address the responsibility agents 
may bear for harms caused by a group to which they belonged when the harm occurred. 
In cases of long-term membership we may question whether dissociation is the best 
approach for an agent when considering her reaction to her group’s harm. Whilst an initial 
reaction to discovering one’s group has caused harm may be a wish to distance oneself as much 
as possible from the group, this may be neither practical nor appropriate. Bearing membership of 
a group whilst harm has been caused by that group has implications for an individual’s 
                                                        
211 See chapter 2. I take ethnic and similar groups to be along the same lines as agent sets such as ‘all agents with blonde 
hair’. They are a group in the sense that they single out agents with common traits or ancestry, but they are not groups 
whose agents have morally relevant interactions with one another. 
102 
 
responsibility. A member’s responsibility will vary depending on whether they have directly or 
indirectly contributed to the harm, whether they were aware of it or culpably ignorant of it, or 
whether they did not know of it and could not reasonably have been expected to know, if for 
instance she was misled by other group members.  
In all these various scenarios, an agent often bears some form of responsibility towards 
the harm. When this is the case, simply rejecting membership is insufficient for avoiding 
responsibility for harm. Where an agent has been a member of a harmful group their best approach 
to discharging responsibilities  are more likely to involve remaining in the group and expending 
their efforts by attempting to reform the group and making amends for harms caused where 
possible. An agent may owe reparations for harms to which they have contributed, and in some 
cases this would mean that dissociation was not appropriate. If, for example, the group had 
reformed its behaviour and was now working to address previous harms, leaving the group would 
potentially render an agent less able to address harms in which they were involved than staying 
within the group and working with other members. In this case an agent may be required to stay 
in a group until the harms have been adequately redressed.  
 
iii.! Reasonable knowledge conditions  
A further consideration for agent knowledge and responsibility involves establishing 
what it is reasonable to maintain an agent should know about a group to which they belong. This 
may seem to be a difficult matter to address, since much of the content of the claim appears 
subjective. However, there are a number of considerations to which we commonly appeal when 
discussing what we believe it is reasonable for an agent to know. These include information that 
is deemed common knowledge, the risks involved in participation both to the agent and others, 
and the likelihood that the action will result in harm. We expect different levels of effort regarding 
knowledge acquisition depending on the level and likelihood of the harm that participation is 
liable to produce. 
For example, where their participation relates to a benign group, such as joining a 
rambling association, we would not expect an agent to go to any great lengths to verify that 
members of the group were not engaged in harmful activities. If, however, an agent were planning 
on joining a very politically active group with extreme views, we would expect them to have 
established the nature of that group and its activities before taking part. In this way, the more risk 
there is of an activity causing harm, the more we think an agent should make the effort to know 
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exactly what it is their actions are contributing towards. The same principle applies when an agent 
is acting on their own but where their actions can affect others.  
When we are establishing what we think it reasonable to expect that an agent should know 
regarding a group, there are some aspects of a group to which we can point, such as the way in 
which membership is decided and the past actions and statements of the group and its 
representatives, which can provide a starting point. Where the practices of a particular group are 
a matter of public knowledge and when its aims and intentions both present and past are easily 
identifiable, it would be difficult for a member to deny knowledge of the nature and practices of 
the group. The agent would have to provide good grounds to explain how and why they remained 
a member of a group whilst being unaware of the group’s activities, particularly in cases where 
these facts were common knowledge.  
In order for an agent to lack this knowledge there would have to be a particular reason 
which may or may not excuse their ignorance. Possible excuses include having been deceived by 
others, having wilfully ignored evidence of harm, or having failed to understand the nature of the 
group’s activities. Establishing whether an agent lacks knowledge due to deception, negligence 
or culpable ignorance, or through non-culpable ignorance or a lack of understanding is an 
important step in establishing their responsibility regarding the harm. The circumstances 
involved, and the subtle differences between each of the possible situations, are important factors 
in assessing an agent’s moral responsibility. If, for instance, it was established that an individual 
was unable to grasp the nature of the group or the harm that the group was causing, despite these 
things being common knowledge, we might question the individual’s capacity as a moral agent.  
The question of culpable ignorance is problematic when we are assessing an agent’s 
relationship to a group.212 A common claim made by individual members of harmful groups is 
that they were unaware of the activities of other group members. Establishing what an agent did 
or did not know, whether they were misled, whether they wilfully ignored information, or whether 
they were genuinely innocent in their ignorance can be difficult. In many cases of social structural 
harm, the nature of the harm involved and the fact that agent participation in social structural 
activities contributes to the harm is so well established that it becomes very difficult for 
participants to argue that they are non-culpably ignorant of the nature of the harm and that they 
are performing contributing actions. For example, if an agent stated that they did not know that 
their cheap clothing was made in sweatshops, we would both find this claim hard to believe and 
think that this is something of which the agent really should be aware. The widespread use of 
                                                        
212 See Michele M. Moody-Adams, ‘Culture, Responsibility, and Affected Ignorance’, Ethics, 104 (1994), 291-309 and 
further discussion in chapter 5. 
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sweatshop manufacturing in clothing production has been common knowledge for some time. 
Where a group’s activities and their consequences are common knowledge, and where we think 
an agent should have known what the group was doing, we are inclined to hold an agent culpably-
ignorant if they are lacking this information. In these kinds of cases we would require strong 
evidence to explain and excuse an agent’s ignorance. 
Establishing an agent’s knowledge and considering an agent’s status in all of these 
situations is an important aspect of our everyday moral evaluations. It is widely accepted that we 
should only hold people morally responsible for participating in harms which they knew, or 
should have known about, and which they had the ability to avoid.213 The conditions that an agent 
needs to know, or should have known, and that they are able to avoid a harm are important to our 
understanding of moral responsibility. Only holding agents responsible for participating in harms 
of which they have knowledge or are culpably ignorant avoids holding agents responsible in 
situations where they could not know the harm of their actions and therefore avoids unfairly 
blaming agents. In cases where an agents does not and could not know the consequences of their 
actions, we would find the idea of blame unacceptably demanding on the individual. 
We are now in a better position to analyse the role of agent knowledge when assessing 
individual members’ responsibility for a collective harm. For example, if a group excludes people 
from membership due to their ethnicity or gender, we can identify these practices as morally 
problematic. Even groups we would not normally associate with being harmful have had their 
membership criteria criticised as morally questionable, such as men-only golf clubs. Whilst the 
activities of the clubs are not cited as being harmful, the discrimination in their membership has 
led to members being questioned on their personal support for discrimination. Remaining a 
member of a club which is seen to discriminate against women often raises questions regarding 
individual member’s attitudes towards those being discriminated against. Appeals to tradition are 
increasingly unlikely to be seen as adequate in contemporary British society, instead such 
discrimination is regarded as unjustifiable and such groups are in decline. 
In order to compare the above example with a non-blameworthy example of agent 
participation in large-scale collective harm, consider the problem of assessing the moral 
responsibility of agents participating in early industrialisation. Human knowledge at that time did 
not include an understanding of the nature and causes of pollution, there was therefore no way 
for participants to know that their actions would be contributing to global warming and long-term 
damage to the environment. Whilst it seems reasonable to state that participants in the industrial 
                                                        
213 Although both Arendt and Young support holding agents responsible for unavoidable harm in some collective 
contexts. 
105 
 
revolution were causally responsible for the increase in pollution, suggesting that they were also 
morally responsible for it in the same way as agents who are currently engaged in polluting 
industrial practices seems unreasonable. To assert that agents from that time were morally 
responsible for the harm they caused seems unreasonable because it conflicts with our commonly 
held attitudes regarding fairness. Blaming people for things that they could not have known about 
places unfairly demanding requirements on them.  Today, we are aware of the effects of pollution 
on the environment, and anyone involved in industrial practices who is not aware of that is more 
than likely culpably ignorant, as such knowledge is commonplace and has been for some time. 
The condition of being able to avoid participating in a harmful activity is also important 
in assessing blameworthiness because of its relation to fairness. In cases where an agent could 
avoid causing a harm, it is acceptable to hold them responsible for failing to do so if they knew 
(or should have known) that this was the case. In cases where an agent is non-culpably ignorant 
of their ability to avoid a harm we are less likely to blame them for failing to do so. Putting the 
agent’s knowledge requirements aside, the ability of an agent to be able to avoid a harm plays a 
central role in assessing an agent’s relationship to a harm. We would expect an agent to avoid 
causing a harm when doing so is of little inconvenience to them, and depending on the type and 
level of harm under consideration, we may be prepared to expect an agent to avoid causing a harm 
even when it did cause considerable inconvenience to them. However, we would not necessarily 
hold an agent responsible for causing a harm in cases where doing so was impossible, or when 
doing so would be at great personal risk or harm. 
 
iv.! Motivations 
The next stage of our analysis of an agent’s moral responsibilities requires establishing 
the motivations the agent had that led them to act in the way in which they did. Agent motivations 
can be very complex and are the result of many influences, including the agent’s knowledge, 
experience, and the actions of others. Motivations are mental states that agents possess which 
incline them towards certain modes of behaviour, they are the factors that influence how an agent 
acts. Motivations are also mental states that an agent may possess but not act upon, and an agent 
may maintain a variety of conflicting motivations of varying strengths. Due to this complexity, it 
would be of little use to an analysis of moral responsibility along the lines of that offered by 
Bjornsson to hold an agent morally responsible for all their motivations which are directed 
towards behaviour we find undesirable. We are reluctant to blame people merely for what they 
think, and for good reason. Apart from the fact that thoughts can be involuntary, people may have 
motivations to engage in immoral behaviour on which they never act. In some cases we may think 
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more highly of an agent who overcomes negative motivations in order to ‘do the right thing’ than 
one who never experiences the temptation to act otherwise.214 Since most people will have to 
decide between conflicting motivations at some point in their lives, the most important 
motivations for moral analysis are those which influence the agent’s behaviour, which may lead 
to action or inaction depending on the circumstances.  
Due to the role that motivations play in an agent’s relationship to states of affairs, they 
are often the subject of moral appraisal. We think that agents should be motivated to act morally, 
that they should not be motivated solely by their own self-interest. Moral agents are expected to 
develop appropriate motivations to act morally; when an agent lacks the correct motivation, we 
may ask whether they have made some kind of error, whether they are lacking information, or 
whether they are capable of actually meeting the requirements of moral agency. The importance 
of agent motivations to moral analysis is discussed throughout Bjornsson’s work, his examples 
draw on cases where the agents lacked a strong enough motivation to do what is commonly 
accepted as ‘the right thing’. When an agent reacts to a situation, we may try to explain their 
response with reference to the motivations they had at the time. This can be seen in the way that 
we tend to ask an agent why they acted in a particular way. We are interested both in what the 
agent knew about the situation as well as how the situation affected them and the motivations 
they developed regarding it.  
Perhaps the most straightforward case of agent motivation is when an agent possesses a 
motivation that causes them to perform a particular action, such as being moved to donate money 
to charity, or to steal something that they cannot afford to buy. In both these examples an agent’s 
motivation to perform a particular action is strong enough to move them to act, and the 
relationship between the motivation and the action it brought about appears more transparent. 
However, this apparent clarity can be misleading. If the agent donating to charity only did so 
because they wanted to impress others with their generosity, or the person who stole did so to 
feed their starving children, our analysis of the moral praise- and blameworthiness of each agent 
is affected. The reason for this change cannot be an appeal to there being anything different about 
the states of affairs, in both cases nothing has changed. The change lies in our response to the 
motivations underlying the actions of the agents involved, our response can be explained by an 
appeal to the importance of agent motivation in our everyday moral reasoning and analysis. 215 
Motivation to inaction can appear harder to analyse in terms of moral blameworthiness 
because the relationship between motivation and inaction may be less clear. In some cases 
                                                        
214 See Susan Wolf, ‘Moral Saints’, Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982), 419-439 for further discussion. 
215 See Strawson. 
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inaction may be the option that morality requires, but more commonly when assessing inaction it 
is a case of failing to act when morality required an agent to do so. Inaction can therefore also be 
the result of a specific morally blameworthy motivation. The cases of inaction that are particularly 
interesting to the Explanation Hypothesis are those where an agent fails to perform an action that 
would normally be seen as morally required because they are engaging in joint action with other 
agents. In isolation, an agent may be motivated to endeavour to avoid harming others and be more 
conscientious of the effects of their actions. When an agent is participating in a collective situation 
with others, the same level of concern may not be present. Agents often have the tendency to act 
in such a way that they hope or expect others to take action, thus avoiding doing so themselves.216 
Agents also frequently use other’s inaction as an excuse for their own, agents may believe it is 
unfair that they should be expected to act in a particular way when other participants do not.   
A further problem when assessing agent blameworthiness is that agents will normally 
maintain a wide variety of motivations, some of which may be seen as undesirable and/or 
conflicting. That an agent holds conflicting or undesirable motivations, however, is not in itself 
necessarily morally problematic. When assessing the moral responsibility agents hold through an 
analysis of their motivations, we are only interested in motivations which influence an agent’s 
behaviour. When an agent possesses a variety of motivations, some of which may be conflicting, 
what we think is most important in the end is that an agent acted on the more morally appropriate 
motivation. We do not expect agents to be ‘moral saints’, where they are always motivated and 
only motivated to act morally.217 Our interest here is that an agent is motivated enough to act in 
such a way that their behaviour does not lead them to participation in harm.  
The problem of agents lacking appropriate motivations to act morally is also a concern 
for moral analysis. An agent can be morally blameworthy for lacking an appropriate motivation, 
such as failing to be motivated to avoid harming others, depending on the reason for their lack of 
motivation. Lacking an appropriate motivation is a slightly different problem from failing to act 
on a motivation. Where an agent has a motivation to act morally, but is more motivated by other 
less morally acceptable motivations, the agent is more morally blameworthy for their failure to 
act appropriately because they possess the required motivation but chose not to do act on it. Where 
an agent lacks the correct motivation in the first place, explaining why the agent lacks a motivation 
is important for an accurate understanding of their moral responsibility regarding the state of 
affairs. Establishing the culpability for this lack of motivation is in many ways similar to 
establishing whether an agent is culpably ignorant of a harm in which they participate. We wish 
                                                        
216 ‘Tragedy of the commons’ problems are a result of this tendency. See Garrett Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the 
Commons’, Science, 162 (1968), 1243-1248. 
217 See Wolf. 
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to understand why the agent lacked the motivation, whether they had inaccurate or incomplete 
information regarding the situation, whether they had been misled or had misunderstood their 
relationship to the harm and their role in the situation. All these factors would affect how we 
assess the agent’s lack of motivation and their responsibility for this lack. 
In order to establish an agent’s responsibility for a harm, it is clear that we must 
understand the precise nature of an agent’s knowledge, understanding, and motivations regarding 
the state of affairs under consideration in order to make an adequate analysis. This information 
can profoundly affect the way in which we ascribe responsibility to agents in a situation. We care, 
when analysing responsibility, whether an agent acted on a misunderstanding or in full knowledge 
of what they were doing, we will evaluate an action differently if it was performed by an agent 
who has been deceived or one who lacks the capacity to understand the implications of their 
actions. Analysing the role which agent motivations play in our general moral evaluations 
demonstrates their importance to an accurate and thorough account of agent responsibility.    
 
4.5 Expanded Individualism and Social Structural Harm  
In the preceding chapter, I discussed the ways in which Young’s work on structural 
injustice provided support for a participation-based account of moral responsibility regarding 
social structural harm. In Bjornsson’s work there is further support for an individualist account 
of moral responsibility for social structural harms through an analysis of the motivations for 
agents’ involvement in these structures, what I shall call ‘expanded individualism’. Holding 
people responsible for social structural harms is problematic for many traditional approaches to 
analysing moral responsibility due to the difficulty involved in identifying individual perpetrators 
of harm. In this section I shall therefore explain how expanded individualism provides an account 
of moral responsibility for social structural harm based on agents’ responsibility for participating 
in harmful structural activities. This account of moral responsibility focusses on agent motivations 
regarding their participation, rather than the specific difference made by each individual 
participating agent. I shall explain why agent motivation plays a significant role in social 
structural harms and discuss the problem that this role is commonly overlooked due to its 
normalisation in contemporary society. 
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i.! The importance of motivation 
Analysing responsibility ascriptions in cases of social structural harm is difficult because 
of the minute or indiscernible contribution of each individual participant. It is often the case that 
an individual contribution, considered in isolation, makes no difference to the harm caused by the 
social structure.218 We can identify the harm that is done by the social structural practice as a 
whole, but identifying the harm caused by specific individuals is usually not possible. We do not, 
however, therefore hold the belief that no-one is morally responsible for social structural harm, 
since identifying the participants is usually possible. This leaves us with a problem, traditional 
accounts of moral responsibility struggle to explain who is responsible for these large-scale harms 
and why.  
By focussing on the importance of agent motivation to our evaluation of moral 
responsibility, Bjornsson’s account of joint responsibility helps explain why participation in 
social structural harm is so morally problematic despite the apparent lack of harm caused by each 
individual participant. The problem lies in the lack of agent motivation to avoid participating in 
harm. Where many agents fail to be motivated to act morally, individual actions which in isolation 
may not cause harm (though they may still be morally problematic) can contribute to large-scale 
harms. Although any one individual’s withdrawal from a harmful practice would have no effect 
on whether the harm caused occurred or not, if many participating individuals withdrew from the 
practice the effect of the process would be altered. 
 
ii.! The significance of individual participation 
Whilst Bjornsson’s account provides an interesting explanation for our practices of 
holding agents jointly morally responsible for harms where no individual has control over the 
outcome, on first reading it may appear that Bjornsson’s account gets us no closer to explaining 
the importance of individual agent participation is social structural harm. The third condition of 
his argument that an agent’s contribution must make a significant contribution, does not appear 
to apply to social structural harms. Each agent’s contribution in these circumstances is usually 
minute, and the difference it makes is minimal when the entire social structural harm is 
considered.  
This, however, misrepresents the importance of individual contributions and the role they 
play in social structural harms. These harms are solely composed of such individual contributions, 
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therefore the choices and participation of individual contributors is of central importance to the 
nature of the overall social structure. If we consider each agent in isolation, this importance can 
be lost. When each individual sees their contribution as unimportant, they will lack the motivation 
to address the harms in which they are involved. When agents understand that their contribution 
makes a difference, however small or seemingly insignificant, to a large-scale harm, their change 
in behaviour to avoid contributing to harm can change the impact of social structures. The more 
participants in a social structure who share this understanding and act accordingly, the less likely 
that social structure is to cause large scale harm. Therefore agent motivation is a particularly 
significant aspect of social structural harms.  
When agents fail to take into account the wider repercussions of their individual 
participation, it is easy for many small and seemingly harmless contributions to compound into 
large-scale harms. These harms are not inevitable, but avoiding them does require agents to be 
mindful of their interactions with others and to consider the effects of their actions when 
performed not just by them, but along with many other agents. When, for example, an agent is 
considering buying a sweatshop produced jumper, they may think that there is very little chance 
that their purchase will harm anyone, which if we consider that action in isolation, it would not. 
Since, however, that action is not performed in isolation, we must think about it in its wider social 
context. 
We can usually ignore a very small chance. But we should not do so when we may affect 
a very large number of people, or when the chance will be taken a very large number of 
times. These large numbers roughly cancel out the smallness of the chance.219 
With the huge amounts of agents involved in social structures, agents cannot think of their 
individual contributions in terms of individual risk, but rather as part of a much larger set of 
individuals all performing actions that risk harm. This better reflects the likelihood that engaging 
in such activities helps perpetuate harm. 
Bjornsson’s argument that an agent needs to play a significant role in a harm in order to 
be held responsible for it helps explain moral responsibility for participation in social structural 
harm in a number of ways. He suggests that agents do not need to engage in intentional action or 
specifically make decisions in order to play a significant role in a harm.220 This is important when 
considering social structural harms, as participants are unlikely to be intentionally participating 
in order to cause others harm. They may have given little or no thought to the implications of 
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their participation, which is part of the problem regarding motivation that leads so many to 
participate in harmful activity.  
I also suggest that it is possible for an agent to make a significant contribution without 
making an individual difference. This is the case for most participatory acts involved in social 
structural harms. Individual contributions are significant because it is these contributions which 
bring about and perpetuate the harm. Without such contributions, there would be no harm caused. 
At the same time, if any one individual’s contribution is considered in isolation it appears 
unimportant because it makes no discernible difference to the whole. The importance of the act 
does not lie in the difference it makes to the harm caused by the structural process. An agent 
therefore does not need to make a decisive difference to the harm, it can be the case that the harm 
will happen regardless of whether a particular agent acts or not, but their contribution (along with 
many others) remains significant because it is an integral part of the explanation as to how and 
why the harm came about.  
Part of the reason that it may appear that contributions to social structural harm are not 
significant is that our multiple contributions have become normalised into our daily lives. As a 
result, Bjornsson’s analysis seems unable to explain why agent participation is morally 
problematic, as much of an agent’s involvement does not seem to be explicable through ‘attention 
grabbers’, through acts that are surprising and stand out from the background conditions.221  Many 
contributions made by individual agents to these harms are through activities widely regarded as 
normal and mundane. This normalisation of participation in large scale harms is a significant part 
of the problem of adequately analysing individual contribution.  
The fact that many social structural practices result in large-scale harm is common 
knowledge, but this knowledge fails to elicit a change in participant behaviour to avoid actions 
that contribute to and perpetuate harm. If we attempt to analyse the morality of our involvement 
objectively, we are presented with a very different picture of the effect on others of our actions. 
However, we usually fail to consider the morality of our participation in large-scale social 
practices in the way that we would consider our actions in smaller-scale direct interpersonal 
exchanges. Considering the common moral beliefs we have in these direct exchanges can help 
shed light on the kinds of moral considerations we should employ in our participation in social 
structural processes. 
 
                                                        
221 In the way that lightning is an attention grabber in his burning house example (Joint Responsibility, p. 191). 
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iii.! Participating in harmful structures 
Many of our widely held moral beliefs regarding the appropriate treatment of other people 
incorporate ideas relating to the avoidance of causing harm, both directly and indirectly, through 
injury, exploitation, negligence, or indifference, to name but a few. When considering exchanges 
between individuals that we view as direct interpersonal interactions, we would consider actions 
which knowingly and foreseeably led to harm as morally unacceptable. There would have to be 
a very good reason for us not to blame a perpetrator of harm in these circumstances, such as them 
acting under duress. Where an agent contributed to significant and sustained harm, we would 
require any exculpation to be very strong indeed. That an agent’s contribution was small would 
not exclude them from responsibility, and claims of ignorance regarding their participation would 
require adequate justification, we would want to establish whether such ignorance was genuine 
or affected, and whether or not it was culpable. 
When an agent participates in social structural harm, we commonly fail to impose these 
same moral responsibility requirements on their actions, and agents do not usually consider the 
implications of their actions in the same way. Participation in large-scale harm has quickly 
become a largely accepted and normalised part of our daily lives, resulting in agents often 
unreflectively contributing to social structural harms.  Its ubiquity has made it appear 
unsurprising, so it fails to grab our attention in the way that we would normally think harmful 
actions should do. Thus despite the fact that it is common knowledge that most clothing is 
manufactured in sweatshops where people work in appalling conditions for very little money, 
many people fail to see their purchase of these clothes as particularly morally blameworthy.   
Pogge has argued that the pervasive nature of our participation in practices that harm the global 
poor has made us ‘active participants in the largest, though not the gravest, crime against 
humanity ever committed’.222 Despite the scale of the harm involved and the extent to which we 
are actively engaged in contributing to it, most people continue their involvement without much 
reflection on their participatory actions. Action to change the social processes that lead to these 
harms largely continues to be seen as supererogatory, rather than a moral requirement of all those 
involved. 
Despite this high level of normalisation, the kinds of harms to which agents are 
contributing would, in other circumstances, elicit our interest. Considering historical examples 
can help explain the morally problematic nature of our current predicament. Slavery is now 
universally recognised as indefensible, and support of slavery is morally condemned around the 
                                                        
222 Pogge, Thomas, ‘Human Rights and Human Responsibilities’, in Global Responsibilities: Who Must Deliver on 
Human Rights?’, ed. by Andrew Kuper, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2005a), pp.3-35, p. 33. 
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world.223 Historically, slavery was often institutionalised and widely accepted as a normal part of 
societies around the world until the 1800s.224 During the time it was legal, it was widely practiced 
and an accepted part of international manufacturing and economic activity. Slave labour has been 
used to provide goods and services that would otherwise have been difficult for many to afford. 
Knowledge of its use was common, and it seems that tacit support for this practice was widespread 
amongst those benefitting from the practice.  
Despite this long running institutional practice of support for slavery throughout human 
history, it is now finally illegal in every country and publically condemned as an immoral practice. 
This is because slavery is regarded as incompatible with contemporary moral values, it denies 
people their basic human rights and causes much suffering. Of course, this was the case before it 
became universally illegal, but this was not so widely recognised. Given our contemporary 
conception of the morality of slavery, were an agent knowingly and willingly to purchase items 
produced from slave labour today, we would find this support of slavery immoral. We would do 
so regardless of whether we could identify any specific harm caused to a specific slave in the 
production of such goods. Simply supporting the practice of slavery through purchasing slave-
made goods would be regarded as an immoral act because such purchases perpetuate the use of 
slaves in manufacturing and thus contribute to suffering and the denial of people’s basic rights.  
 
iv.! Explaining collective responsibility: Expanded Individualism 
Many people in the world today work in dangerous and horrendous conditions, denied 
basic human rights, and endure much suffering whilst working to produce cheap goods that would 
otherwise be difficult for many people to afford. Knowledge that these practices are widespread 
in the manufacturing of many goods, particularly clothing, is commonplace. However, despite 
the similarities, participating in the social structures that create this harm is not considered nearly 
as immoral, if it is considered immoral at all, as participating in social structures supporting 
slavery. Supporting harmful manufacturing processes has become institutionalised and 
normalised into contemporary society, so much so that many people rarely reflect on how and 
where the goods they purchase are produced.225 Participating in harmful social processes is not 
perceived by agents in the same way as performing other harmful actions. In many ways, the 
                                                        
223 This is, unfortunately, oversimplifying the issue, as slavery continues to be practiced illegally around the world. 
Since this is done in secret, I take it that it is still acknowledged that this practice is considered morally unacceptable. 
224 Although slavery remained legal in some countries until the 21st century, the abolition of slavery became widespread 
during the 19th century.  
225 I shall return to the problem of agent assumptions regarding others in the next chapter. 
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extensive institutionalisation of harmful social practices is a normal part of life, in much the same 
was as slavery was still viewed by many in the early 19th century.  
Social structural harm is ubiquitous throughout contemporary society, it is something that 
most people contribute to in some way or another every day. The ability to explain why 
participating in harmful social structures brings with it moral responsibilities for those harms is 
therefore necessary in order to provide a more complete and accurate account of the moral 
responsibilities we all hold. Considering Young and Bjornsson’s work on participatory moral 
responsibility, we can explain individual moral responsibility for engagement in social structures 
which cause harm in the following way: 
1.! Social structural process are responsible for causing large-scale harms. 
2.! Social structures are perpetuated by the continuing participation of individuals. 
3.! Individual contributing actions provide a significant explanation of the occurrence of collective 
harm in social structures. 
4.! Agents are capable of being responsible agents in their involvement in social structures as much 
as they are in individual interactions. 
5.! Agents’ motivations regarding social structures play an important role in the continuation of 
immoral social structures. 
6.! Therefore, agents bear moral responsibility for participation in social structures. 
Expanded individualism helps explain why agents bear responsibility for collective 
harms in which they participate but might make no discernible difference. Whilst the majority of 
agents continue to fail to be motivated to avoid harmful participation and fail to work towards 
changing social structural processes in order to make them non-harmful, these harms will continue 
to occur. Although the withdrawal of any one individual makes no difference to the outcome, 
were many of those involved to withdraw or alter their participation, the harm caused by the social 
structural process would be altered. The collective nature of this harm, and the need for a 
collective approach in order to adequately address it, makes it a difficult subject for many 
individualist accounts of responsibility. However, expanding our understanding of individualism 
to incorporate responsibility for those harms we cause with many others is an important step 
towards developing a full and accurate account of our moral responsibilities.  
 
4.6 Conclusion  
Social structural harms have become a major source of suffering in the world, and a form 
of harm in which most people participate, though often in indiscernibly small ways. 
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Understanding the way in which agents come to bear responsibility for their participation in these 
harms, particularly when their contribution often appears to have no effect on the harm, can be 
difficult. The context in which an agent acts is important to our understanding of the morality of 
their actions, and participation in social structures requires agents to get involved in collective 
processes where their small contribution is one of many. Focussing only on the individual and the 
difference their contribution makes to a harm is to neglect the importance of the collective context 
of the agent’s actions. When an agent’s actions help perpetuate a harmful social structure, they 
bear responsibility for the effects of that social structure. 
When an agent is participating in harm, we need to analyse their reasons for doing so. If 
an individual has been deceived or is incapable of understanding their participation we will hold 
them less or not responsible for the harm they help bring about. If, however, an agent participates 
in harm because they failed to reflect on their actions, because they lacked motivation or were 
more motivated by self-interest than the harm their actions would cause others, we are likely to 
hold that agent morally responsible for their participation. In some respects what is required is 
not so much an expansion of individualism, but a more rigorous application of responsibility 
ascriptions in collective contexts, instead of the tendency to downplay an agent’s responsibilities 
when other agents are involved. When a person is a capable moral agent in their direct 
interpersonal interactions, there is no reason they should not be so in their interactions with wider 
social processes. 
Whilst the work of Young and Bjornsson provide some foundations for a participatory-
based account of responsibility for social structural harms, there remain a lot of questions in need 
of further discussion. Questions regarding the nature and extent of the moral responsibility 
concerning social structural harms, how and in what circumstances agents bear this responsibility, 
and how agents should respond to this responsibility and the way in which this kind of moral 
responsibility is best discharged are only partially addressed, if at all, in their work.  In the next 
chapter I shall analyse these questions in the hope of establishing an account of moral 
responsibility that addresses the large-scale harms in which we all participate. 
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5: Contributing to Social Structural Harms 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter I outlined the basis for an alternative account of responsibility 
that is better able to accommodate cases of social structural harm. I suggested that in order to 
understand the responsibilities involved in these collective harms, we need to understand that they 
are often brought about by the seemingly mundane daily participation of multitudes of 
individuals, all making minute contributions to what results in a large-scale collective harm. 
These actions are not intended to help bring about social structural harm, indeed many agents fail 
to reflect on the structural nature of their daily interactions, but a great deal of our daily activities 
do nevertheless involve participation in social structures. Through expanding our understanding 
of individual moral responsibility beyond the direct harm caused in interpersonal interactions to 
instead encompass responsibility for those larger harms our actions perpetuate, we can more 
accurately account for our responsibilities regarding social structural harms. In order to illustrate 
the relationship between individuals and social structural harms, I shall analyse agent 
participation through the example of the global clothing industry, particularly the harm done by 
the sweatshops used to produce much of the world’s clothing today. 
The clothing industry may not be the first thing that springs to mind when considering 
different types of social structure. Systems of government, of law, education, class systems, and 
organised religion are all perhaps more obvious examples. Defining social structures is 
notoriously difficult,226 but the basic idea is that a social structure is a system of rules governing 
human organisation and interaction within an established framework. Social structures are the 
ways in which we have organised our interactions both within a society and across multiple 
societies. Often these structures operate on a grand scale and can affect large numbers of people, 
even everyone on earth. This being the case, clothing production, like many other traded 
commodities, has become a global social structure in which almost all people participate, whether 
they are consciously aware of it or not. Through an explanation of the morally important links 
between individuals at the ends of lengthy and complex causal chains resulting in large-scale 
harms we can develop a better account of the morality of participating in such structures.  
Over the last 40 years the design and manufacturing of clothing has moved from a largely 
regional undertaking to a more global enterprise.227 Much clothing design has moved to developed 
countries, whilst manufacturing is centred round a huge sweatshop industry in developing 
                                                        
226 See chapter 3. 
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countries. The design, manufacture, and distribution of clothing has become a highly organised 
social undertaking, the rules of which apply around the world.228 At the same time, fashion has 
become increasingly homogenised, allowing mass produced items to be globally distributed.229 
All levels of clothing manufacture, from the cheapest t-shirts to high end fashion, are largely 
produced in the same way. Almost everyone around the world wears clothing, most of which is 
produced as part of the global clothing industry,230 and so of all the social structures we have 
developed, the clothing industry has become the social structure with almost universal 
participation. 
Participating in a structure such as the clothing industry is also something we view quite 
differently from participating in other social structures. Participating in governmental practices 
through voting, for example, is a conscious act which usually involves some reflection on the 
implications of that action. Buying a jumper, on the other hand, is an action that many people do 
not necessarily see as having moral implications. If someone wants a new jumper, their main 
concerns will often be around whether they can find one that they like for a price they are willing 
to pay, rather than the way in which the jumper was manufactured, whether the people involved 
in its production were fairly treated, and what impact the making of that jumper had on the 
environment. That agents purchase such goods as often as they like and are able has become a 
normal part of daily life.  
Attitudes to clothing, as well as our knowledge of the ways in which it is manufactured, 
have drastically changed over the past few decades. We have more clothes than ever before, 
clothes that are cheaper than they have ever been, and we are more knowledgeable regarding their 
production due to the large amount of discussion of the conditions workers endure in 
sweatshops.231 There seems, then, to be something of a moral problem between our large and 
increasing consumption of sweatshop manufactured goods, and our knowledge of the harms 
inflicted by their manufacture. I argue that this problem arises from the scale of the social 
structure, the sheer number of agents involved, and the seemingly insignificant contribution to 
harm that any one purchase produces.  
                                                        
228 Mike Morris, and Justin Barnes, ‘Globalization, the Changed Global Dynamics of the Clothing and Textile Value 
Chains and the Impact on Sub-Saharan Africa’, United Nations Industrial Development Organization Working Paper 
(2008), <http://www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media/Publications/ Pub_free/Globalization_changed_global_dynamic 
s_of_clothing_and_textile_value_chains_and_impact_on_subSaharan_Africa.pdf>, p. 6-7. 
229 Angela B. McCracken, The Beauty Trade: Youth, Gender, and Fashion Globalization, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2014). 
230 Of course a few communities around the world still produce their own fabrics and clothing, but this has become a 
dwindling minority of people. 
231 See Brooks; Julian Allwood, Soren Laursen, Celcilia Rodriguez, and Nancy Bocken, ‘Well Dressed? The present 
and future sustainability of clothing and textiles in the United Kingdom’, University of Cambridge Institute for 
Manufacturing (2006), <http://www.ifm.eng.cam.ac.uk/uploads/Resources/Other_Reports /UK_textiles.pdf>. 
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Due to the large number of other agents involved in the production of sweatshop-made 
items, and the lack of direct interactions between consumers and those harmed, agents fail to 
recognise the connection between their actions and the harm to which they contribute. Social 
structural harms appear to us as quite different from direct interpersonal harms, and this leads to 
an under appreciation of our role in them. Analysing the way in which participation in social 
structures like the clothing industry perpetuates the harms it causes is important to developing an 
understanding of our moral responsibilities regarding these structures. I shall explain why our 
involvement in these harms does not require a new form of responsibility, but rather an expansion 
of our more traditional conceptions of moral responsibilities towards others, to encompass those 
we harm through our participation in social structures.  
In section 5.2 I explain in more detail the way in which clothing manufacturing has 
become a globally organised undertaking and why focussing particularly on the structural nature 
of the global clothing industry is useful in demonstrating the nature and extent of much of our 
everyday participation in social structures. In section 5.3 I analyse the relationship between the 
individual and the social structural harms in which they participate. There are a number of key 
considerations regarding this relationship, including the importance of connection through 
participation, the motivations behind agent participation, the problem of agents bearing the wrong 
sensitivity to collective harms, and the problem of agents developing inconsistent and erroneous 
assumptions concerning other participants, all of which lead us to frequently underestimate our 
responsibility for these harms. I turn to questions regarding the harm itself, including 
imperceptible and unavoidable harm, in section 5.4, before finally examining a common excuse 
made in support of sweatshops, the argument that they in fact make workers better off, in section 
5.5.  
 
5.2 Harmful Social Structures: The Rise of the Global Clothing Industry 
The choice of using the clothing industry as an example of a pervasive social structure is 
important for a number of reasons, including its almost universal participation, the unreflective 
nature of most participatory acts, the normalisation of the structure, and the widespread harm it 
causes. I am not going to discuss the morality of fashion itself here, though I think it is 
important,232 but I shall rather be focussing on a particular consequence of the globalisation of the 
fashion industry, namely the rise of sweatshops.233 Clothing manufacture has only recently 
                                                        
232 For an interesting discussion of the morality of globalised fashion see McCracken. 
233 Sweatshops are of course used to make other non-fashion items, particularly toys and small electrical goods. As 
these items are more of a luxury rather than a basic necessity, unlike clothing, and therefore not items that are owned 
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become primarily produced through sweatshops, like most other manufacturing it was 
traditionally a local or regional undertaking. There has been increasing industrialisation of certain 
areas of clothing and textile manufacture since the end of the 18th century, and whilst trade in 
textiles during this time became standardised in certain parts of the world, only recently has 
manufacture moved from a largely regional affair to a globally organised market.234 I shall begin 
by briefly defining what is meant by the term ‘sweatshop’, along with an explanation of the way 
in which they have risen to become the primary method of textile manufacturing, before 
discussing questions of responsibility. 
The definitions of what constitutes a sweatshop vary, some authors suggest that a factory 
which employs people on very low wages in often dangerous conditions for long hours 
encompasses the main characteristics, 235 whilst others provide a more thorough description of the 
conditions usually experienced by workers: 
Shifts are commonly at least ten hours, six days a week, and forced overtime is common. 
Factories usually have strict rules, which often include restrictions on talking and going 
to the bathroom, and supervisors are often abusive as a matter of policy. Working 
conditions are often dangerous, with poorly ventilated, overheated spaces and little 
protective equipment. Women workers often suffer sexual harassment or verbal abuse. 
Workers who protest their exploitation or attempt to organize unions are typically 
intimidated, beaten, or fired. Wages for these workers are often below the local legal 
minimum wage, and even when they are not, the wages fall below what the workers need 
for subsistence.236 
There is overwhelming evidence from a wide range of sources, including governments and NGOs 
supporting these claims; that these practices occur and are widespread is now common 
knowledge.237 Although some factories are worse than others, they share many of these common 
conditions for workers and are prevalent throughout many developing countries, particularly in 
East Asia. 
Historically this concentration in global production was not the case. Before the 1970s 
much clothing manufacture was domestic or regional, even where multinational corporations 
(MNCs) like Nike and Disney did have foreign production arrangements, the items were intended 
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235 See Chris Meyers, 'Wrongful Beneficence: Exploitation and Third World Sweatshops', Journal of Social 
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236 Young ‘Global Labour Justice’, p. 366. 
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for distribution within the manufacturing country. During the 1970s international organisations, 
especially the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), encouraged developing 
countries to establish ‘free trade zones’, ‘to encourage foreign investment via tax incentives and 
a minimal regulatory environment.’238 This move was successful in encouraging a large-scale 
movement of clothing manufacture to the developing world at an astonishing rate over the 
following few years.239 Many well-known clothing companies, including Nike, Adidas, and Levis, 
became designers and marketers rather than manufactures during this time because outsourcing 
production was very beneficial. Outsourcing provided clothing companies with ‘flexibility, 
diversity, reduced costs, and enhanced product development.’240 They could increase and decrease 
production at no direct cost to themselves, as the cost would be borne by the factories, and they 
could diversify their products easily without large set up costs. The low cost of manufacturing in 
these zones, largely due to low pay and low legal requirements, reduced production costs, even 
with the cost of international shipping and distribution, and allowed companies to develop their 
products with low cost to themselves. These benefits all led to a huge increase in sweatshop 
manufacturing in developing countries. 
The creation of free trade zones was intended to encourage investment in developing 
countries, open up markets, and aid development. Whilst the number of sweatshops has risen 
dramatically, there has not been a corresponding increase in the living standards of many of the 
workers employed in these factories.241 Wages have remained low, and due to the lack of taxes 
paid by corporations operating in these countries, local governments have often been unable to 
uphold even the most minimum employment and safety laws to protect workers, let alone 
redistribute the wealth these enterprises were meant to bring to the wider economy.242  Although 
workers clearly benefit from gaining some wages, however small, economies in many developing 
countries have failed to flourish, and the key beneficiaries of sweatshops have been clothing 
companies and consumers.   
The role of corporations that use sweatshop manufacturing has also been changing in 
ways which make it even more important to develop a clear account of moral responsibilities 
concerning sweatshops. Increasingly, multinational corporations (MNCs) have been taking on 
roles usually undertaken by governments, particularly through self-regulation and voluntary 
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codes of conduct.243 MNCs have usually had more resources than the local authorities to enforce 
local labour laws and have taken on these responsibilities as part of a developing culture of 
corporate responsibility in the industry.244 Some large corporations, such as Nike and Levis, have 
departments dedicated to social welfare and human rights, established after exposés regarding the 
conditions at some of the factories producing their goods.245 Whilst there has been increasing 
awareness of the problems sweatshop labour raises for corporate image and acknowledgement of 
the need to change within the industry,246 as well as ongoing anti-sweatshop campaigning from a 
number of groups, the abolition of these factories has failed to materialise.  
Measures taken by companies to tackle the problems of sweatshops have overwhelmingly 
focussed on tying the employees to their factories through the development of programmes which 
lead workers to depend on sweatshops for a variety of social needs, rather than on improving their 
overall rights and ability to exercise free choice. For example, employers have introduced 
education plans for employees at the weekend247 and in some cases have improved health and 
safety measures to reduce the high number of deaths and injuries in their factories, but there has 
been precious little improvement in wages or working hours for employees. The lack of progress 
is further evident in that the cost of many of these improvements is borne by the factory owners, 
not the clothing companies, suggesting that corporate social responsibility for these working 
practices has not been adequately addressed, despite the pledges of clothing companies.248 
There are some interesting parallels here with the condition of workers during the 
industrial revolution. The huge rise in factory production and rapid movement of people from 
rural Britain to manufacturing towns led to terrible working and living conditions for employees. 
Where factory owners did take steps to provide for their workers, it was similarly through 
initiatives that usually tied workers to the owner’s factory, through housing and other social 
provisions such as schooling for employees’ children, which were only available as long as 
workers continued to be employed in the associated factories.249 These initiatives also supported 
the social engineering aspirations of factory owners. In some cases these were laudable, such as 
the provision of green spaces and public libraries to improve city workers’ access to education 
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and fresh air. Some were more specific in their proscription of employee activities, several worker 
villages, for example, were built without public houses because the owners believed their 
employees should support the temperance movement.250  
The provisions made by factory owners during the 19th century were beneficial to workers 
where no state welfare system was in place, but in contemporary society it seems somewhat 
anachronistic that MNCs are once again taking on these aspects of their industrial predecessors, 
giving them a degree of control over their employees lives that we would no longer accept in 
affluent countries. In this way benefits such as fair wages, reasonable hours, and safe working 
conditions cease to be seen as basic rights due to all employees, and instead become dependent 
on the good will and charitable disposition of MNCs.      
The extent of sweatshop production and the changing role of sweatshop owners and 
contractors raises serious questions regarding moral responsibility for these factories. This 
responsibility, I shall argue, does not lie solely with clothing companies, though they may well 
bear more of the blame than other actors in the social structure. Since knowledge of the plight of 
those employed in sweatshops is commonplace, the widespread acceptance of these practices and 
continued purchase of the items they produce is morally problematic for those involved. Despite 
a number of high profile cases exposing the use of child labour, or the unsafe working conditions 
that led to the 2013 Rana Plaza building collapse in Bangladesh where 1129 workers died, none 
of the companies for which the items were being produced have ever been forced to close, 
changed their production methods, or had a major crisis through significant loss of custom.251 
Consumer habits regarding clothing have not significantly changed. Fairly traded clothing is still 
a fraction of the market, it continues to be seen largely as a luxury and too expensive for many 
consumers.252 At the same time, consumer demand for cheap clothing continues to rise around the 
world. This demand helps perpetuate the ‘race to the bottom’ in labour standards in developing 
countries,253 where factory owners compete to provide clothing companies with the cheapest 
possible goods, keeping wages low and conditions dangerous for sweatshop workers. Through 
purchasing these goods, individuals are participating in a harmful social structure that supports 
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terrible working conditions for huge numbers of people, and as a result their participating actions 
bring with them responsibilities regarding those harmed. 
 
5.3 Individual Agents and Social Structural Harm 
An expanded individualist account of responsibility requires a two stage approach when 
analysing responsibility ascriptions. The first stage requires us to identify harms and their causes. 
Although this account of responsibility does not require difference-making on the part of 
individuals, it does require difference-making at the collective level. This means that there must 
be some kind of harm that results from the actions of a collection of individuals, for which we 
can say the collective is casually responsible, even in cases where many of the individual 
participants are not directly causally responsible for the harm. Where a collection of agents are 
identified as causally responsible for producing a harm, we can move on to the second stage. This 
involves identifying participants in the collective harm and discerning their individual 
relationship with and moral responsibility for the collective harm. Both of these stages are 
necessary if we are to develop an accurate account of responsibility ascriptions in cases of social 
structural harm. This is because most participatory actions, if considered in isolation, appear 
harmless or insignificant on their own. It is only through observing the impact of the wider social 
structure of which the participation is a part that we get a more complete picture of the nature of 
these actions. 
In this section I shall discuss some of the key factors in the relationship between 
individuals and the social structural harms in which they participate, particularly the global 
clothing industry. The first two factors concern the scope and foundation of expanded 
individualism. Parts iii-vi concern the agent’s attitudes towards the social structures in which they 
participate, including the problems of agents bearing the wrong motivation, sensitivity, and 
assumptions towards their participation, as well as culpable ignorance regarding their role in the 
harm. All these factors lead to widespread participation in harmful structures, sometimes 
unintentional, but often through an actor’s lack of reflection on the nature of their participating 
actions. 
 
i.! Rejecting individual difference-making in collective contexts 
Looking to the collective rather than the individual can appear dangerously close to 
collectivist accounts of responsibility discussed in chapter 2. These were rejected for a number of 
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reasons, including the common criticism that collectivist accounts have a high risk of blaming 
innocent agents for the actions of others. In looking at difference-making at the collective rather 
than the individual level, it may appear that we run a similar risk of holding agents responsible 
for the actions of others. However, in the case of social structural harms, we are not blaming 
people for harms that other people bring about, but rather harms which they bring about with 
other people. The fact that the individual difference made by any specific participatory act is 
negligible does not mean that any individual is innocent of participating in harmful activities. 
Unlike collective accounts that rely on ideas of common membership of a group, through 
particular shared traits or beliefs for example, responsibility for social structural harm rests on 
specific participatory acts performed by agents. It is only through participation in harmful social 
structures that agents can come to bear responsibility for the harms done by these structures. In 
this way, agents are only held responsible for harms in which they are involved through their 
participation. 
When we discuss difference-making in the context of understanding agent responsibility, 
we are mainly concerned with actions that make a discernible difference to particular individuals. 
Whilst it is true that all actions will make some difference in the world just in virtue of being 
performed, not all actions will have a discernible effect on anyone in particular. Most traditional 
moral theories rely on identifying specific perpetrators and victims and analysing the link between 
them in order to attribute responsibility for harm. When many agents are contributing to a social 
structure like the clothing industry, where there are often no clear causal links between specific 
perpetrators and victims, this method of analysing responsibility is not possible. We are then left 
with a problem, we can identify the kinds of interactions that are resulting in harm, and we can 
identify the agents who are participating in the harm and those harmed, but on traditional accounts 
it is difficult to identify anyone who is responsible for the harm. Where no-one is responsible for 
the harm, no-one appears to be doing anything wrong, and therefore no-one is required to change 
their behaviour and the harm continues.  
This problem is especially evident in cases of social structural harm. If we consider an 
individual participatory act, the action of buying a sweatshop manufactured t-shirt for instance, 
the harm caused to any specific agent is indiscernible, if indeed there is any actual harm done at 
all. No factory worker is better or worse off because of any one purchase, and whether or not that 
individual action is performed will have no effect on the overall harm caused.  However, a 
sweatshop worker will be better or worse off if we consider a number of such purchases. In some 
cases, the actions of many individuals when viewed together cause harm, but no individual 
instance of that act is harmful on its own. If, then, a large number of consumers demanded that 
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factory conditions were improved, this would lead to a change in corporate policy, whereas the 
actions of only a few consumers are unlikely to have any real effect on factory conditions.  
When considering our actions, we need to think of them not in isolation as if they are 
performed in a vacuum, but as participating in a wider set of actions. Acknowledging that 
individual acts can lead to large-scale harms more accurately reflects the moral repercussions of 
our actions on the world. Parfit argues that an act can be wrong even if it harms no-one, ‘because 
it is one of a set of acts that together harm other people’.254 The inverse is also true, he suggests, 
so that there are actions one ought to do because they are part of a wider set that will bring benefit 
to someone. Thus whilst a difference-making condition is important for moral analysis, there 
needs to be some harm or benefit brought about in order for us to assess praise or blame. Looking 
for this solely at an individual level overlooks the way in which many of our actions are only 
harmful because they are part of a set of actions which together are responsible for harm. In order 
to understand this relationship between individual participating actions and the harmful structures 
of which they are a part, we need to understand the connection between agents and the larger 
social structures in which they are involved. 
 
ii.! Connection  
Any account of responsibility needs to be able to explain the connection between the 
agent and the harm under consideration. Establishing a connection between agents and harm is 
particularly important in moral analysis due to the connection we commonly make between moral 
responsibility and our practices concerning praise and blame. Blaming individuals for harms to 
which they bear no relation is believed to be unfair, and the idea of holding innocent parties 
responsible for the deeds of others is universally rejected. If, therefore, we wish to develop an 
account of responsibility for social structural harm, it is essential to establish whether we can 
provide an accurate account of the ways in which we are connected to the harms caused by social 
structures. I argue that this can be done through an analysis of our participation in these harmful 
social structures.  
Establishing a connection between consumers and sweatshop workers, who often live in 
other parts of the world and have no direct contact with one another, was for some time seen as 
implausible.255 The responsibility for the conditions in sweatshops was thought to lie with the 
owners and managers, those people who are directly involved in their construction and running. 
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This position came to be regarded as untenable as it became clear that the owners and managers 
of these factories were often themselves also not in a position to effect much change in 
conditions.256 Realising that those immediately involved in the problem were not able to address 
the situation, it has become increasingly clear that a demand for cheap clothing and pressure to 
keep the production of this clothing poorly regulated have led to its continued widespread use and 
expansion. But the huge numbers of people involved in the causal chains that lead to sweatshop 
workers’ exploitation, and the relatively new nature of this kind of relationship for the parties 
involved, leads to much difficulty in ascribing responsibility for these harms.  
Whilst historically many if not all of the items most people purchased have been made or 
grown locally, the increased ability to distribute products worldwide has seen an explosion in the 
amount of products we consume that have been produced by people we will never meet, who 
often live thousands of miles away. People in wealthier countries have benefitted from more 
affordable goods, but the gap between the richest and poorest countries has grown phenomenally 
since 1970, as has the gap between rich and poor within countries.257 The social institutions we 
have developed, many of which are now global, support this inequality. There has, of course, 
been widespread inequality throughout history, but what is striking about our current situation is 
the extent and level of inequality. Inequality at this level is not a naturally occurring phenomena, 
as Pogge notes, 
However one may want to imagine a state of nature among human beings on this planet, 
one could not realistically conceive it as producing an enduring poverty death toll of 18 
million annually. Only a thoroughly organized state of civilization can sustain horrendous 
suffering on such a massive scale.258 
One part of this widespread poverty problem relates to the proliferation of sweatshops. There are 
other problems caused by the global clothing industry, such as the dumping of vast quantities of 
cheap (often second-hand or excess stock) clothing into developing countries that has destroyed 
much of their domestic clothing industry, which is a particular problem in parts of Africa.259 The 
damage done by these practices is foreseeable and avoidable. It is the result of deliberate actions 
                                                        
256 Many authors have argued that factory owners are often in as bad a position as workers. See Arnold, DeWinter, 
Young, and Robert Mayer, 'Sweatshops, Exploitation, and Moral Responsibility', Journal of Social Philosophy, 38 
(2007), 605-619. 
257 Ricardo Fuentes-Nieva and Nick Galasso, ‘Working for the Few: Political capture and economic inequality’, Oxfam 
Policy Paper (2014), <https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp-working-for-few-political-capture-
economic-inequality-200114-en.pdf>. 
258 Thomas Pogge, ‘Real World Justice’, Journal of Ethics, 9 (2005b), 29-53, (p. 40). 
259 Sally Baden and Catherine Barber, ‘The Impact of the Second-hand Clothing Trade on Developing Countries’, 
Oxfam GB Research Report (2005) < http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/the-impact-of-the-second-hand-
clothing-trade-on-developing-countries-112464> and Rudolf Traub-Merz and Herbert Jauch, ‘The African Textile and 
Clothing Industry: From Import Substitution to Export Orientation’, in The Future of the Textile and Clothing Industry 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, ed. by Herbert Jauch & Rudolf Traub-Merz, (Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2006). 
127 
 
by many individuals, albeit through complicated social structures. When we deny that these 
outcomes are inevitable, and instead acknowledge that they are the result of ‘state and corporate 
complicity’,260 we can begin to address the responsibilities of agents involved in bringing these 
harms about. 
Agent interactions have become drastically more complicated than they were even a 
hundred years ago. Increased globalisation has become the norm in contemporary society, with 
huge advances in technology allowing us to interact with people all over the world in a variety of 
ways. Whilst some of this increased interaction has been mutually beneficial to all parties, such 
as increased ability to share knowledge and communicate through social media, other aspects of 
this interaction have been much less benign. In the case of the clothing industry, MNCs benefit 
greatly by outsourcing production to developing countries.261 At the same time, the people 
producing these items are unable to afford to buy them themselves, they are often unable to even 
meet their basic needs with the meagre salaries they receive and terrible conditions in which they 
work. Since these individuals rarely have many options to seek alternative employment, there is 
a great deal of inequality between the workers and consumers in terms of benefiting from their 
interactions. 
When agents purchase items produced in sweatshops, they are participating in the 
harmful structure which exploits sweatshop workers for the advantage of clothing companies and 
consumers. Despite the fact that consumers will probably never meet any of the agents involved 
in manufacturing these products, their continued demand for the products these workers produce 
supports the continued existence of sweatshops. Until the agents involved in a social structure 
start to work towards changing the rules governing the interactions it supports, there is little hope 
that the situation will change. Due to the current structure of the large-scale interaction, which 
would involve significant changes in order to bring about greater equality, there has so far been 
no major move towards a demand for the abolition of sweatshops from affluent consumers. 
There has been ongoing argument for recognition of the consumers’ role in the use of 
sweatshops through the anti-sweatshop movement. Campaigners have urged consumers to 
‘consider how consumption preferences are linked through global trade to the mistreatment of 
workers abroad.’262 This movement has seen very limited success, and sweatshop-free clothes 
remain largely a luxury item. There has been an increased awareness within the clothing industry 
of the possible brand image damage from association with the use of sweatshop labour, leading 
                                                        
260 DeWinter, p. 108 
261 Arnold, DeWinter, Zwolinski. 
262 DeWinter, p. 112. 
128 
 
some companies to sign up to initiatives that promise to improve working conditions in 
factories.263 These rarely go as far as self-regulation, but are rather a promise to try to do better in 
the future, it remains to be seen how effective they will be in improving standards. Despite an 
increased awareness that consumer practices directly influence the use of sweatshop 
manufacturing, and that therefore consumers are connected in a morally relevant way to these 
harmful practices, many agents continue to fail to take up that responsibility. I suggest that this 
lack of acceptance of responsibility can stem from a number of agent attitudes towards social 
structural harm, some of which I shall now discuss. 
 
iii.! Motivation  
Motivation plays an important role in our relationship with and attitude towards social 
structural harms, as it does with direct interpersonal interactions. Agents experience a range of 
motivations of different strengths, so our motivations to act in a particular way can be 
complicated. In order to perform any specific act, an agent needs to be more motivated to perform 
that act than any other. Knowing the morally right thing to do is not, on its own, necessarily 
enough to ensure that an action is performed. Agent motivation regarding social structural harms 
is particularly problematic for a number of reasons, including the fact that our participation in 
them is largely normalised, most of the people we know also participate in them, and changing 
our participation would involve much more effort than maintaining the status quo. Changing 
individuals’ motivations towards social structural harms is essential, however, if we are to address 
them, as it is only through a change in the attitudes and actions of individuals that social structures 
can be reformed. 
The normalisation of participation in social structural harms has led them to become an 
unreflective part of our daily routines, so that we do not perceive our participatory acts as 
contributions to harm. For example, if an agent wants to buy a new dress, her first consideration 
is unlikely to be where and under what circumstance the dress will have been produced. We are 
not involved in the production of most consumer goods, particularly clothing, little of which is 
manufactured in affluent countries. Our lack of direct experience of this aspect of such items 
renders considerations regarding an item’s origins less important or obvious to us. Most people 
only experience these items as finished products in shops, ready for them to take away and use. 
It is often the case that everyone we know has similar motivations regarding clothing and other 
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consumables, we are concerned with whether we can get the items we like at prices we are willing 
to pay. Although knowledge of the production methods used in clothing manufacture is 
widespread, it is not widely discussed as part of our daily routines. Agents are aware, or would 
be if they reflected upon it, of the fact that the items are produced in sweatshops, but since this is 
not something in which they feel involved, or feel that their purchases have any impact, they lack 
motivation to change their habits. 
Changing individual motivations regarding structural harm is essential as it is this 
widespread change in individual attitudes that results in change to structural rules. Pogge argues 
that it is ‘not just the causal role of social institutions that is important, but the implicit attitude of 
social institutions.’264 This attitude comes from the attitudes of those participating in the social 
structure, their attitudes towards the social structure and its effects on participants and non-
participants alike. Social structural organisation reacts to social changes, change which can be 
gradual or more sudden. Changing social attitudes to race, gender, sexuality, and the environment 
have all led to changes in social structures to reflect these altered attitudes. Many forms of 
discrimination, which were once just a normal part of everyday life, have now been made illegal. 
We no longer refuse people work or pay them less because of their ethnicity, gender, or 
sexuality,265 slavery is illegal, and there is increasing legislation regarding environmental 
protection issues. All of these changes in legislation have come about through changing social 
attitudes to each particular issue. There is every reason to suppose that a change in social attitudes 
towards the manufacturing of consumables would have a similar effect on our social structures. 
Arnold has argued along these lines, stressing that sweatshops have a diminishing future 
with growing consumer awareness.266 This, however, has so far been a slow process. Whilst some 
people in affluent countries continue to campaign against sweatshop conditions, a large number 
of people in these countries continue to purchase sweatshop produced goods, not so much due to 
the cost of fairly-traded items, but because of a lack of motivation to take production methods 
into account when making purchasing decisions. This lack of widespread change in consumer 
attitudes has led to limited motivations within the clothing industry to address the problem of 
sweatshop labour. Although consumers are aware of the problem, their participation has become 
normalised, they benefit greatly from the current situation, and their individual ability to effect 
change appears minimal, or non-existent. It is hard, therefore, for many people to feel motivated 
to address the harmful origins of the products they buy. If agents can come to see the importance 
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of their involvement in social structural harms, and understand that their continued participation, 
when considered as one of many actions, leads to the perpetuation of these harms, they can come 
to take this consequence of their activities more seriously. 
During our daily activities, we are often more motivated by meeting our immediate needs 
and satisfying our preferences than ensuring that our lives are not negatively impacting on distant 
others and the environment. Although for some individuals the difficulties they face meeting their 
immediate needs means other considerations regarding the wider effects of their actions are 
rendered of little concern, many people, particularly in affluent countries, do not have this excuse. 
Taking the wider effects of participation seriously would no doubt lead to potentially radical 
changes in some forms of participation, but this in itself does not justify ignoring the 
consequences of our participation in social structural harm. Agents often choose to improve their 
own lifestyles over improving the conditions of others, even when in relative terms very little 
sacrifice on their part may lead to huge improvements in the lives of others. Recognising this is 
an important step towards developing stronger motivations to avoid participating in harmful 
structures. 
 
iv.! Wrong sensitivity problem  
A further problem facing the relationship between individual agents and social structural 
harms is agents’ sensitivity to the context and wider effects of their actions.  Whilst sensitivity 
and motivation are similar concerns, they are distinct. Having an inappropriate sensitivity to a 
situation affects an agent’s motivation, so that that they fail to be moved to act morally. But an 
agent can have the right sensitivity and still fail to act, through a lack of will for instance, thus the 
two are not synonymous. An agent having the wrong sensitivity to a situation involves issues 
including an agent failing to understand what morality requires of them at a given point, failing 
to recognise the harm caused by an action or a set of actions, or incorrectly prioritising varying 
moral responsibilities. Therefore, when an agent cares more about what an item of clothing looks 
like than whether anyone was harmed in its production, or chooses not to take account of the harm 
and ignore this aspect of their purchase, they are demonstrating the wrong sensitivity to the 
situation. This problem is widespread and it is exacerbated by the fact that, due to so many of our 
actions having far reaching consequences for many other people, we are constantly required to 
consider how our actions contribute to often very complex social processes. In order to analyse 
the problem of agents developing the wrong sensitivity to social structural harm, I shall discuss 
the impact of globalisation on our everyday moral reasoning, along with large-scale harm being 
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seen as part of the explanatory background of globalisation, and the sheer extent of the problem 
facing us. 
Scheffler has discussed the problems raised by the increasing globalisation of our world 
for what we might call our common sense morality. The clearly delineated bounds of our 
responsibility and ability to affect others through our actions has fundamentally changed in recent 
years, our previous notions of minimal responsibility to all but those with whom we directly 
interact is becoming increasingly difficult to justify.267 Until recently our ability to affect the lives 
of distant others has been somewhat limited. Our spheres of influence were restricted to others in 
our community, and the way in which we lived our lives affected very few other people outside 
of our family, friends, and neighbours. This picture has changed quite dramatically, the way in 
which we live our lives today affects the lives of countless others. Our purchasing choices, our 
transportation choices, and many other lifestyle choices contribute to processes which effect 
people around the world. Changes in affluent diet fashions effect farming communities globally, 
emissions from cars contribute to global warming, as does international cargo shipping that 
distributes sweatshop made goods largely from developing to more affluent countries. Whereas 
only a century ago our lifestyle choices only affected those in our community and surrounding 
areas, our ability to have an impact on the lives of others has been totally transformed.268  
A consequence of our increasingly globalised world is the problem that many of the 
harms connected with this development have become normalised into our daily lives. They are a 
part of what we think of as the explanatory background, they are just a basic fact regarding the 
way the world is and participation is therefore not seen as anything surprising or out of the 
ordinary. Through globalisation and the normalisation of our participation in these harms, we fail 
to view them as shocking displays of injustice and immorality, they are just the norm. Sweatshops, 
for example, are just a part of the background conditions that are taken for granted in clothing 
manufacturing and not something to which we need to give particular attention when considering 
our clothing purchases.269 Many social structural harms are so widely established and accepted 
that they have reached the status of these background conditions, their existence is considered so 
normal it is not something that requires explanation or justification because it is not out of the 
ordinary. Since this has become the case, it is usually just accepted that clothes will be made in 
sweatshops, this is simply where they are produced. If asked, agents may very well condemn 
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sweatshops as harmful and support their abolition, but these sentiments rarely play a part in most 
agents’ decision-making processes regarding their purchasing habits. Agents are therefore aware 
of the harm associated with the products they purchase, but bear an inappropriate sensitivity to 
this harm.        
The suggestion that agents bear inappropriate sensitivity towards a harm suggests that 
there is a more appropriate sensitivity agents should hold instead. Whilst it is difficult to outline 
what specific attitudes agents should develop in various situations, we can make some general 
observations that point towards what a more objective view of morality might require of us 
concerning sweatshops. We can agree that causing others to suffer harm is, ceteris paribus, 
immoral. We can agree that knowingly contributing to harm is immoral. We can also agree that 
sweatshops are unsafe and unpleasant places for people to work, and that paying workers below 
subsistence wages and subjecting them to verbal and physical abuse are immoral practices. If we 
agree that causing harm is immoral, and that sweatshops cause harm, continuing to support 
sweatshop manufacturing in incompatible with our moral values. 
We can consider what the reaction would be if a clothing company were to openly set up 
sweatshops with these same wages and conditions in cities in affluent countries; people would 
object and be outraged that a company could act in such a way. Reaction to less severe cases of 
worker mistreatment and underpayment have provoked large backlashes in affluent countries. 
There is, it appears, quite an inconsistency in our reactions when it comes to what is thought to 
be acceptable in terms of domestic and international workers’ rights. Agents are far more 
complacent when it comes to international workers’ rights, and fail to be sensitive to the suffering 
their shopping supports, but justifying this lack of concern is quite difficult. If we were, for 
example, asked to justify our actions by some objective outside observers, it is difficult to see 
how we could maintain that we are morally conscientious individuals in the face of our apparent 
indifference to the quite inhumane treatment of our fellow human beings in this regard.270 
Apart from the problem of social structural harms becoming background conditions, 
agents also develop the wrong sensitivity to these harms due to their scale and the extent of the 
changes required to address the harms concerned. Social structural harms can appear 
overwhelming and our individual contributions insignificant. Avoiding participation would be 
difficult, and if we stop to consider how many of our everyday actions contribute to one large-
scale harm or another, it may seem that the actions we would have to take to address these harms 
and the personal costs to us would be huge, with no chance of making a discernible difference to 
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the collective harm despite our best efforts. Affluent agents also benefit greatly from the current 
social structure, and many people are enjoying a very high standard of living whilst the gap 
between the richest and poorest continues to grow. Pogge has argued that it is ‘convenient and 
common for wealthy citizens to ignore interdependencies of social institutions’271 and thus fail to 
make the connection between their consumer-driven lifestyles and the poverty of those producing 
the goods they buy. This can lead agents to view social structural harm as a problem, but not one 
for which they bear any personal responsibility.  
Bjornsson has argued that this wrong sensitivity amongst affluent agents concerning 
social structural harms is not inevitable, 
Given high enough normative expectations that people should avoid working for or 
purchase the goods of organizations that are responsible for certain bad outcomes, it will 
seem that a great many people without direct causal influence on these outcomes are 
nevertheless responsible for them.272   
When agents therefore recognise that their participation in social structures brings about these 
harms and realise that, as participants, they bear some responsibility for this, they can begin to 
address them. Where normative expectations are altered, agents can come to see their 
participation as more problematic than the fact that their individual ability to make a difference 
is so slight.  If participants throughout a social structure take seriously the moral implications of 
the effects of the structural process on individuals, participants and nonparticipants alike, these 
harms can avoid being seen as simply background conditions and unfortunate consequences of 
interactions for which no-one in particular bears responsibility.  
Whilst the scale of these harms is huge, agents still need to take the moral implications 
of their participation seriously. The difficulties agents in affluent countries face in addressing 
these harms are many, but those suffering the harms are in a far worse position and this needs to 
be taken into account. It may be easy for agents to develop the wrong sensitivity to these harms, 
but being overwhelmed or failing to recognise the seriousness of these harms is not a sufficient 
excuse for contributing to them. Continuing participation in social structural harms amongst the 
most affluent people in the world demonstrates a large-scale problem of agents having the wrong 
sensitivity to moral values.  
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v.! Problem of assumptions  
Making assumptions is an essential part of daily life, we need to make assumptions to be 
able to act in the world. We assume that other agents will act in a particular way, that they will 
follow social rules, do their jobs, and generally not act in a very unusual way. We do this all the 
time without thinking, we assume that other road users will follow the Highway Code, that our 
colleagues will turn up for work, that the shops will be open at their usual times and that our 
utility supplies will be working when we get home. These kinds of assumptions are important as 
they allow us to go about our daily lives without worrying constantly whether it will be safe to 
drive, whether the shops will open, or whether the lights will switch on when we need them. Of 
course, our assumptions can be wrong, there are power cuts, emergencies, and dangerous drivers. 
These, though, are not normal events, which is why they take us by surprise. Even when events 
fail to unfold as we expect, we usually believe that things will return to normal, we rarely rethink 
our assumptions as a result of one or even a few unexpected events.  Our wide ranging 
assumptions allow us to pursue our goals and engage in diverse activities, they provide a stable 
background against which we can plan our lives. Assumptions, therefore, are incredibly important 
to how we act in the world. 
Due to their central role in our daily reasoning, people can often fail to reflect on their 
importance and implications. However, as O’Neill has argued, although assumptions form much 
of the framework in which we act, we can often apply them rather inconsistently. 
[T]he assumptions on which activities are based remain in place: they cannot be assumed 
for action or in taking up attitudes or in supporting policies and relying on practices, but 
then denied when ethical questions arise.273 
We make assumptions which in turn dictate what we believe our responsibilities to be. Where our 
assumptions are incorrect or where we fail to apply them consistently, we can be mistaken 
regarding the responsibilities we bear towards others.  
Many assumptions appear innocuous; assuming that the trains will run and shops will be 
open do not seem to be morally problematic suppositions. However, some of our assumptions 
have more harmful repercussions. When we assume that other people will take up responsibility 
for a problem, assume that our harmful behaviour does not cause any serious harm to anyone, or 
assume that people in the future will discover a way to reverse the harm we have done to the 
environment and therefore fail to change our lifestyles, we are basing our actions on very 
problematic assumptions. Assumptions are even more problematic when we fail to keep them 
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consistent. When, for example, I buy an item of clothing, I assume that all the people involved in 
its production, from growing the raw materials, through the manufacturing to the item’s 
distribution, have done their jobs and that the finished item is fit for purpose. When I look for 
cheap items of clothing, ‘I presuppose the actions of those who make decisions to minimize costs 
of production, decisions like failing to equip garment factories with smoke detectors and 
sprinklers.’274 I assume that the retailers have cut costs during the process so that the finished item 
costs me less. 
It is unlikely, of course, that any agents go to the shops thinking that they would like to 
buy clothing where as many corners have been cut as possible, in terms of treatment of workers 
and care for the environment, so that they might have particularly cheap clothing. However, when 
an agent buys a t-shirt for £2.99 in a high street store or supermarket, there are a number of 
underlying assumptions regarding the manufacture of that item that allows it to be that cheap. 
Despite the minimal amount of pay the workers involved in producing the item clearly received, 
we still expect that item to be of a certain quality. If the garment fell apart after being worn once, 
or was poorly made, we would feel justified in complaining. We clearly assume that the workers 
are capable human being who are able to produce goods of an acceptable standard. O’Neill offers 
the similar example that,  
those who sell or buy coffee grown by foreigners in distant regions take for granted that 
coffee growers are intelligent and competent agents and subjects who can deliver an 
acceptable product and negotiate market relations, and would feel aggrieved and complain 
if the supermarket offered sub-standard coffee.275  
The problem with both of these examples is that we do not seem to necessarily have the 
corresponding assumption that the workers involved should be treated as capable people and 
reimbursed for their work accordingly. 
This inconsistency in assumptions regarding sweatshop workers is not only evident in 
consumer practices, businesses subcontracting to sweatshops for production often demonstrate a 
similar contradictory set of assumptions. One particularly interesting example can be seen in legal 
issues concerning factory operations. Arnold and Bowie discuss the fact that MNCs require the 
countries they operate in to have laws in place that protect their property and their rights regarding 
having contracts fulfilled, copyright upheld, and other similar requirements of running a 
profitable business. When any of these are breached, MNCs demand action from both local and 
international governing bodies that the law be upheld, otherwise they would be unable to trade 
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effectively. However, when it comes to the rights of sweatshop workers regarding hours, pay, and 
conditions, many MNCs have shown less interest in upholding the law.276  
For both consumers and businesses, the assumptions that are made usually lean in the 
agent’s favour. It is assumed that workers will do a good job and produce good quality products 
for us to use, but it is not assumed that we should bear any responsibility for the treatment of those 
same people. We benefit from their labour, but do not feel we should therefore be concerned about 
their situation. This, however, is an inconsistent and morally unacceptable position to take. As 
O’Neill argues, if we make assumptions for our benefit, we cannot deny them when they raise 
ethical questions. Unfortunately, this is something we do quite often. We do this ‘unjustifiably, 
but often advantageously’ by denying that the people we make assumptions about for our benefit 
have any ethical standing, by denying that we have a morally significant connection to them. 277 
This is to our own advantage because if we acknowledge that all those about whom we make 
assumptions in our daily lives require us to maintain those assumptions when it comes to 
questions or moral responsibilities, the ethical scope of many of our daily activities would be 
significantly altered. 
When considering the role of assumptions in our moral reasoning, we come back once 
again to the question of consistency. It appears that many of our everyday assumptions regarding 
our purchases are inconsistent, in that we are willing to make a great many assumptions regarding 
the capacities of other agents when it comes to providing us with the means to do what we want, 
but we are less willing to maintain these assumptions when it comes to questions of responsibility 
for any harm they suffer in the process. Consistency is an important part of our moral reasoning, 
however, and we usually require agents to act consistently when it comes to the treatment of 
others. We would normally reject the suggestion that an agent should be able to arbitrarily 
acknowledge the moral status of some agents over others and alter their acknowledgement of 
particular agents depending on how personally advantageous such an alteration might be. In order 
to take this aspect of our moral reasoning seriously agents about whom we make assumptions in 
order to pursue our own ends must also be taken into account when assessing our moral 
responsibilities. 
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vi.! Culpable ignorance  
The final point I shall discuss regarding agents’ attitudes and individual relationship to 
social structural harm is culpable ignorance. When an agent is ignorant of the nature of their 
actions for no blameworthy reason, such as being deliberately misled by another agent, then we 
can say that they were non-culpably ignorant of what they were doing, or the consequences of 
what they were doing. This kind of ignorance is ‘the pre-eminent example of an excuse that 
forestalls blame’.278 Where ignorance is genuinely not the agent’s fault, when they have been 
misled or could not have known that they were causing harm, we do not hold them morally 
responsible or blameworthy for their actions. On the other hand, an agent is said to be culpably 
ignorant when they are unaware of or misunderstand a situation through some faulty behaviour 
or reasoning on their part. Culpable ignorance can result from an agent failing to adequately 
investigate the situation or making deficient inferences from the information available to them, 
for example.279  
When assessing whether an agent is culpably or non-culpably ignorant of something, we 
can look to a number of considerations. We can consider whether anyone else has given them 
incorrect information, whether or not they should have trusted that person, whether the 
information regarding the harm is well known within the agent’s community, or how difficult it 
would be for the agent to discover the facts of the matter, to name a few. It is important to our 
moral analysis to establish both what the agent did know and what we think they should have 
known about the situation. What we think it reasonable that an agent should know plays an 
important role in our analysis, ignorance alone is taken as an insufficient excuse when we think 
an agent should have known what the consequences of their actions would be. 
If, for example, an agent drove whilst drunk, and on questioning maintained that they 
were unaware that doing so was illegal, we might find this excuse hard to believe. It is such 
common knowledge that drink driving is illegal that it seems remarkable that someone could 
reach adulthood and learn to drive without ever having come across this information. Suppose, 
however, that this individual maintains that she genuinely did not know, that no-one had ever told 
her this was the case, and she was completely unaware that driving whilst drunk was illegal. It is 
unlikely that we would see this as an adequate excuse and think her ignorance was blameless. If 
we believed that she was genuinely ignorant of the legality of her actions, we would think that 
this was due to a fault on her part. Driving is a dangerous activity, we expect those who wish to 
drive to learn the rules of the road. Information regarding these rules is easily and readily 
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available, they are well known within the community, and it would take very little effort on the 
part of the individual to find this information out. This being the case, any ignorance an agent has 
in this respect is blameworthy and culpable, it is due to their own morally faulty behaviour from 
failing to take adequate steps to find out basic information regarding the situation. 
Agents can be genuinely ignorant of the harm they cause and be non-culpable, for 
example in cases where they could not have known that their actions were harmful. During the 
early years of industrialisation, agents were not aware that some of their new factory emissions 
were causing damage to the environment.  Even when some individuals noticed that the smoke 
and alteration to the landscape were an eyesore, agents did not have the scientific understanding 
to be able to know the extent of the damage they were causing to the environment. In this kind of 
case, then, agents were non-culpably ignorant, as they did not know, and could not have known, 
the consequences of their actions.  
When it comes to social structural harms the problem of culpable ignorance is 
widespread. As we have seen so far, agents often fail to take the harm caused by social structures 
seriously, or as something in which they are personally involved. They develop the wrong 
sensitivity to the severity of these harms, and make inconsistent assumptions regarding those 
people that support their way of life. In the case of harm caused by the clothing industry, 
professions of ignorance regarding the existence of sweatshops and the methods used in the 
manufacturing of clothing are hard to justify. Whilst 30 years ago many people might have been 
unaware of the working conditions in sweatshops that were producing the cheap imports that they 
purchased, the same cannot be said of today’s consumers.  There has been so much coverage over 
the past couple of decades regarding these factories, so many campaigners, high profile exposés, 
magazine articles, documentaries, and films, that no capable agent could be unaware of the use 
of sweatshops in clothing manufacturing. This being the case, when agents profess to be unaware 
of the fact that the items they are purchasing are made in this way, it is unlikely that this lack of 
awareness is either genuine or blameless. 
If, however, an agent does maintain that they were unaware of the fact that most clothing 
is produced in sweatshops, we are faced with the problem of establishing how and why this is the 
case. One possibility is that the individual is not a fully capable agent, in which case we would 
not hold them morally responsible generally. But where this is not the case, there would be few 
circumstances in which their lack of knowledge could be non-culpable in this regard. Unless the 
agent has recently regained consciousness from a three-decade-long coma, or been kept in 
isolation and given inaccurate information about the world by a nefarious agent, we would think 
that their lack of knowledge was due to some faulty behaviour or reasoning. In order for an 
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individual to be unaware of information that is common knowledge, they would have to wilfully 
ignore all the readily available sources of information or fail to commit any reference to 
sweatshops to memory. 
It seems more likely, when considering sweatshop labour, that agents are aware that such 
practices exist and are widespread, but fail to appreciate, or acknowledge, that the specific items 
they are purchasing are made in this way. In which case, they are not so much ignorant of the 
situation, as unreflective, in that they could provide the correct information when asked to give it 
consideration, but do not take it into account in their daily lives. This still leaves them culpably 
ignorant that the specific items they buy are made in sweatshops, but provides some explanation 
as to how agents can appear unaware of facts that are so widely known throughout society.  
An alternative position might be to accept that many agents are non-culpably ignorant of 
the use of sweatshops, or unaware that their actions are contributing to the use of sweatshops in 
manufacturing. One reason could be an appeal to some of the problems with the relationship 
between individuals and social structures that I have discussed. It could be argued that in 
contemporary culture social structural harms are often normalised and underestimated by those 
involved in them. Since this is a cultural phenomenon, individuals cannot be blamed for enacting 
the values of their culture. This ‘cultural defence’ can be used as an excuse or justification. Both 
are problematic, but supporters of cultural defences usually pose them as excuses rather than 
justifications, thus attempting to excuse an agent’s responsibility in acting rather than attempting 
to justify ‘the normative quality of their conduct’.280 Thus it can be argued that an agent is affected 
by their culture in such a way as to be unable to act otherwise, rather than attempting to argue that 
the agent’s actions are actually acceptable. Whilst it is true that an agent’s culture has a powerful 
influence over their actions, shaping their desires and purposes in action, cultures are not static 
nor do they entirely dictate an agent’s actions.281 If this were the case, it would raise a number of 
questions regarding the capabilities of the agents involved.282 
Moody-Adams has argued against the use of culture as an excuse for ignorance of 
participation in harms for a number of reasons. She suggests that if we deny that an otherwise 
capable person has engaged in wrongdoing on these kinds of grounds, we are denying their 
humanity, as by doing so we fail to treat the individual as an independent agent.283 She also argues 
that talking about culture is just a theoretical shorthand, and that it becomes problematic when we 
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talk of culture as a cause for some behaviour or other. Cultures are not responsible for anything, 
the individuals who perpetuate a culture are the agents responsible for any actions,284 and agents 
often uncritically follow cultural norms and act to preserve the way of life with which they are 
familiar.285 This should not act as an excuse for an agent’s behaviour, however, as they still bear 
responsibility for their actions. The actions of others are not an excuse for an individual to act 
harmfully, this is true on an individual and collective level. Similarly, arguing that a social 
structural harm, such as the use of sweatshop labour, is culturally acceptable or excusable, and 
therefore that agents are not culpable for their ignorance of their role in the harm, is not an 
acceptable position if we wish to take the agency of those involved seriously. 
 
5.4 Harming Others through Social Structural Participation 
Thus far I have discussed the ways in which individual agents can misinterpret their 
relationship with social structural harms. In this section I turn to ways in which agents commonly 
deny that their actions are actually harmful. The denial of harm stems from the perception that, 
since individual contributions are so insignificant when compared to the vast harms caused by 
social structural processes, individual actions must be inconsequential and therefore not 
blameworthy. This line of reasoning, however, misses an important part of the nature of these 
harms. Whilst we need to look to the more general effects of social structural processes in order 
to measure their impact on the world, social structures only ultimately cause harm because of the 
actions of the agents of whom they are constituted. This is the main reason that understanding 
structural harm as the result of the actions of its members is so important. Without 
acknowledgement that individuals bring about social structural harms together, we would be left 
with social processes in which vast numbers of people participate but for which no-one is 
responsible. When we know, however, that agents are contributing to, and often benefitting from, 
these structures, it is clear that this position is an inaccurate account of their responsibilities and 
unfair to those who are harmed.  
In part i I outline the way in which participation in social structural harm is different from 
other forms of harm in which agents are involved. I then turn to two key problems concerning 
traditional attempts to analyse individual instances of participation in social structural harm, the 
fact that such harms are seen as imperceptible and/or unavoidable, in parts ii and iii.  
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i.! Social structural harm 
Before discussing the kinds of harms involved in contributing to social structures, it is 
important to discuss briefly what is meant here by harm and what we might call our common-
sense moral sensibilities regarding involvement in harm. We usually think someone is harmed 
when they have been injured or they have suffered what Feinberg describes as a ‘setback to 
interests’, where an agent’s ability to meet their needs or pursue their goals is impaired.286 There 
are a number of commonly held beliefs regarding the morally appropriate treatment of others 
which are typically thought to hold in direct interactions between agents. These include refraining 
from harm and treating others as you would like yourself to be treated. Whilst these are often held 
to be an important part of society and human interactions, when agents participate in larger social 
structures, the importance of these codes of conduct often diminishes.  
One reason for this is the problem of perceived distance between individuals involved in 
social structures, because the agents involved will never meet each other, let alone have personal 
relationships, and those involved will not directly experience the harms to which they contribute. 
The nature of the participatory actions also causes perceptual problems when assessing their harm. 
Each individual participating act, when considered in isolation, appears to make no difference to 
the social structure as a whole. As participating agents, people only experience social structures 
through these small participatory acts, and so they do not perceive their personal acts as harmful. 
Though an agent would not directly force someone to work in a sweatshop because they would 
view this as harmful and immoral behaviour on their part, they do not see participating in the 
perpetuation of sweatshops as harmful, because their purchases do not involve them personally 
harming any particular agent. 
Social structural harms can be difficult for us to analyse because of the impersonal nature 
of the harms involved. They are rarely experienced as straightforward, direct, interpersonal harms 
inflicted by one named perpetrator against one named victim.287 Instead, they result from huge 
numbers of small actions performed by many agents that contribute to incredibly complex causal 
chains. Consumer demand for cheap clothing has created and perpetuates the widespread use of 
sweatshop labour, but no consumers are building, or insisting that sweatshops be built. Instead, 
their consumer practices lead companies to compete to provide goods, and when the demand is 
for cheap products, companies cut costs in any way available to them. Although any one 
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individual agent changing their shopping habits would have no effect, when large numbers of 
consumers change their purchasing demands, companies alter their business accordingly. 
 
ii.! Imperceptible harms  
The first problem regarding the nature of individual harm in social structures is that most 
of the individual participation produces what we would think of as imperceptible harm. This is 
difficult for many accounts of moral responsibility to accommodate, as it is uncommon to hold 
people morally responsible and blameworthy for causing imperceptible harm. If no-one is 
measurably worse off because of an agent’s actions, it can be difficult to argue that an agent has 
actually done anything wrong on traditional responsibility accounts. The reluctance many people 
have with holding agents responsible for participation in social structural harm, then, is that it 
appears we are blaming individuals for causing harm when their participation does not harm 
anyone.288 However, this approach fails to understand the nature of social structures, whose harm 
is different from direct interpersonal instances of harm, because they are the result of a huge 
number of very small participatory acts which only cause harm when performed with many other 
fellow participants’ actions. This results in the analysis of participation in social structural harm 
requiring a different approach to other forms of harmful actions. 
In the case of social structural harms, an agent’s participatory actions cannot be assessed 
in the same way as direct interpersonal interactions. When agents directly interact, the assessment 
of whether either agent is harmed is easier to understand, we can single out those involved, the 
actions they performed, and the way in which one of them was harmed. In cases of social 
structural harm, however, ‘few or none of the agents who contribute to the causal chain can be 
singled out as responsible’ and therefore it is usually impossible for us to identify specific 
perpetrators of specific harms against specific victims.289 This is not just an epistemic problem, it 
is not the case that if we had a better means of measuring these contributions we would be able 
to identify which agents caused which harm, but the problem is rather that none of the individual 
contributions alone causes any harm.290 The important part of an analysis of structural harms is to 
recognise the importance of how agents’ actions combine and interact, and that in the collective 
                                                        
288 All participatory actions will of course cause some difference, but the problem is that these difference are usually 
likely to be too small to be classed as harm.  
289 Elizabeth Ashford, ‘The Inadequacy of our Traditional Conception of the Duties Imposed by Human Rights’, 
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 19 (2006), 217-235, (p. 218). 
290 Ibid. p. 224. 
143 
 
context of a social structure, we are not only assessing individual contributions, but how those 
contributions come together to cause harm. 
Although this poses a problem for many moral theories, it would be incorrect to suggest 
that this situation means that no-one causes harm and therefore that no-one is morally responsible. 
We can clearly identify that certain actions, when performed by many agents contributing to a 
large social structural process, result in often very grave harm to agents and the environment. 
Although each action in isolation might very well cause no harm, or harm that is imperceptible, 
these actions simply are not performed in isolation, but rather as part of a wider social process. 
Therefore when an agent buys a sweatshop produced item, they are not performing an isolatable 
action that has no wider implications. One particular action may not on its own cause harm, but 
as it is not performed on its own, that is not the way in which it should be analysed. We need to 
assess our actions in the contexts in which they are performed in order to get an accurate 
understanding of their moral import.291 
In order to better understand the importance of what we might think of as imperceptible 
harms, let us turn to an example provided by Parfit. He describes a group of ‘harmless tortures’, 
who, instead of each directly inflicting a large amount of pain on a specific individual, rig up a 
system allowing them to distribute the amount of pain they inflict across a group of victims. Doing 
so allows them to only inflict a minute amount of pain on any one individual, so small that none 
of them makes any individual victim’s pain perceptibly worse.292 Parfit argues that, were we to 
appeal to the idea that an agent has to perceptibly make someone worse off in order to be 
blameworthy, we would be unable to explain why what the tortures do is wrong, which is 
something we surely wish to be able to do. 
Even if none of them harms anyone, the torturers are clearly acting wrongly. If we cannot 
appeal to the effects of what each torturer does, we must appeal to what the torturers 
together do. Even if none of them causes any pain, they together impose great suffering 
on a thousand victims.293 
Appealing to what the agents do together is important in situations where agents are acting 
together in an organised way. This is because we miss an important aspect of the consequences 
of actions if we fail to take into account their context. If, instead of a group of torturers, an 
individual agent had attempted the same undertaking, it would be difficult for them to produce 
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such a system alone. If they still only contributed an imperceptible amount of harm to each victim, 
none of the victims would actually suffer any pain and there would in that case be no harm (at 
least in terms of torturing) caused.  
Considering the case of sweatshops, these simply could not be created, particularly on 
their current scale, without agent cooperation. A lot of agents are involved in the social processes 
that bring these kinds of harms about, we just cannot produce the same amount of damage 
working alone and in isolation, we would lack the means required to do so. Social structural harms 
cannot be performed alone. If, for example, an agent set up a sweatshop and forced agents to work 
there in terrible conditions, not because of market pressures but simply because they wanted to 
inflict this particular type of harm on someone, their actions would not form part of a social 
structural harm, but rather a direct interpersonal harm. Similarly, if an agent bought items from 
this factory directly, without any of the other structural causal chains and involvement of many 
other agents that we associate with structural harm, it would not be a social structural harm at all, 
but rather a direct interpersonal harm. Participations in social structural harms cannot be assessed 
in isolation because they are not isolated events, if they were, they would no longer be part of a 
social structural harm at all. The context of these imperceptible harms makes them the kind of 
harms they are, small but important participatory actions in large-scale harms that agents produce 
together. Their context is therefore more important than the individual harm they produce. 
 
iii.! Unavoidable harms  
The second problem when assessing individual participation in social structural harms is 
that agents’ participation appears to unavoidably cause harm. We commonly have reservations 
regarding blaming an agent for things that are genuinely unavoidable. The concern usually stems 
from the fact that an agent does not seem able to exercise their free will; when a harm is 
unavoidable they are unable to choose to not harm. We therefore appear to be blaming them for 
something that was beyond their control and act unfairly when doing so. There are a number of 
assumptions in this line of argument regarding the way in which participation in social structural 
harm is unavoidable, and what this means in terms of responsibility ascriptions, that require closer 
analysis. Distinctions and clarifications such as whether something is impractical or impossible, 
choosing the least worst action, and something being currently or necessarily unavoidable, are all 
important in understanding the morality of participation in social structural harms. 
In some cases, participation in social structural harm is practically impossible for agents 
to avoid. Our daily lives are governed by habitual participation in a range of social structures that 
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help us define our personal identity, provide a range of activities we take for granted, and provide 
the framework within which we live our lives. Given their importance, and the difficulty an agent 
would face in attempting to withdraw from these structures, it could be argued that holding agents 
morally responsible for social structural harms is unfair, they have no other realistic option but to 
participate. The unavoidability of participation, however, does not necessarily render it non-
blameworthy.  As Murphy has argued, whilst we continue to live in highly unequal and immoral 
societies, the burdens on individuals are much greater than they would be in an ideal moral 
society.294 In a perfect world it might be the case that agents would never be forced to choose 
between options that all result in harm, but instead always have the option to avoid involvement 
in harmful activities. This is not currently the case for us in the real world, however, and agents 
cannot pick and choose what their options are in a situation to enable them to always avoid causing 
harm. Given that harm is sometimes unavoidable, the question remains how we analyse an agent’s 
responsibility in relation to these kinds of situations. 
When we talk about ‘unavoidable harm’ we rarely mean impossible to avoid, but rather 
something along the lines of extremely difficult or implausible to expect someone to avoid. It 
would, for example, be extremely difficult for an agent to avoid all participation in economic 
activity, since doing so would make meeting one’s daily needs extraordinarily difficult. It would 
be practically impossible to avoid all participation in some form of government, as most of the 
world’s land mass is claimed by one government or another. Living within a states’ borders is 
usually taken as at least tacit consent to be a citizen of that country, with the result that one would 
need to abide by the country’s laws or face fines or imprisonment. Considering the extent to which 
social structures govern people’s everyday behaviour, it is infeasible for agents to completely 
withdraw from them, at least at this particular juncture.295 
When we are in a situation where we cannot avoid performing harmful actions, the best 
response would surely be to perform the action that results in the least harm. If causing harm is 
unavoidable, it seems that we still have a responsibility to try to mitigate the harm we cause, to 
try to avoid as much harm as we can. To argue that, since we cannot avoid harm, it is not 
something for which we should be held responsible, undermines our status as morally responsible 
agents. There are of course factors we can take into account regarding the extent to which an 
agent is responsible for being in that particular situation, whether they have helped bring about 
the harm or benefitted from it previously, for example. We also refrain from blaming people for 
their involvement in harm where it was genuinely unavoidable through no fault of their own, 
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where they would have avoided causing harm if it were possible, or where avoiding causing harm 
would put themselves in considerable danger. 
Consider the following example of a harms which is unavoidable and non-blameworthy. 
We could discover that humanity’s continued breathing is causing irreversible damage to the 
environment. Whilst this is a harm in which we would then be knowingly participating, expecting 
us to cease doing so, whilst not impossible, would be considered by most people to be expecting 
too much. Asking for the impossible from an agent undermines our blaming and praising 
practices. We intend these practices to effect behaviour, and so target them towards encouraging 
and discouraging behaviour in which we do or do not want agents to engage in accordingly. 
Blaming people for a harm that they are not deliberately bringing about and which they cannot 
avoid without grave personal sacrifice is both unfair and unreasonable. Cases of social structural 
harm are not like this. 
If we consider the use of sweatshop manufacturing, we can see that it is clearly not the 
case that avoiding the use of such factories is impossible. Some factories manage to implement 
ethical working, even mainstream clothing companies have shown that they can have a successful 
business model without resorting to such harmful activities, including well-known brands. For 
example ‘Levis Strauss, Motorola, and Mattel have expended considerable resources to ensure 
that employees in their global sourcing operations work in healthy and safe environment.’296 There 
are an increasing amount of alternatives to harmful participation, including ethical banking and 
fairly traded goods, which allow agents to move away from harmful engagement in so many 
social structural harms. There are a great many resources available to consumers with information 
regarding which companies have better ethical track-records than others, resources that are readily 
and easily accessible.297 It is also easy for consumers to join campaigns aimed at improving 
working conditions in sweatshops and in raising awareness of social structural harms.  
There is a further distinction that demonstrates that social structural harms are not 
unavoidable in the same way as the breathing example. Whilst it is often the case right now that 
participation in social structural harms is largely unavoidable, it is not necessarily the case that it 
should continue to be so. Once a large number of participants realise that they bear responsibility 
for the harms caused by their contributing actions, they can work towards changing the social 
structure to render it less, and eventually non-harmful. Although we could not expect agents to 
stop breathing, expecting agents to change their shopping habits or other non-essential lifestyle 
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consumption is quite different. This is because asking agents to dramatically change their 
lifestyles in order to avoid large-scale harm which affects huge numbers of people is both fair and 
achievable, particularly when those agents’ lifestyles have relied on and been brought about by 
the social structural harms in which they participate. 
One of the reasons that people find it difficult to avoid participation in so many harmful 
structures is because they accept them unreflectively as a part of their daily lives, lives which 
often benefit from the current social structure. Therefore any immediate actions will still be 
participatory involvement in harm, even actions aimed at changing the structure, which then 
leaves an agent unable to avoid participating in harm. This is not as unfair as it may at first appear, 
because the agent, as an ongoing participant, will already bear responsibility for their previous 
contributions.298 That is why leaving a social structure, apart from being impractical, is also 
undesirable. It would leave an agent less able to address the harms to which they have contributed. 
Until a social structure ceases to cause harm, those involved will continue to be participating in 
harm, but their blameworthiness will be less where their participatory actions are aimed at altering 
the social structure to make it non-harmful.  
Another consideration regarding responsibility in situations of unavoidable harm is 
discussed by Pogge, who argues that even in cases where harm is caused unavoidably, it may still 
be the case that those causing harm owe the harmed compensation. This will be the case when 
the agents involved have participated in social institutions which have harmed people in ways 
which are foreseeable, knowable, and avoidable through the alteration of their social 
institutions.299 Pogge observes how difficult it would be for most of us to give up our privileged 
positions to avoid further participation in harm, and suggests that our ability to support  NGOs 
like Oxfam and UNICEF can help make up for our participation in harm.300 Whilst I do not think 
that supporting such NGOs alone compensates for our participation in the way that Pogge seems 
to suggest, actively working towards structural reform will go some way towards helping an agent 
redress the harms in which they are involved. 
Participation in many social structures is not strictly unavoidable, for many it is more of 
a case of convenience rather than necessity. There are, of course, some members of society who 
are unable to avoid participation in harm due to their limited resources. Many people who are 
buying sweatshop produced items, however, are not in this position. Even when agents cannot 
feasibly avoid participation, they usually still bear responsibility for their participation due to their 
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relationship to the social structure. I have outlined some of the ways in which agents fail to 
recognise or appreciate their role in social structural harm, through developing the wrong 
sensitivity to the harm or failing to be motivated to take their contribution seriously. Even though 
agents may fail to appreciate their involvement in these harms, they still bear responsibility for 
them due to their participation which helps bring the harm about.  
 
5.5 Sweatshops and the Non-Worseness Claim 
The final consideration I shall discuss regarding individual contribution to harm caused 
through social structures is what has come to be called the non-worseness claim (NWC).  
Originally outlined by Wertheimer,301 it has become a common argument in support of the use of 
sweatshops. The suggestion is that sweatshops make people better off than they would be, despite 
their appalling working conditions, were the sweatshops not in operation. Therefore sweatshops 
cannot be said to be harmful and are not immoral. At first the basic premise of this position may 
seem to have a point, that making people better off cannot be blameworthy, but when applied to 
the case of sweatshops it quickly becomes clear that this is actually a very problematic claim. I 
shall begin by outlining the structure of this argument in part i. In part ii I argue that the extent of 
the unfairness of the interactions involved undermines the most basic values concerning the fair 
treatment of other agents and is at odds with common ideas regarding the avoidance of harm. I 
argue in parts iii-v that the key arguments of the NWC do not necessarily apply in the case of 
sweatshops, and in part vi I discuss the problem that some supporting arguments for sweatshops 
are based on a desire to avoid the issue of ‘dirty hands’ in addressing the harm these factories 
cause.   
 
i.! The non-worseness claim 
The non-worseness claim is the argument that agents are not harmed when they are left 
better off from an exchange than they would have been had the exchange not taken place. The 
argument rests on the claim that, when the agents involved have the choice of whether to interact, 
and both sides benefit more from the interaction than they would without the interaction, the 
interaction cannot be harmful: 
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The Non-worseness Claim: Interaction between A and B cannot be worse than non-
interaction when A has a right not to interact with B at all, and when the interaction is 
mutually advantageous, consensual, and free from negative externalities.302 
The agents who benefit more from the exchange are not harming the less well-off agents as both 
parties are better off than they would be if they had not interacted. The important aspects of the 
interaction that also render it non-exploitative are that the agents involved have a right not to 
interact, all parties participate willingly without duress, and that all parties benefit more with the 
interaction taking place. Supporters of the NWC argue that this position respects agent autonomy, 
allowing agents to exercise their own judgment regarding the interactions in which they wish to 
participate.303  
The NWC has been increasingly used to support the use of sweatshops and other 
interactions that many find exploitative and/or harmful. In the case of sweatshops, supporters of 
the NWC defence argue that people willingly take up employment in these places, knowing the 
risks and conditions involved. They choose to continue to work in sweatshops and they benefit 
from these jobs, as other employment options are often scarce and unemployment in countries 
without welfare systems would leave them much worse off. Zwolinski has gone as far as to argue 
that, given these conditions, we should view sweatshops as ‘on net, a good thing.’304 I do not 
disagree that people willingly accept work in sweatshops and that in many cases it does leave 
them better off than the alternative currently available to them. However, I do not agree that the 
perpetuation of sweatshops can be supported by appeals to the NWC. Agents may voluntarily 
choose to work in sweatshops, but this does not mean that such work is not exploitative, 
particularly when the agent has no other reasonable options. Unfairly benefitting from the plight 
of others also sets an unacceptably low moral standard, an agent may have a right not to interact, 
but this does not mean that when they choose to interact they can do so without as much concern 
for the morality of their interaction. Finally, it is also not clear that sweatshops do make people 
better off overall, as the effects of the international clothing trade and sweatshops on local 
economies is more complicated than supporters of the claim suggest. 
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ii.! The extent of the unfairness in clothing industry exchanges 
To begin a discussion of the harm or benefit that sweatshops bring about, some contextual 
information regarding the exchanges involved is required. At the beginning of this chapter I 
described the nature of sweatshops and the conditions faced by the individuals who work in them. 
Apart from issues of safety, hours, and worker’s rights, I noted that workers are paid incredibly 
low wages. Workers are often paid so little that they cannot meet their basic needs.305 The fact 
that workers’ wages are so incredibly low is problematic for many of the arguments used in 
support of sweatshop labour. The actual cost of addressing low pay, long hours, and health and 
safety concerns are incredibly small when contextualised against the profits of the companies 
involved in contracting with sweatshops and the expenditure of consumers of sweatshop-
produced goods. When we reflect on the extent of the unfairness involved in the use of sweatshop 
labour, and the ease with which those benefitting more from the exchange could drastically 
improve the exchange for the less well off (with minimal cost to themselves), appeals to the NWC 
as an acceptable standard of conduct for those involved is a pitifully low moral baseline.  
Consider a pair of trainers that retail for £50. Of that price, only around 1% will go to the 
individual who made them.306 If the wages of that individual were doubled, they would be left 
significantly better off whilst the company would suffer no significant losses. Even if companies 
shifted the entire burden of supporting increased wages in sweatshops onto consumers, a 1% rise 
in prices is unlikely to have a major impact on the number of trainers sold. Outlining the extent 
of the difference in the level of benefit each party receives helps bring home the extent to which 
workers are unfairly treated in these kinds of exchanges. Only an agent in quite a desperate 
position would accept these kinds of terms of interaction and allow others to benefit so much from 
their disadvantaged position. In direct interpersonal exchanges we are likely to see this kind of 
exchange as completely unfair. 
The NWC does not, however, take fairness into account, only whether the exchange is 
consensual and both agents end up better off. This is not how we necessarily view direct inter-
agent transactions, we expect agents to treat each other in a fair and morally appropriate way, and 
so it must be asked whether disregarding fairness in structural exchanges is any more acceptable 
than it would be in other situations. I suggest there is no good reason why this should be the case, 
morality requires agents to have respect for persons and treat them in at least a minimally decent 
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way. If treating an agent in a particular manner would be considered unfair in direct interpersonal 
interaction, treating an agent in that way through a structural exchange is equally unfair. 
The question of fairness is under-discussed in literature concerning sweatshops, the focus 
is firmly on the questions of benefit and exploitation.  This sets a very low moral standard for 
interactions. Consumers clearly benefit disproportionately in relation to sweatshop workers from 
the access to cheap clothing that these exchanges bring, as clothing companies do from the cheap 
labour. In order to interact responsibly, agents should not settle for the fact that sweatshops are 
the least worst option currently available to some workers. The suggestion that an exchange is 
morally acceptable so long as the agents involved are slightly better off than they would otherwise 
be, regardless of how unfair the exchange may be, is hard to justify. Interacting with other agents 
requires us to take seriously the way in which the interaction effects those involved.  
 
iii.! The right to not interact 
Apart from the NWC being somewhat incompatible with our common concerns for 
fairness when considering the existence of sweatshops, it is not at all clear that they actually 
satisfy the conditions for the NWC. The first condition for an exchange to satisfy the NWC is that 
the agents involved have a right to not interact with one another. Where there are no pre-existing 
duties, and the agent who benefits more has no obligation to engage in the exchange, that agent 
cannot be guilty of harm when they engage in unfair, but at least minimally mutually beneficial, 
exchanges. This, of course, assumes that the agents involved have the right not to interact and 
that no such duties exist between them, a claim that has been disputed in various ways.  
One such counterargument has been provided by Singer, who has argued extensively that 
we have duties to aid the global poor and disadvantaged which are based on moral obligations 
concerning beneficence.307 This duty of beneficence stems from a number of considerations, 
including charity, kindness, and our ability to help alleviate the plight of others. Where we have 
the means to help the needy, Singer argues that we should do so until we reach the point of 
marginal utility, where to give more would leave us worse off than those we wish to help.308 Even 
less extreme arguments for duties of beneficence still support to the idea that affluent agents have 
duties to the global needy generally, and that these will continue so long as we live in a world of 
such extreme inequality.309 Supporters of duties of beneficence would therefore reject the claim 
that the agents concerned necessarily have the right not to interact in sweatshop exchanges. It 
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may very well be the case that the more affluent agents involved have duties to aid those who are 
worse off, these duties would pre-exist the exchange and therefore undermine the NWC. 
Another argument for pre-existing duties between agents in the kinds of exchanges 
concerning sweatshops has been provided by those arguing for accounts of global justice. Pogge 
argues that affluent agents who benefit from unfair international institutions owe compensation 
to those agents who are disadvantaged by these institutions. 310 Caney argues that the demands of 
justice are globally applicable and that we therefore have obligations of justice towards everyone, 
regardless of considerations such as nationality.311 These duties of justice and compensation 
would again pre-exist any exchanges concerning sweatshops. Until international institutions are 
reformed to no longer disadvantage the world’s poor, affluent agents engaging in exchanges with 
less well-off others will most likely bear responsibility to compensate those disadvantaged or 
address institutional flaws, duties which would again undermine the NWC.    
Miller has presented an alternative to the above arguments, suggesting that all agents have 
a duty not to take advantage of those with whom they interact, and so affluent agents act 
immorally when they engage in the kind of unfair but minimally mutually advantageous 
exchanges concerning sweatshops.312 Thus whilst a supporter of the NWC may argue that an agent 
has the right not to employ people, and can choose to leave them worse off than sweatshop labour 
might make them, Miller’s suggestion is that as soon as an agent decides to get involved in this 
kind of interaction they are bound by moral rules concerning the treatment of others. These 
include the avoidance of harm and the importance of fairness. When an agent gains much at the 
expense of others, particularly others who are already disadvantaged and have little option but to 
participate in the interaction, such benefit is unfair and immoral.  
In order for agents to be in a position to have the right not to interact with one another, as 
required by the NWC, there would have to be no pre-existing duties between those involved. 
Given our current global institutional order and the extent of problems such as global poverty and 
disadvantage, it is difficult to support the idea that the affluent agents involved in exchanges 
concerning sweatshops will have no pre-existing duties to those with whom they wish to engage. 
Even where no pre-existing duties exist, it is not at all clear that this gives agents the right to take 
advantage of the plight of others, particularly if we are to uphold general responsibilities of respect 
for persons. The first condition of the NWC is therefore both difficult for agents to satisfy and 
morally problematic. 
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iv.! The benefit of sweatshops 
The second condition of the NWC is that the agents involved in an exchange must 
mutually benefit from the interaction. Supporters of sweatshops suggest that the alternative to this 
kind of employment is usually destitution. Therefore, even though the exchanges may seem 
unfair, affluent agents are not really doing anything wrong by benefitting so much more than the 
disadvantaged, they are saving these workers from a worse fate. That these exchanges are 
beneficial to the affluent is not in question, but the claim that they are beneficial to the 
disadvantaged is less straightforward than is usually assumed. Some of the most problematic 
assumptions regard the role of market forces and the idea that sweatshops are always beneficial 
to developing economies 
Some sweatshop supporters argue that they are beneficial to the disadvantaged because 
they pave the way for further development and improved standards of living. Maitland suggests 
that affluent individuals are not responsible for the level of worker income because markets will 
generate ethical wages over time.313 He seems to be guilty of the reification of ‘the market’ that 
was criticised by Young.314 If we treat market forces like forces of nature, independent of the 
individuals of which they are comprised, we fail to see those individuals as responsible for the 
damage the system causes. The assumption that ‘markets’ will eventually make people better off 
is problematic because it has not been very evident so far and also completely ignores the role 
played by agents in controlling global economic interactions. This is particularly hard to justify 
when we see the amount of interference that goes on in the ‘free market’, through the interventions 
of national governments and international organisations such as the IMF and World Bank. 
Governments in affluent countries have increasingly been involved in setting minimum wages 
and establishing worker rights to avoid the exploitation of their country’s workers, not leaving 
these aspects of their citizens’ lives to the mercy of global market forces. The assumption that 
market forces will work to the benefit of sweatshop employees seems implausible given the 
current nature of global social structures.  
Apart from arguing that markets will make sweatshops beneficial over time, supporters 
of sweatshops sometimes argue that maintaining current sweatshop conditions is beneficial 
because imposing higher moral standards on factories would lead to their closure, which in turn 
would make workers worse off and would therefore be more morally problematic than their 
continued use.315 There are several points that need separating out here. One concern is that 
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improving conditions will necessarily lead to job losses. Whilst this may be the case, it is not 
definite. Consumer demand for clothing will not disappear overnight and therefore these items 
will still need to be made by someone. The concern for factory closure also assumes that the cost 
of improving conditions would be so high that factories would no longer be able to keep the same 
size work force.316 But this claim rests on the further assumption that the cost would be great, and 
would have to be entirely supported by the factories which are unable to finance such change, 
both of which I have already cited as quite dubious claims.  
Assuming the status quo is beneficial to workers also presupposes that those who lose 
their jobs would necessarily be worse off, and that working in a sweatshop is better than 
unemployment in a country without a functioning welfare system. This, again, may currently be 
the case, but it is not certain that it is always necessarily the case. Part of the support for the 
continuing use of sweatshops in manufacturing is the assumption that they benefit developing 
economies through international investment.317 However, a major problem facing communities 
where large number of individuals work in sweatshops is that the wages of those individuals are 
so low, and the taxes paid by the international companies so small, that there is little wealth 
creation in the community. If a person does not earn enough to meet her most basic needs, then 
she will not be spending money in local businesses.318 Without a customer base, there is a lack of 
local investment or opportunities outside of sweatshops, meaning that they can effectively lead 
to stagnation in developing economies. Unless workers are able to earn enough to support 
themselves and their families, ideally with a little bit extra, they cannot spend their wages in local 
business which would create job opportunities in the community.  
Many of the assumptions regarding the benefits of sweatshops surround the idea that 
workers would be much worse off without them. Whilst this may currently often be the case, part 
of the reason for this is the existence of the sweatshops themselves. Sweatshop workers are caught 
in a vicious cycle where the general acceptance of sweatshops leads to their perpetuation, which 
at the same time stifles alternative employment opportunities in the communities in which they 
operate, so that agents in developing countries have a choice of sweatshop employment or 
destitution. So long as sweatshops continue to operate, agents in their vicinity will be benefitted 
by their employment opportunities insofar as they will cease to have any better options. In this 
way it is hard to argue that sweatshops really benefit those who are forced to work in them. 
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v.! Willing interaction and negative externalities 
The third condition required for exchanges to satisfy the requirements of the NWC is that 
each agent participates in the exchange without duress. Supporters of the NWC suggest that we 
should not interfere in an agent’s freely made decision to engage in interactions where this 
decision is taken without coercion. We should think other people’s decisions are ‘worthy of our 
respect’ when they demonstrate that agent’s exercise of their free will, regardless of whether or 
not we ‘disagree with the reasoning’ the agent employs.319 When agents seek to ban worker 
exploitation in sweatshops, they therefore fail to respect the autonomously made decisions of 
those who work there. Respecting agent autonomy is clearly very important, but this argument 
puts too much weight on the idea that sweatshop workers should be allowed to suffer because 
they have volunteered to do so. It does not take seriously the context in which those agents make 
that choice, context that would usually count as negative externalities. 
I agree that we may let a friend make what we see as a mistake because we respect her 
autonomy.320 This situation is quite different from the comparison being drawn, namely that of 
letting disadvantaged people allow others to exploit them in the name of allowing those 
disadvantaged people to exercise their autonomy. In that case the individual is not making what 
we might call an error of judgment, they are not making a bad career move or paying too much 
rent for what we think is an overpriced apartment. They are choosing the least worst option 
available to them, which is perfectly rational. The problem is not, therefore, that reforming 
sweatshops interferes with their exercise of free will, but rather that failing to do so leaves people 
at a disadvantage. 
The suggestions that we would not interfere in a friend’s life choices out of respect of her 
free will and autonomy is a poor comparison to the situation of most sweatshop workers.  A closer 
example would be circumstances where our friend’s available choices were dire, or where we 
believed that she was putting herself in danger. If, for example, a friend decided to turn to 
prostitution in order to avoid losing her home, failure to intervene would not demonstrate a respect 
for her autonomous choices, it would demonstrate a lack of concern for her wellbeing and a total 
failure to be a good friend. In this situation, helping the friend find a better solution and trying to 
open up alternative choices would be a better approach than allowing her to simply act 
autonomously without interference. 
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Sweatshop workers are choosing that employment because their other options are worse 
and usually include even more dire conditions and pay. They are not exercising faulty logic in 
choosing sweatshop employment. The problem lies in the fact that the options available to the 
agent are themselves unsatisfactory. A worker facing starvation is rational to choose exploitative 
work in order to survive.  It would be better for them to choose work that is dangerous and 
exhausting over destitution. Workers often also face pressure from having families to support, 
and once in employment are subject to psychological coercion which is rife in these factories,321 
making it difficult for them to leave, along with lacking the means and the time to find other work. 
Given the context in which agents are making the decision to take employment in sweatshops, it 
is doubtful that we can maintain that they choose this work without being driven by negative 
external factors. 
 
vi.! Sweatshops and exploitation 
The NWC is difficult to maintain in the case of sweatshops. The assumptions that agents 
have no pre-existing duties, that the exchanges are mutually beneficial, and that agents participate 
without duress are all questionable. I have so far argued that it is very likely that sweatshop 
workers are worse off overall as a consequence of their employment, even though they usually 
benefit in the short term in light of their immediate employment options. This still leaves open 
the question of whether disadvantaged agents in these exchanges are both harmed and exploited. 
The answer to this question is not straightforward and I am unable to give as much consideration 
as it is due here.322 I shall, however, make some brief observations regarding comments that have 
been made concerning exploitation that are pertinent to the case of sweatshops  
Meyers suggests that an interaction is exploitative when one party is ‘benefiting from 
[another’s] misfortune, and benefiting disproportionately to their contribution.’323 This definition 
would render most exchanges involving sweatshop employees as cases of exploitation. However, 
denials that agents can be exploited when they willingly choose to engage in such exchanges 
persist.324 The argument that such exchanges cannot count as exploitative often focus on the 
willing participation of all parties, willingness that I have argued is usually down to a lack of 
options. Another approach is an appeal to market forces. It has been suggested that in economic 
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exchanges, such as those concerning sweatshops, agent actions are largely dictated by market 
forces, and are therefore not exploitative in the same way as direct inter-personal exchanges.325 
The argument that market pressure drives people to exploit others does not make this 
exploitation morally permissible, if it did it would support practices universally held to be morally 
unacceptable, such as slavery.326 The idea that market forces remove some, or sometimes all, 
individual responsibility for harms caused in business transactions is not uncommon, such 
transactions are often thought to be in a different moral realm than personal interactions.327 Mayer, 
for example, suggests that when playing ‘a game or sporting event I may exploit my opponent’s 
weaknesses or mistakes without the taint of unfairness, as long as I play by the established 
rules.’328 He argues that market forces are very much like this, so when the demand for cheap 
clothing leads people to open sweatshops, no-one is acting unfairly or immorally.  
This line of reasoning is again problematic. Whilst exploiting weakness in a game is 
perfectly acceptable, the moral rules concerning the employment of other agents are different. 
Much more is at stake for those involved than in the case of games. Too often the exchanges 
involved in business contexts are thought of as more similar to those in a game rather than as 
exchanges and interactions concerning the lives of moral agents. When we consider what morality 
requires of us when participating in an exchange with other agents, such as in the case of 
sweatshops, ‘we should consider the basic needs of employees that employers can meet, even 
when the market does not require that they be met.’329 This is important if we wish to be consistent 
in our interactions with other agents, and to take seriously our moral obligations regarding the 
fair and respectful treatment of others. 
 
vii.! Problem of dirty hands 
The final problem for the attempt to justify sweatshop labour through the NWC is that 
there appears to be an underlying desire to avoid claims of responsibility that would require agents 
to make difficult decisions regarding the abolition of sweatshops. If affluent agents were to accept 
that they bore responsibility for the use of sweatshops, they would have to find a way to address 
the harm these factories cause. The use of sweatshop labour is extensive, and a great many people 
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would be affected by any changes implemented in order to make sweatshops into safe, reasonable 
places to work. Any such reforms, which in the long run will make people better off by securing 
their rights and ensuring they can meet their basic needs, risks making some people worse off in 
the short term. The fear of being accused of making anyone worse off, despite the wider profound 
benefits, suggests a reluctance amongst the affluent to get involved and risk getting morally ‘dirty 
hands’.  
The motivation behind the avoidance of dirty hands is that if we can avoid getting 
involved, even though we could improve people’s lot, we cannot be blamed for the harm any 
agents suffer as part of this process. It is, of course, a rather self-serving view to take of the 
situation on the part of the more affluent. The fear of improving general conditions because of the 
risk of making a minority worse off is difficult to support for the fact that, in a situation such as 
this, we can foresee that there is a risk of job losses and thus act to mitigate, or even avoid, this 
problem. A precedent has already been set in this regard in the steps taken by some companies to 
avoid association with the use of child labour in manufacturing.  
When a large number of child workers were found to be working in a South Asian 
sweatshop, they were promised payment to stay in school and guaranteed a job when they 
completed their studies by the international clothing company whose products were being 
produced in the factory by subcontractors.330 Ensuring the child workers stayed in school was 
important for the company’s image; association with child labour has been detrimental to several 
large multinational corporations, including Gap.331 Rather than simply turning the children away, 
making them financially worse off and potentially forcing them to take up even more harmful 
types of employment, the company took measures to ensure the children concerned were not made 
worse off by the loss of their jobs. The financial costs involved in implementing practices such 
as these are low, given the current wages paid in such factories, so that taking on the responsibility 
to help prevent child labour costs the company involved very little in terms of resources when 
compared to the damage that could have been done to the company’s image. Rather than denying 
responsibility, as has previously been the case for multinationals,332 some companies have made 
moves towards accepting responsibility for worker’s welfare and addressing it accordingly. 
That many workers choose to work in sweatshops and that they would be worse off were 
we to close all sweatshops tomorrow is no doubt true in most cases. Supporters of these factories 
are here offering a false dichotomy however, as closure or the status quo are not the only options 
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available to us. They also assume that the only way to address the harm of sweatshops is to shut 
them all and remove worker’s jobs, but addressing the harmful conditions and low pay involved 
does not require any sweatshops to be closed. Once sweatshops have been set up, the agents 
involved have responsibilities towards those employed in the factories, responsibilities that would 
be more difficult to discharge if the factories are all closed. The fact also remains that sweatshops 
exist because of the high demand for cheap clothing, a demand that will not disappear overnight. 
Whilst consumers continue to want to purchase clothing, there will be a need for garment factory 
workers. The question is how to make sure that those involved in the production are treated fairly 
and morally, particularly when they are in a disadvantaged position in terms of protecting 
themselves from exploitation. 
 
5.6 Conclusion  
Whilst the idea that we should hold individual agents responsible for social structural 
harm may at first seem implausible, by analysing the nature of these harms, how they come about 
and how individual agents participate in them, it becomes clear that in many cases individuals do 
bear responsibility for harms they help bring about with others. We currently face something of 
a perceptual stumbling block when faced with our participation in structural harm. It is easy for 
us to fall in with our contemporaries and participate in interactions which are often to our benefit. 
It is also easy to ignore the impact of our actions on others and the environment, because everyone 
else is involved in similar actions and our participation appears insignificant. Considerations 
regarding our motivations and sensitivity to our involvement are things we can put out of our 
minds in our daily lives quite easily, and our assumptions regarding the actions of others are 
things we rarely need to question. However, it is most often the case that we choose to ignore 
these harms rather than that we are in a state of genuine ignorance regarding them, our continued 
participation is therefore blameworthy. 
Considering the extent of the harm caused by social structures, it can seem plausible to 
us to reject our individual participation as harmless and unimportant. The harm we cause is 
infinitesimal, or its unavoidability seems to make it unfair to hold us accountable. However, we 
are so deeply involved in these harms through our previous and ongoing participation that we 
bear responsibility to address them. When we examine the case of the global clothing industry, 
simple everyday acts of participation help perpetuate great harms which affect huge numbers of 
agents, particularly in developing countries. This is a harm in which we are all involved in some 
way and for which we all hold some degree of responsibility, despite the fact that our individual 
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participation appears to make no discernible difference and would be all but impossible for us to 
avoid. It is also clear that arguments suggesting that sweatshops do not in fact make people worse 
off are difficult to support. 
Our responsibility stems from our involvement because social structural harms are 
collective in nature; they require the participation of a great many agents in order to come about. 
The same is true when it comes to addressing the harm they cause, it is the responsibility of 
everyone involved and it requires the involvement of all (or at least of many) of the participants 
in order to be able to change the social structural processes to render them harmless to participants 
and non-participants alike. Having argued that agents bear moral responsibility for their 
participation in social structural harms, we now face the question of what exactly such 
responsibility demands of us, and how we can best address it. I turn to these questions briefly in 
the final concluding chapter. 
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6: Taking up Responsibility for Social Structural Harm 
6.1 Introduction  
Participation in social structures has become part of our daily lives, but our willingness 
to take responsibility for the consequences of these actions has yet to catch up. Most people fail 
to recognise and accept the role they play in social structures and the harm these structures cause 
to others and to the environment. There are a number of reasons why we have found this 
problematic. Some are perceptual, the scale of the harm involved and the minute involvement we 
have in the overall structure make our responsibility difficult to comprehend. Some are 
motivational, we would have to significantly change our involvement in social structures in order 
to make our participation non-harmful to others. Some are based on our development of the wrong 
sensitivities and assumptions regarding our involvement.  
Whilst all of these have led to a reluctance to take up responsibility for our participation 
in large-scale harms, they do not excuse our behaviour. Agents can bear moral responsibility for 
a situation without themselves acknowledging this. So far I have discussed why agent 
participation brings with it responsibility for these social structural harms and some of the 
problems agents have concerning their relationship to social structures and the harm these cause. 
In this final chapter I will discuss what an expanded individualism requires of agents in order for 
them to take up their responsibility, and why such a position is likely to be controversial.  
The current harms caused by social structures are huge, and a great deal of effort will be 
required from most of those involved in the structural processes to make these structures non-
harmful. Depending on an agent’s position within the structure, and the nature of their 
participation, some agents will bear more responsibility for addressing these harms than others, 
but all participating agents will bear some responsibility both to redress the harms already caused 
and to ensure that future interactions are not harmful. In order to take up this responsibility, agents 
need to overcome the obstacles they face in understanding their relationship to social structures. 
They will need to develop more appropriate motivations and sensitivity regarding their 
participation, they will need to take seriously the harm that can be caused through participation 
in social structures, and work towards changing the nature of the interactions involved in order to 
stop perpetuating these harms. This will all be quite demanding, particularly in comparison to 
most agents’ current beliefs regarding their responsibilities regarding these harms. However, I 
argue that the extent of this demandingness is not as problematic as might be supposed.  
In section 6.2 I shall discuss the ways in which agents must begin to take up their 
responsibility for their participation in harm, beginning with developing a better understanding 
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of the way in which individual participation helps collectively bring about this harm, to changing 
their interactions within social structures and working with other participants towards social 
change. Expanding individualism to incorporate the harms agents bring about with others results 
in each individual participant bearing a lot more responsibility than most people currently believe 
to be the case. I therefore discuss the problem of the demandingness of this position in section 
6.3. In section 6.4 I conclude this thesis with a summary of my discussion and some suggestions 
of possible further implications for the development of this kind of individualism and other ways 
in which it can be an important framework to understand our moral responsibilities in an 
increasingly complicated world. 
 
6.2 Taking up Responsibility as a Participant  
I refer to an agent’s effort to address their involvement in social structural harm as ‘taking 
up responsibility’ for a number of reasons. Unlike direct interpersonal moral responsibilities, 
addressing participation in social structural harms almost certainly involves some effort on the 
part of the individual. An agent will usually need to change their behaviour, they will need to 
research where the products they purchase have come from and the circumstances under which 
they have been made. They will need to become involved in efforts to reform social structures in 
order to make them non-harmful. If in a position to do so, they may be required to compensate 
for past involvement in harm. Whatever action they take, they will need to take some action in 
order to address their participation. Taking up responsibility for social structural harm requires an 
agent to alter their daily interactions and participation in social structure. Since involvement in 
harm has become normalised into contemporary society, agents will have to work hard in order 
to change this. I shall therefore attempt to draw out some of the most pressing problems agents 
need to overcome in order to take up their moral responsibly for social structural harms. 
Taking up responsibility for participation in social structural harm is made more difficult 
than addressing other moral responsibilities because the harm is widely accepted as normal by 
most people. If an agent goes around stealing, lying, and injuring others directly, people are going 
to notice this behaviour and call into question the agent’s moral fibre. If, on the other hand, the 
agent is an extremely morally conscientious individual in their direct interactions with others, but 
continues to participate in harmful social structural exchanges such as buying sweatshop-made 
produce, it is unlikely anyone will think their behaviour morally questionable at all. Continuing 
participation in harm is therefore quite easy, it is already an accepted part of daily life and no-one 
is likely to criticise an agent for their involvement.  
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Responsibility for social structural harm is different from other forms of moral 
responsibility. It is collective, because social structures are necessarily collective, and so 
responsibility for the harms they cause is collective. As these harms are different from direct 
interpersonal harms, the way in which they must be addressed is also different. Only seeking to 
address the specific harm that an agent’s particular participation has caused is not possible 
because individual contributions are not isolatable in this way. Simply withdrawing will also not 
be sufficient in this instance. Withdrawing fully may not be an option, but even where it is, doing 
so will not redress the harm already caused. It may also place the agent in a position that makes 
taking up responsibility for harm already caused more difficult, as social structures have the 
capacity to provide agents with a greater range of opportunities to act than they could access 
acting in isolation. The first step in taking up responsibility for social structural harm , therefore, 
is to develop a more accurate understanding of the nature and implications of participating in 
harmful social structural activities.  
Although the amount of effort expanded individualism requires from each agent is small 
when we consider the amount of harm social structures produce, it still has big implications for 
the way in which agents should lead their lives. Some may therefore question whether continued 
involvement in social structures is desirable. Given the amount of change agents are required to 
undertake, it could be asked whether it would not just be easier for agents to do their best to 
simply withdraw from social structural participation. This approach, if it were possible, would 
only stop an agent participating in further harm. It would not address harms in which the agent 
has already participated. This approach also fails to take into account the importance of social 
structures in our lives. Even if it were possible for an agent to withdraw, the implications for that 
agent’s ability to fulfil their goals and for them to continue to have the kinds of social interaction 
to which they will have become accustomed would be huge.  
Establishing that an agent has participated in a large-scale harm and as a consequence 
bears some responsibility for that harm does not provide an agent with much information 
regarding how they are best to discharge that responsibility. When it comes to harms which are 
collectively brought about, it is important to remember that individual agents do not bear sole 
responsibility for redressing collective harms, but they do share in the responsibility with other 
participants. Individual agents cannot address social structural harms alone because the harms are 
produced on a large scale and involve a great many agents, acting alone would give an agent very 
little scope to tackle the problems involved. This raises the question of what actions an agent 
should take in order to address their responsibility for social structural harm.  
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Considering the harm caused by the global clothing industry, one suggestion might be 
that we simply boycott sweatshop produced items, thus ending our involvement in this particular 
social structure. This is a problematic approach for several reasons. Firstly, it would be very 
difficult for most of us to do this. Apart from the limited supply of fair-trade clothing, these items 
can be much more expensive than their chain-store equivalent, as fair-trade clothing companies 
currently lean towards more boutique high-end fashion. Secondly, the sudden withdrawal of 
custom would make huge numbers of sweatshop employees destitute without making any 
provisions for their support. Thirdly, sweatshop workers do not want to lose their jobs, what they 
want are jobs with fair pay and conditions. At the same time, we will continue to need and want 
clothes, so boycotting clothing manufacturers en masse does not serve either party particularly 
well.  
In order to ensure that those employed in sweatshops get fair treatment, consumers need 
to support and campaign for industry changes, through petitioning companies and supporting 
ethical initiatives. They also need to be prepared to make some changes to their interactions, 
through changes in their shopping habits, for example. The number of clothes and the amount we 
are prepared to pay for these items may, for instance, need to change. Some companies have 
started to move towards more ethical approaches to their supply chains, Marks and Spencer is a 
notable example of this.333 Purchasing from companies that are actually engaging in institutional 
reform helps support this change and also encourages other companies to follow suit. Simply 
boycotting social structures, then, is not the answer. Attempting to leave a social structure, apart 
from often being totally impractical, is an inappropriate response as it renders the agent less able 
to address the harms in which they have already been involved. Boycotting mass produced 
clothing would almost certainly be more harmful for workers than continued participation, and 
charities working with sweatshop employees argue that to simply stop buying clothes put workers 
at risk.334  
Attempting to leave a harmful social structure is an understandable response when faced 
with the realisation that participation perpetuates so much harm. But the desire to remove oneself 
from the situation demonstrates a continued narrow individualist view of the problem of social 
structural harm. Leaving would stop the individual agent’s involvement, but it would not address 
the wider problem. In order to understand what morality requires of individual participants in 
order to address these harms, agents need to shift their focus from their individual participation 
                                                        
333 Marks and Spencer’s ‘Plan A’ aims to transform their business into a fairer, more sustainable enterprise, with goals 
including paying worker a living wage and reducing the environmental damage caused in their manufacturing 
procedures. 
334 ‘Never Again’, War on Want. 
165 
 
to the wider patterns of participation in which they are involved. As Goodin suggests, the best 
way to do this ‘is to set up institutions to attend systematically to morally important demands that 
we individually can attend to only partially and imperfectly.’335 Agents need to discern the best 
collective approach to reforming social structures, working out the most effective collective 
strategy for change and then establishing the way in which individuals can act to bring this about.  
Shifting focus from the direct effects of a specific agent’s actions to considerations of 
how many actions will combine may seem difficult for an individual agent to achieve, but it is 
again important for participants to realise that they are not solely responsible for these 
interactions. Agents in different parts of a social structure will have more information regarding 
the way in which that structure operates than others. Considering the case of harms caused by the 
global fashion industry, agents working directly with sweatshop employees through charities or 
other NGOs have direct access to information regarding these harms and the ways in which 
workers are affected. Clothing companies and their suppliers and distributors are also better 
positioned within a structure to know what kind of actions need to be taken in order to make the 
structure of the industry non-harmful. These agents are able to make this information readily 
available to most participating agents, particularly with the increasingly widespread access to the 
internet. It is then the responsibility of agents to refer to this information before purchasing items. 
Consumers can also join campaigns and participate in other advocacy activities as recommended 
by those more closely involved in order to help change the interactions within the social structure. 
This does require agents to put some thought into how they participate with others in their daily 
lives, but the level of effort required is small when compared with the very great difference such 
actions would have on the suffering of others. 
One thing that should have hopefully become clear through this discussion is that in order 
to effectively address social structural harm agents need to work together with other participants. 
Just as these harms cannot be brought about by agents working in isolation, they cannot be 
redressed by the uncoordinated, unorganised effort of individuals. The ability of agents to 
improve social structural processes is increased through cooperation. A donation of £20, if given 
directly from one individual to another, can of course bring them some benefit. Combining that 
£20 with other donations to provide vital coordinated support services and institutional reform is, 
however, more likely to contribute to an agent’s long-term wellbeing. Taking up responsibility 
for social structural harm requires agents to think carefully about their participation in social 
                                                        
335 Robert E. Goodin, ‘Demandingness as a Virtue’, Journal of Ethics, 13 (2009), 1-13, (p. 11). 
166 
 
structures and to work constructively with others in order to reform these structures to make them 
beneficial for everyone. 
 
6.3 The Problem of Demandingness  
The literature on demandingness is vast, and it is deserving of far more attention than I 
am able to give it here. However, given the level of effort expanded individualism requires of 
individual agents, I will briefly address some of the concerns of demandingness that my 
discussion is likely to raise. Beginning with an explanation as to why my approach may appear 
overly demanding, I then turn to a discussion of the ways in which it does not actually ask as 
much of individuals as might be expected, and that complaints of demandingness are not 
necessarily damaging to an account if that account accurately reflects the harm in which an agent 
has been involved. Finally, I discuss the argument that demandingness should not be our primary 
focus when faced with the extreme moral problems that current social structures are perpetuating. 
An initial reaction to the idea of expanded individualism might be to simply reject a 
position that holds individuals responsible for social structural harms. Due to the nature of these 
harms and the difference that individual participants make to social structures, the obligations to 
redress harms in which an agent has participated, and the requirements to work towards the reform 
of structural processes which most people see as being beyond the concern of individuals, appears 
incredibly demanding. The minute, often indiscernible difference an individual’s participation 
makes to a social structural harm makes suggestions that such participation is blameworthy appear 
disproportionate and unfair. The inability of individual agents to alter these structures alone also 
makes such responsibility seem never-ending. There is no way for agents to fully discharge their 
moral responsibilities for participation in social structures. 
Another reason this position seems so demanding is that participation, as well as the harm 
it produces, has become a normalised part of our daily lives. In a different situation, we would 
see participation in large-scale harm as something more morally problematic, something to be 
avoided and redressed. For example, people would not accept the reintroduction of 
institutionalised slavery, as this is something that has become universally morally unacceptable. 
Yet due to the widespread acceptance of harmful social processes, many continue to participate 
in similarly harmful social structures, but fail to recognise their action as participation in harm. 
We are highly influenced by the opinions of others in our community when it comes to what we 
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think reasonable and demanding.336  Therefore when few people, if anyone, question our 
involvement in social structural harm, we see little reason to question it ourselves. This problem 
of perception is not in itself much of a criticism of expanded individualism, as I have argued 
before it is quite possible for agents to have moral responsibilities that they fail to acknowledge.  
Rejecting expanded individualism on the charge of over-demandingness overlooks an 
important consideration of the content of the requirements of addressing social structural harms. 
This approach does require agents to put more thought into their daily interactions with others 
through social interactions and participation in structural processes. However, due to the massive 
amount of inequality involved in many of these exchanges, the actual amount of sacrifice required 
of participating individuals is not necessarily that high. If we reflect on an earlier example 
regarding the cost of trainers and the amount a factory worker is paid per item, we can see that 
very small increases in retail costs, or slight reduction in profits, can have a profound effect.337 
Where agents can drastically improve the lives of others, particularly others who they have 
negatively effected through participation in large-scale harm, expecting agents to alter their 
involvement in structural processes to render these less harmful is quite reasonable. 
Since the responsibility for social structural harm stems from participating in bringing 
this harm about, that an account requires agents to redress the harms they have helped bring about 
is not itself demanding; it merely asks agents to take responsibility for their actions and the harm 
they have caused. As Goodin notes, ‘[i]f anything, we ought to be blaming people for not doing 
the right thing without moral nagging.’338 It has been common knowledge for some time, for 
instance, that the demand for cheap clothing drives the continued use of sweatshop labour. 
Although agents know this to be the case, discount clothing retailers continue to thrive. Of course 
some agents will shop in these stores due to their own financial hardships, but many more do so 
who have no such appeal to necessity.339 
Even if the demands of expanded individualism did require a lot of sacrifice on the part 
of more affluent participants in social structural harm, this in itself is not a sufficient reason to 
argue that the position is in some sense incorrect or misguided. This line of reasoning has been 
criticised by many, including Meyers who states that arguments suggesting that moral obligations 
which conflict with self-interest and profit are excessively demanding and therefore cannot be 
                                                        
336 Matthew Braddock, ‘Defusing the Demandingness Objection: Unreliable Intuitions’, Journal of Social Philosophy, 
44 (2013), 169-191, (p. 175). 
337 See chapter 5.5 (ii). 
338 Goodin, p. 2. 
339 There is a further problem with defending the manufacturing of sweatshop-produced goods to provide clothes for 
the poor, in that this merely deflects attention from the problem that some people in affluent countries lack the means 
to reasonably meet their basic needs without resorting to the exploitation of others.  
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required are completely unrealistic.340 It is not the case, when analysing an agent’s moral 
responsibilities, that we first decide what an agent thinks are reasonable expectations to which 
they are happy to be held, and then consequently work out what falls within that scope. We look 
to what an agent does and does not do in the world and how this measures up against what we 
think morality requires of them. In a world with huge amounts of inequality and international 
social structures which work to the advantage of the affluent, some agents will inevitably be 
required to do more to address these moral concerns than others.341 Meyers argues that many 
agents in affluent countries have demanding moral obligations concerning the global poor 
precisely because they are benefitting from their exploitation.342   
A further argument in support of maintaining that affluent agents bear demanding moral 
obligations towards the global poor is based on the fact that many people in the world are currently 
living in what can certainly be referred to as an emergency situation. Ashford has argued that, 
given the extent of suffering currently endured by the global poor, any ‘complaints of unfairness 
from the affluent are outweighed by the demands of those in dire need.’343 If we take morality 
seriously, and maintain the belief that all people should be treated in a morally acceptable way as 
equally important moral beings, the current state of the world will lead affluent agents to have 
drastically more demanding moral obligations than common sense morality might be thought to 
indicate.344 When we compare the standard of living of agents around the world, the extent of the 
inequality and suffering, and the limited redistribution of resources required to transform the lives 
of millions of disadvantaged people, complaints of demandingness from the affluent are very 
difficult to justify. Even if it were the case that affluent agents were not involved in bringing about 
much of this harm, there would still be a strong case for arguing that they would bear demanding 
moral obligations to alleviate the suffering of the global poor. 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
Throughout this thesis I have attempted to explain the moral import of an individual’s act 
when that act is an instance of participation in a harmful social structure. I began with a discussion 
of the emergence of social structural harm and the history of the collective responsibility debate. 
I suggested that previous attempts to make accurate responsibility ascriptions in cases of social 
structural harm have fallen short, leaving responsibility for the harm caused underdetermined. 
                                                        
340 Meyers ‘Wrongful Beneficence’, p. 330. 
341 See Murphy. 
342 Meyers ‘Moral Duty’, p. 625. 
343 Elizabeth Ashford, ‘Utilitarianism, Integrity, and Partiality’, Journal of Philosophy, 97 (2000), 421-439, (p. 434). 
344 Elizabeth Ashford ‘The Demandingness of Scanlon’s Contractualism’, Ethics, 113 (2003), 273-302, (p. 275). 
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Arguing that collectivist approaches to large-scale harms are inadequate because those 
participating in social structures cannot satisfy the criteria for responsibility-bearing groups that 
these accounts require, I turned to an attempt to provide an individualist account of responsibility 
for social structural harm presented by Young. I argued that there are many interesting ideas in 
her work that support an account of collective responsibility in these situations, but that her 
specific attempt to develop a new kind of non-moral responsibility for participation in social 
structural harm ultimately failed. I therefore examined an alternative account of joint 
responsibility based on agent motivation and attitude presented by Bjornsson, who focusses on 
the reasons why agents become so deeply involved and complicit in social structural harm. 
Through the development of Bjornsson’s discussion of the importance of agent motivation and 
participation in harmful practices, and Young’s analysis of the relationship between individual 
agents and social structural harm, I suggested an alternative approach to previous accounts, 
namely expanded individualism. I analysed the ways in which agents come to be involved in these 
harms in a blameworthy manner, and why individuals bear responsibility to address the harms 
caused by the social structures in which they participate. Finally, I outlined what taking up this 
responsibility requires of individuals, as well as briefly discussing possible objections based on 
demandingness. 
I have focussed on agent participation in the clothing industry to illustrate the kinds of 
participatory actions for which an expanded individualism holds agents morally responsible. This 
is of course only one of many social structures in which so many of us participate. Embracing an 
expanded individualism would help in the analysis of other social structural harms in which we 
are involved. Contributions to global warming through the ongoing widespread use of fossil fuels, 
for example, is a major source of harm in the world that philosophers have often found difficult 
to analyse in terms of individual responsibility ascriptions. Many theorists have rejected the idea 
that this problem can be analysed collectively, but then struggle to account for it within a standard 
individualist framework.345 The participatory actions produce too little pollution to make a 
measurable difference, but holding agents responsible without identifying those actions which are 
harmful is open to criticisms of unfairness.  
By offering an alternative approach to analysis of large-scale harm, I hope to have 
provided some groundwork for an account which is able to explain responsibility ascriptions for 
social structural harms and empower agents to take up this responsibility through coordinated 
efforts to reform those structures in which we all participate. Through drawing attention to the 
role we all play in perpetuating these harms, I hope to make acceptance of moral responsibility 
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for them easier to grasp, grounding this responsibility in our daily participation. In this way, the 
moral obligations we all bear to ensure that social processes are fair and beneficial for all will not 
continue to be seen as the responsibility of more powerful or distant others, but a responsibility 
that all we bear in virtue of the interdependent lives we lead. 
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